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Choice of Law in the United States
by
GREGORY E. SMITH*
Perhaps no legal subject has caused more consternation and confu-
sion among the bench and bar than choice of law.1 Much of the bewil-
derment is attributable to the fact that the modern choice of law era did
not begin until approximately 1963.2 Since then, courts have struggled
mightily to come to grips with various modern choice of law theories put
forth by conflicts scholars. The decisions in any given jurisdiction are
often decidedly, perhaps wildly, inconsistent. Added to this is the fact
that published conflicts decisions are quite rare. Although conflicts cases
arise at the trial level fairly often, many years may pass before a court of
last resort is called upon to resolve a difficult choice of law problem. 3
Thus, confounded judges are left to grapple with a smattering of irrecon-
cilable and sometimes incomprehensive precedents. It is no small won-
der that many judges have dreaded seeing choice of law cases on their
dockets.
There are approximately a half-dozen separate choice of law theo-
* Member, Michigan Bar. B.S. 1983, Defiance College; J.D. 1986, The University of
Toledo Law School.
1. "Choice of law" is the phrase generally used to describe that branch of the subject of
conflict of laws which deals with the processes by which courts select the substantive law
governing particular cases. The term "conflict of laws" is often used synonymously with
"choice of law," and will be so used in this Article. Literally, however, the former term is
broader than the latter, and includes within its domain such topics as domicile, establishment
of jurisdiction, and enforcement of judgments. Choice of law describes only the process courts
use to determine the applicable law in a case which concerns more than one jurisdiction.
2. As Professor Sedler has pointed out, 1963 was a watershed year for choice of law in
theory and in practice. In that year, the late great Professor Brainerd Currie's writings were
collected in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). Also in that
year, Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals wrote the opinion in the most famous of
all choice of law cases, Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963). See Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response
to the "New Critics," 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983).
3. In New York, for example, there was not a single choice of law decision in the court
of appeals during the thirteen-year span between Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286
N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) and Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480
N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985). In the interim between these two decisions, each of the
seven seats on the court of appeals changed hands at least once.
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ties currently in use. Nevertheless, courts have shown a distinct inability
to distinguish them. Courts often say they are using one theory when
their opinions clearly show that they are using another. At other times,
courts utilize any number of choice of law methodologies in order to
reach the desired results, apparently reasoning that twenty conflicts
scholars cannot be wrong. This process, known as eclecticism, makes it
extremely difficult to sort out the precedents.4
Unfortunately, the complexity of a legal concept is often directly
proportional to its practical importance. Choice of law is no exception.
The choice of law decision may determine the success or failure of a
lawsuit, the amount of damages recoverable, or the legality of a defense
raised. It is essential, therefore, that judges and lawyers be able to sort
out the various choice of law theories and to determine which rules gov-
ern in their respective jurisdictions.
To aid in this determination, this Article catalogues and analyzes all
of the significant choice of law decisions handed down in the modern era
and, when appropriate, provides forecasts of which theories are likely to
prevail in particular jurisdictions in the future. The Article begins with a
brief introduction to the choice of law problem, including a description
of the various choice of law theories currently in vogue, and then pro-
ceeds to make a comprehensive survey of the choice of law methods cur-
rently used in the fifty states and the District of Columbia. 5
4. Professor Reppy, in his wonderful article, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid
Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REv. 645 (1983), identifies seven "types of eclecticism"
used by the courts. They are: (I) "methodless ad hoc decisionmaking" - the judge decides
which party he wants to win and writes an opinion to match; (2) "pure better law in dis-
guise"--the judge makes his choice of law decision on the basis of which substantive law he
likes better, but disguises his method by referring to more policy-blind considerations; (3)
"confused lower court or federal court judge"-conflicting precedents create confused deci-
sions; (4) "kitchen sink" - the judge purposely utilizes all available choice of law theories and
gives each theory one "vote" toward his selection decision; (5) "odd-numbered mishmash" -
differs from the "kitchen sink" only in that not all available theories are given "votes"; (6)
"blend of coffee" - using a second choice of law method to resolve a conflict left unresolved
after application of the primary method; and (7) "uninformed judge" - the judge doesn't
know what he is doing because he is incapable of recognizing the characteristics which distin-
guish one modem choice of law theory from another. Id. at 651-55.
5. The inspiration for this project was provided by Herma Hill Kay in her leading arti-
cle, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521 (1983). Pro-
fessor Kay was interested in determining precisely in what manner the theories developed by
her academic colleagues were being applied in the courts. Her emphasis was on the judicial
development and utilization of choice of law theory. My focus is instead on the courts them-
selves: What exactly have the courts of any given jurisdiction done in regard to choice of law,
and where are they likely to go in the future?
[Vol. 38
CHOICE OF LAW
I. Choice of Law Systems
A. First Restatement
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 6 historically the primary refer-
ence for choice of law decisions in the United States, requires in each
case the application of the law of the geographical place where the key
event occurred by which plaintiff became possessed of a cause of action.
This key event, in the case of a tort, is the place where the defendant
allegedly committed the wrong.7 The place of wrong, in turn, is the
place where the last event necessary to create the defendant's liability
occurred.8 Ordinarily, this last event is the plaintiff's injury. For this
reason, the place of wrong rule is often renamed, as is done here, the
place of injury rule.
The First Restatement also provides an all-encompassing rule for
choice of law in contract cases. Under that rule, the validity and con-
struction of a contract will be determined with reference to the law of the
place of making, 9 where "the principal event necessary to make a con-
tract occurs."10 Issues concerning the sufficiency of performance under a
contract are governed not by the place of making, but by the law of the
place where performance is to occur.1 In the great majority of cases, the
place of making and the place of performance are within the same juris-
diction. In cases where they are not, however, the court's characteriza-
tion of the issue as one of validity or performance of the contract
becomes crucial in the choice of law process.' 2
The courts did not question the appropriateness of these broad rules
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter First Restatement].
7. See id. §§ 377-397.
8. See id. § 377.
9. See id. §§ 311-347.
10. Id. § 311 comment d.
11. Id. §§ 355-372.
12. Indeed, one of the criticisms of the First Restatement's contract rules is that a court
may avoid the application of the law called for by the rule through the expedient of
recharacterizing an issue of contractual validity as one of performance, or vice versa. In con-
flicts parlance, this is known as an "escape device," an exercise in creative verbiage by which a
court makes an a priori decision as to which law it will apply, and then defines the issue in such
a way as to lead to the desired result. Another escape device is the familiar substantive/
procedural dichotomy, under which issues relating to the merits of the case are determined via
the normal choice of law process, but issues which can be presented as relating merely to
procedure are governed by the law of the forum. Another frequently used escape device is a
refusal, based on the forum's public policy, to apply the foreign law which would otherwise
obtain by operation of the state's choice of law system. This escape device is basically a subter-
fuge for applying a governmental interest analysis approach and thereby serving the felt needs
of the forum.
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until the 1945 case of W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 13 in which the Indiana
Supreme Court adopted a "significant contacts" test to determine the
applicable law in contract cases. Then, in the 1954 case of Auten v. Au-
ten, 14 the New York Court of Appeals espoused the center of gravity
approach, which, though similar to that used by the Indiana court, put
somewhat more emphasis on the policies behind the competing laws.
The choice of law revolution, however, did not take hold until 1963,
when the famous New York guest statute case of Babcock v. Jackson 15
was decided.
In the years since Babcock, use of the First Restatement approach
has steadily declined. This system of broad, single-contact, policy-blind
rules, which was almost universally accepted as gospel a quarter of a
century ago, is now the law of fewer than half the states. In many of
these states, the courts have not recently had a chance to replace the old
rules, and might well be inclined to do so at the next opportunity. 16
B. Second Restatement
Even before the seminal decision in Babcock, the American Law In-
stitute (ALl) had begun a project designed to forge a new choice of law
system. The project was completed in 1971 when the "most significant
relationship" test was finally approved by a thirteen to twelve vote of the
ALI's choice of law council. This test, incorporated in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws,17 requires a court to apply the law of that
state which has the closest relationship to the parties and issues involved,
taking into consideration a number of general principles collected in sec-
tion 6.18 In addition, the Second Restatement suggests specific contact
points which should be taken into account in applying the principles of
13. 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).
14. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
15. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
16. Several recent cases, however, have affirmed the rules of the First Restatement in
various contexts. See, e.g., Paul v. NationalLife, 352 S.E.2d 550, 555-56 (W. Va. 1986); Beth-
lehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas and Co., 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985); Jacobsen v.
Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985); General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95, 311 S.E.2d 460
(1984); Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969) [hereinafter Second
Restatement].
18. The Second Restatement provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of
its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applica-
ble rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
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section 6. The relevant contact points for tort are listed in section 14519
and for contract in section 188.20 As an added feature, the drafters in-
cluded a number of presumptive references which point the court to the
law of a specific jurisdiction unless, with respect to any given issue, an-
other state has a more significant relationship to the issues and the par-
ties than does the state presumptively chosen. 21 Finally, with regard to
contracts, the drafters added an element of flexibility to the system by
providing, in section 187,22 a mechanism for upholding, in most cases,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6.
19. Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue.
Id. § 145(2).
20. In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the con-
tacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law
applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue.
Id. § 188(2).
21. One such presumptive reference, for example, provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particu-
lar issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied.
Id. § 146.
22. Section 187 provides:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have re-
solved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not
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contractual choice of law provisions selected by the parties themselves.
The Second Restatement is the most popular of the modem choice
of law theories, having been adopted in toto by thirteen states, and in part
by several others.2 3
The Second Restatement has considerable merit as a flexible mixture
of the current thinking on choice of law. Certainly it is far superior to the
First Restatement's single-contact, policy-blind rules. Its fatal flaw, how-
ever, is its complexity. The basic theory behind the Second Restatement
is that a court is supposed to make its decision on the basis of the interest
and policy factors listed in section 6, and is to use the contact factors in
sections 145 and 188 only as indicia of which states are sufficiently impli-
cated that their interests should be considered in the ultimate choice of
law decision governed by section 6.
Unfortunately, the system is almost never applied in this way.
Courts that purport to follow the Second Restatement generally engage
in a contact-counting exercise, with-the Second Restatement relegated to
the status of a guide for determining which particular contacts are gener-
ally relevant to the choice of law inquiry. In short, sections 145 and 188
are being used as ends in themselves, rather than as starting points for
the choice of law decision, which ultimately should be governed by the
principles identified in section 6. Those who drafted the Second Restate-
ment were, for the most part, advocates of the governmental interest
analysis, which is subsequently described. Paradoxically, the substantial
success of the Second Restatement has undercut the vitality of the true
interest analysis, a theory which has floundered somewhat in the courts
since the ALI adopted the Second Restatement.
C. Center of Gravity Test
Closely related to the most significant relationship test is the so-
called grouping of contacts or center of gravity test. The oldest of the
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless
either (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the trans-
action and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (b) application
of the laws of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of
the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
Id. § 187.
23. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Ohio, Nebraska, Texas, and Washington have adopted the Second Restatement for use
in both tort and contract. Alaska, Florida, and Oklahoma have adopted § 145 for use in tort
cases. Conversely, Delaware, Kentucky, and New Hampshire have adopted the Second Re-
statement in contract but not in tort.
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modem choice of law theories, it authorizes the court to look at all of the
significant factors which might logically influence it in deciding which
law to apply, and to choose the law of the state that has the greatest
contacts with the case. Its virtue and its vice lie in its almost infinite
flexibility.
The center of the gravity approach was, for many years, virtually
the exclusive province of the New York Court of Appeals. The New
York courts no longer follow the theory, but some other courts do.24
Additionally, it is applied surreptitiously by many courts purporting to
apply the Second Restatement.
D. Interest Analysis
Beginning in the fifties, a new choice of law theory, articulated by
Professor Brainerd Currie of Duke University, came into vogue.2 5 This
theory has come to be known as the "governmental interest analysis," or
simply, "interest analysis" theory of choice of law. The principal pur-
pose of interest analysis theory is to ensure that the law which is applied
in the majority of cases will be one whose application in a particular
context will serve the purposes for which that law was created. The pro-
cess begins by identifying the specific law in each state touching upon the
disputed legal issue. Next, the court must determine the precise policies
which the respective laws were designed to augment. Finally, the court
examines each jurisdiction's factual relationship with the litigation and
determines whether or not the application of a particular state's law
would be consistent with the purposes identified as supporting that law.
Once the court has completed this three-step technique, the actual
choice of law decision is routine. If application of neither law would
serve the purposes behind that law, the case is an unprovided-for case
and the court should apply its own law for the mere sake of convenience.
If application of one law would further the purposes behind that law, but
application of the other law would not serve a purpose, the choice is easy:
the court should apply the former law. This is known as a false conflict.
Finally, if the case is such that application of either law would serve the
purposes behind that law, a true conflict is presented and the court is left
with several options as to how to resolve it. It can proceed as Currie
24. The North Dakota Supreme Court is especially fond of this "contacts" theory. It has
adopted it for use in both tort and contract and has managed to keep its approach distinct
from that of the Second Restatement. In addition, Indiana continues to adhere to its Barber
precedent, and Pennsylvania has followed an eclectic approach to contract cases which can
properly be classified as a center of gravity method. The District of Columbia and New Jersey
also follow this approach in contract cases.
25. Professor Currie's writings are collected in B. CURRIE, supra note 2.
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originally suggested and apply the forum's law;26 it can sharpen its analy-
sis and determine whether "a more moderate and restrained interpreta-
tion" of the forum law will show that its application is unnecessary for
the fulfillment of the purpose behind the law;27 it can apply the law of the
state whose interests would be most impaired by not having its law ap-
plied;28 or, it can simply use one of the other choice of law theories as a
true conflict tie breaker.29
The virtue of the interest analysis theory lies in its sensitivity to the
substantive aspects of the laws being considered. It is not a jurisdiction-
selecting tool but a law-selecting tool. It makes the choice of law painless
in many situations by rejecting the application of a given law only if ap-
plying that law would fail to further the legislature's purposes in enacting
it. The primary difficulty with the theory, however, has been its histori-
cal failure to deal with the resolution of true conflicts: what is to be
done when the purposes behind either law would be served by its applica-
tion? As it has been suggested, there is no one satisfactory answer to this
question. Additionally, the theory is quite manipulable. A court can al-
ter the result in many cases merely by identifying alternative governmen-
tal interests or by describing alternative purposes for the creation of one
law. Finally, interest analysis, especially in the pure form advocated by
Professor Currie, is heavily forum-favoring in operation: the categories
of true conflicts and unprovided-for cases will constitute a substantial
percentage of the total number of cases encountered by a court. In each
of these categories Currie favors application of forum law.30
E. Leflar
The last of the major theories is that propounded by Professor Rob-
26. See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE L.J.
171, 178.
27. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757
(1963). If, after taking this second look, the court remains convinced that the forum's govern-
mental interests are implicated, as would likely occur in most cases, then the court should
apply forum law.
28. This is the so-called "comparative impairment" approach advocated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215 (1976).
29. Oregon, for instance, has adopted interest analysis, but its courts use the Second Re-
statement approach to resolve true conflicts. See Casey v. Manson Constr. and Eng'g Co., 247
Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
30. California, Louisiana, and Oregon have adopted interest analysis for use in both con-
tract and tort. The District of Columbia and New Jersey apply this method in tort only. New
York courts use interest analysis in contract cases.
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ert Leflar in a 1966 law review article,31 in which he undertook to cap-
sulize those factors that had influenced courts in their choice of law
analyses. He articulated the following five factors: (1) predictability of
result, (2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3) simplifi-
cation of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's governmental
interests and, by far the most controversial factor, (5) application of the
better rule of law. The Leflar factors have proven to be exceedingly flexi-
ble in practice, often allowing a court to apply a law which could not be
selected under any other modern theory, but which, for any number of
reasons, might provide an appropriate rule of decision in a particular
case. Unfortunately, the theory is plagued by excessive forum-favorit-
ism. The third and fourth factors will almost never point to the applica-
tion of foreign law.32 Moreover, the fifth factor also points to forum law
in the great majority of cases, since judges rarely consider their state's
own laws to be inferior to those of another state. A final problem with
the Leflar test is that the first three factors are totally irrelevant in tort
cases and tend to be ignored by judges. This further heightens the signifi-
cance of the incredibly pro-forum fourth factor and the highly subjective
fifth factor. Several states, however, have found this system to their
liking.33
F. Cavers, Fuld's Rules, and Lex Fori
The remaining choice of law systems have been relegated to minor
roles in the courts. Pennsylvania appears to have adopted for tort con-
fficts a system of ready-made rules formulated by Professor David
Cavers. 34 The system is known as the principles of preference system,
and embodies seven such principles, the first two of which are most com-
monly encountered. 35 To date, the Pennsylvania courts have utilized
31. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv.
267, 282 (1966).
32. In nearly every case, these two factors will either point to application of forum law or
be neutral. It is hard to imagine how the judicial task could be simplified by requiring the
court to resort to foreign law as the rule of decision. Equally as unusual will be the case in
which applying a foreign law advances the governmental interests of the forum. But see
Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252 N.W.2d 360 (1977), an odd case in which the court
held that applying Illinois law would further Wisconsin's governmental interests.
33. Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are the leading proponents of the Leflar approach.
A few other states utilize the Leflar factors in tort only.
34. See generally D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965).
35. The first two principles outlined by Professor Cavers are as follows:
1. Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard of conduct or
of financial protection against injury than do the laws of the state where the person
causing the injury has acted or had his home, the laws of the state of injury should
determine the standard and the protection applicable to the case, at least where the
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only the second of these principles, but they have done so three times.36
It remains to be seen whether these rules, designed to take into account
both governmental interests and party expectations, will find favor in fu-
ture cases.
Related to Professor Cavers' principles are the rules first announced
by Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals in a concurring opin-
ion in Tooker v. Lopez,37 and adopted by the full court three years later in
Neumeier v. Kuehner.38 Judge Fuld's rules were designed exclusively for
application in guest statute cases, but have recently been extended by the
court of appeals and adopted for use in tort cases generally.39 Like Pro-
fessor Cavers' principles of preference, Judge Fuld's rules emphasize gov-
ernmental interests and party expectations. Although these two systems
are admirable, each suffers from the same defect: it is simply impossible
to design choice of law rules that will reach all of the myriad conflicts
situations that arise. Although expertly drafted, these systems are neces-
sarily incomplete.
Finally, what is perhaps the most obvious choice of law approach of
all has been adopted for use only in tort cases in Kentucky and Michi-
gan. Under this approach, the court simply eschews choice of law en-
tirely and applies the law of the forum.40 This approach, entitled lex fori,
is to be distinguished from the more common situation where a court
simply fails to recognize a conflicts problem and instinctively applies lo-
cal law.
II. Survey of Choice Of Law
The following is a state-by-state survey of the choice of law rules in
practice.
person injured was not so related to the person causing the injury that the question
should be relegated to the law governing the relationship.
2. Where the liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted and caused an
injury set a lower standard of conduct or of financial protection than do the laws of
the home state of the person suffering the injury, the laws of the state of conduct and
injury should determine the standard of conduct or protection applicable to the case,
at least where the person injured was not so related to the person causing the injury
that the question should be relegated to the law governing the relationship.
Id. at 138, 146.
36. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970); Levin v. Desert Palaces,
Inc., 318 Pa. Super. 606, 465 A.2d 1019 (1983); Kabo v. Summa Corp., 523 F. Supp. 1326
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
37. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
38. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
39. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90
(1985).
40. See infra notes 195-200, 247-56 and accompanying text.
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Alabama
Alabama follows the traditional First Restatement choice of law
rule in tort cases, referring to the place where the injury occurred. In
1980, the Alabama Supreme Court described the arguments against the
traditional rule as "compelling," and hinted that a change was in the
wind.4 1 Four years later, however, the court, without dissent, dismissed
a suit by an injured worker against two co-employees, on the theory of
lex loci delicti.42 Most recently, in Powell v. Sappington,43 the supreme
court held that lex loci delicti required the application of Georgia law,
forbidding a suit against a co-employee, even though the plaintiff, injured
in Georgia, had elected to receive worker's compensation benefits in his
home state of Alabama, which permits co-employee suits.
A federal district court sitting in diversity has recently described the
rule of lex loci delicti as "well settled" in Alabama. 4
Research reveals no Alabama cases involving choice of law in con-
tract actions. The First Restatement rules would probably govern here
as well.
Alaska
Alaska follows the Second Restatement in tort cases. In 1985, the
Alaska Supreme Court utilized sections 145 and 146 of the Second Re-
statement to determine that Alaska's more liberal law of damages for
products liability would govern in a wrongful death suit. The suit was
41. In Bodnar v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 392 So. 2d 1161 (Ala. 1980), the court stated as
follows: "Some of the arguments advanced by the scholars and some courts in adopting a
more flexible conflict of laws rule are compelling and may well find favor in this jurisdiction in
the proper case, but the case before us is not such a case." Id. at 1163.
42. Norris v Taylor, 460 So. 2d 151 (Ala. 1984). The opinion contains no indication that
the court contemplates departure from the traditional rule:
It is well settled that the traditional conflict rule of lex loci delicti applies to tort
actions brought in this jurisdiction. Bodnar v PiperAircraft Corp., 392 So. 2d 1161
(Ala. 1981). Under this principle, an Alabama court will determine the substantive
rights of an injured party according to the law of the state where the injury occurred.
Id. at 152. A separate concurrence was no less resolute: "The applicable law is the law of the
state where the injury occurred. We have not adopted the 'significant interests' rule; nor do I
contend for the adoption of this minority view." Id. at 153 (Jones, J., concurring). See Spen-
cer v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 292 Ala. 582, 586, 298 So. 2d 20, 22 (1984); Ex parte
Zepernick, 259 Ala. 493, 496, 66 So. 2d 757, 759 (1953); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Chandler,
487 So. 2d 937, 939 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
43. 495 So. 2d 569, 570 (Ala. 1986). Three dissentors argued that once the injured em-
ployee had made his decision to receive compensation under the Alabama workers' compensa-
tion act, the act, including the provision permitting the injured worker to sue a co-employee,
should have been applied in its entirety. The dissenters did not question the applicability of lex
loci delicti generally, however. Id. at 570-72 (Jones, J., dissenting).
44. Thomas v FMC Corp., 610 F. Supp 912, 913 (M.D. Ala. 1985).
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brought by a Florida resident on behalf of her husband, an air taxi pilot
who was killed in a plane crash in Barrow, Alaska, while flying for his
Alaska employer.45 Prior to that case, the state's highest court had de-
parted from lex loci delicti on only one occasion, when it held that the
question of interspousal immunity from tort action would be governed by
the place of marital domicile rather than the situs of the injury.46 That
decision expressly left open the possibility that Alaska might adopt a
modem choice of law theory.47
There have been no contractual choice of law cases in Alaska since
statehood, perhaps due to the state's isolation and its infrequency of con-
tacts with the lower forty-eight states. Presumably, the place of making
rule governs.
Arizona
Arizona is one of the most consistent adherents to the Second Re-
statement approach to choice of law. The break with the past began in
1968, when Arizona became the first state to adopt the new section 379
(now section 145) in tort cases. 48 The Arizona Supreme Court actually
applied section 309g (now section 169) as the rule of decision in that
case, holding that the place of marital domicile governs the question of
interspousal immunity. The Arizona courts have had numerous other
opportunities to apply the Second Restatement in tort cases, and they
have done so unhesitatingly.4 9
45. Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446, 453 (Alaska 1985).
46. Armstrong v Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699, 701 (Alaska 1968).
47. The court stated:
In deciding not to adopt the choice-of-law rule that the place of the wrong governs
interspousal immunities and liabilities in tort actions we find it unnecessary at this
time to decide whether or not we will adopt the Babcock v. Jackson criterion for
determination of choice-of-law questions arising out of tortious conduct.
Id. at 703.
48. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 565, 447 P.2d 254, 257 (1968). The court held:
Cognizant of the fact that we are charting paths through a developing area of the
law, we have felt it necessary to make the foregoing extensive examination of the
competing choice-of-law theories... [T]he contacts theory offers the brightest pros-
pects for a rational yet flexible approach to choice-of-law problems. Accordingly, we
adopt the contacts theory, as embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws as the rule for Arizona.
49. The most recent case in the Arizona Supreme Court was Bryant v. Silverman, 146
Ariz. 41, 703 P.2d 1190 (1985), which involved plaintiffs from Arizona, New Mexico, and
Texas; a defendant airline headquartered in Phoenix; and an airplane crash in Durango, Colo-
rado. In a dutiful, seven-page analysis under § 145 and § 146, the court opted for the Arizona
law allowing unlimited recovery for wrongful death, rather than the Colorado law, which
limited recovery for wrongful death and prohibited an award of punitive damages. Other cases
utilizing the Second Restatement in tort include: Wendelken v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 455,
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An Arizona appellate court, without discussion, used the Second
Restatement approach in determining the law governing an insurer's
right, under an insurance contract, to intervene in a suit against the in-
sured.50 In a breach of contract case, the appellate court relied upon
sections 6 and 188, applying Arizona's statute permitting the award of
attorney's fees against the breaching Wisconsin defendant.5 1 Given the
state supreme court's consistent resort to the Second Restatement in tort
cases, there is no reason to doubt that the court will find occasion to
adopt the principles of section 188 in contract cases as well.
Arkansas
The dawn of the modem era in Arkansas was Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's
Pie Co.,52 which involved a suit by Arkansas residents against a Penn-
sylvania corporation for injuries caused primarily by the negligence of its
employee truck driver in an accident on an interstate freeway in Mis-
souri. In that case, the Arkansas Supreme Court abandoned the place of
the wrong rule53 and used Arkansas' rule of comparative negligence,
rather than Missouri's law of contributory negligence. The court cited
Leflar's choice-influencing considerations and also relied upon three out-
of-state cases 54 which discussed the Leflar approach approvingly.
Although the opinion did not expressly adopt any choice of law theory, it
appeared to rely on the last two Leflar factors-advancement of the fo-
rum's governmental interests and application of the better law.55 This is
457, 671 P.2d 896, 898 (1983); Ambrose v. Illinois-California Express, Inc., 151 Ariz. 527,
529-30, 729 P.2d 331, 333-34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Gordon v. Kramer, 124 Ariz. 442, 443,
604 P.2d 1153, 1154 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); King & Johnson Rental Equip. Co. v. Superior
Court, 123 Ariz. 276, 278, 599 P.2d 232, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Moore v. Montes, 22 Ariz.
App. 562, 529 P.2d 716 (1974).
50. McGough v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 143 Ariz. 26, 31 n.4, 691 P.2d 738, 743 n.4
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
51. See Aries v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 735 P.2d 1373, 1380-81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
52. 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977).
53. The principal pre-Wallis "place of injury" decisions were Bell Trans. Co. v.
Morehead, 246 Ark. 170, 174, 437 S.W.2d 234, 237 (1969) and McGinty v. Ballentine Pro-
duce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 537, 408 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1966).
54. Wallis, 261 Ark. at 628, 550 S.W. 2d at 456 (citing Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509
(Miss. 1968); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968); Clark v. Clark, 107
N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966)).
55. The Wallis court stated as follows:
This State's governmental interest in its citizens is best served by application of our
comparative fault statute rather than Missouri's contributory negligence law. As ex-
pressed in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1968) [sic], probably the
truest governmental interest the forum has is "in the fair and efficient administration
of justice," and in our opinion application of our statute better achieves that result.
The decided trend is away from the harsh results which occur in the application of
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consistent with the approach of other states utilizing Leflar's method.
The Arkansas Supreme Court's adoption of Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations was clear by 1978.56 An Eighth Circuit panel recently
relied on the Leflar factors in a strict liability case.57
In a 1987 guest statute case, the court utilized the five Leflar factors
once again in holding that Arkansas' "archaic and unfair" guest statute
would not be permitted to deny recovery in tort to a Tennessee plaintiff
who was injured in Arkansas, when her Arkansas friend lost control of
the car in which they were riding.58 Not only was Tennessee's law better,
but application of the Arkansas guest statute would not have advanced
the forum's governmental interests since the statute had been repealed
two years after the accident.
In contrast to its commitment to Leflar in tort cases, the Arkansas
Supreme Court has been anything but consistent in contract cases. The
cases have proceeded along either of two lines. The first line of decisions,
characterized by the Babcock era case of Cooper v. Cherokee Village De-
velopment Co. ,59 feature the traditional rule, looking to the place of mak-
ing and the place of performance, with an emphasis on intention
validation. 60 A second line of decisions, beginning with Standard Leas-
ing Corp. v. Schmidt Aviation, Inc.,61 follow a center of gravity or most
the contributory negligence rule of law. Approximately 35 jurisdictions, including
Pennsylvania, the home state of appellant corporation, have now enacted compara-
tive negligence statutes in some form.
261 Ark. at 632, 550 S.W.2d at 458.
56. See Williams v. Carr, 263 Ark. 326, 333, 565 S.W.2d 400, 403-04 (1978).
57. Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Williams v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1984) (purporting to follow Williams v.
Carr, but in fact using a contact-counting approach).
58. See Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 334, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987).
59. 236 Ark. 37, 364 S.W.2d 158 (1963). The Cooper court found that New York law
controlled regardless of whether one looked to the place of making, the place of performance,
or the contractual choice of law clause expressing intentions of the parties. Cases following the
Cooper approach to choice of law include Stacy v. St. Charles Custom Kitchens, 284 Ark. 441,
443, 683 S.W.2d 225, 226 (1985); Grogg v. Colley Home Center, Inc., 283 Ark. 120, 122-23,
671 S.W.2d 733, 734 (1984); Snow v. CIT Corp., 278 Ark. 554, 557, 647 S.W.2d 465, 467
(1983); and Ladd v. Ladd, 265 Ark. 725, 731, 580 S.W.2d 696, 699 (1979).
60. In Grogg v. Colley Home Center, Inc., 283 Ark. 120, 123, 671 S.W.2d 733, 734
(1984), for example, the court stated:
In Cooper we noted that in determining what law governs the validity of a multistate
contract we had on different occasions applied three different theories: 1) the law
where the contract was made; 2) the law where the contract was to be performed in
its most essential features; and 3) the law of the state which the parties intended to
govern the contract. We noted, too, in Cooper a consistent preference for the law of
the state that would make the contract valid rather than void.
61. 264 Ark. 851, 576 S.W.2d 181 (1979). The case held that Arkansas law governed a
lease agreement despite the fact that the lease provided that Tennessee law would govern.
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significant contacts approach without citation to the Second Restate-
ment. Until recently, it appeared that the Standard Leasing view would
prevail, but two recent supreme court cases have relied exclusively on
Cooper.62 The Arkansas rule is now most accurately characterized as the
traditional place of making rule. As has been the case in some other
Leflar states, the Arkansas courts have so far failed to extend the better
law approach to contract cases.
Federal courts sitting in diversity have been unsurprisingly per-
plexed by the oscillations and variations of Arkansas' high court in con-
tract cases. Some have relied on Cooper,63 others on Standard Leasing.64
The trend in the state courts, however, appears to be toward recognizing
that Arkansas remains a place of making state in contractual conflict
cases.
California
More than any other state, California represents "pure Currie." In-
terest analysis has been the chosen method of resolving conflicts cases in
the Golden State since Reich v. Purcell65 was decided two decades ago.
That case involved a suit by an Ohio plaintiff against a California defend-
ant over an accident that occurred in Missouri. Justice Traynor evalu-
ated the relevant governmental interests of three concerned states, and
found that Ohio law, allowing unlimited recovery in actions for wrongful
death, controlled. Ohio therefore was interested in providing full com-
pensation to its injured citizens; California's law allowing unlimited re-
covery demonstrated that it had no interest in shielding its resident
defendant from liability; Missouri's law, limiting damages in such cases
With scant analysis and no citations, the court reasoned that "the principal significant contacts
occurred in Arkansas." Id. at 855, 576 S.W.2d at 184. Cases following this center of gravity
approach include McMillen v. Winona Nat'l & Say. Bank, 279 Ark. 16, 18, 648 S.W.2d 460,
462 (1983) ("The principal significant contracts [sic] were in Minnesota") and Tri-State
Equip. Co. v. Tedder, 272 Ark. 408, 409-10, 614 S.W.2d 938, 939-40 (1981) (relying exclu-
sively on Standard Leasing).
62. Stacy v. St. Charles Custom Kitchens, 284 Ark. 441, 683 S.W.2d 225 (1985); Grogg
v. Colley Home Center, Inc., 283 Ark. 120, 671 S.W.2d 733 (1984).
63. See Bice Constr. Co. v. CIT Corp., 27 Bankr. 543, 548 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd, 700
F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1983); Wilkins v. M & H Fin., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 212, 219 (E.D. Ark. 1979),
aff'd, 621 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1980). Both cases carefully considered and then rejected the
argument that Standard Leasing had overruled Cooper.
64. See Tiffany Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Grain Bin Co., 714 F.2d 799, 801 (8th Cir.
1983); Roofing & Sheet Metal Serv., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 995
(I th Cir. 1982) (transferred from Western District of Arkansas to Southern District of Ala-
bama); Bell v. Kansas City Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (W.D. Ark,
1985); Snow v. Admiral Ins. Co., 612 F. Supp. 206, 209 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
65. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
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to $25,000, sought to protect its own tortfeasors from excessive financial
burdens, but this interest did not extend to the nonresident defendant.
The case, therefore, presented a classic false conflict, and the laws of
Ohio, the only interested state, were applied.
The next major California case was Hurtado v. Superior Court.66
Hurtado was an unprovided-for case. Both defendants were California
residents and the fatal automobile accident occurred there. Plaintiff's
decedent, however, was a Mexican domiciliary, and Mexico imposed se-
vere limits on the amount recoverable in a suit for wrongful death. The
California Supreme Court upheld the trial court's pretrial ruling that
California law, allowing unlimited recovery, would govern. Mexico had
no interest in protecting an American national from excessive liability.
At the same time, California had no governmental interest in compensat-
ing a Mexican widow and her family. True to its selected theory, the
court opted for forum law, not because California had any overriding
governmental interests, but simply because there was no reason to dis-
place the presumption of lex fori.
The first true conflict arose in the famous dram shop case of Bern-
hard v. Harrah's Club.67 There, the defendant, a Nevada casino, served
intoxicants to a visiting California couple after the couple had reached "a
point of obvious intoxication rendering them incapable of safely driving a
car."' 68 On the way home and shortly after crossing back into California,
the couple drifted over the center median, causing an accident which
severely injured Bernhard, a passing motorcyclist and resident of
California.
Bernhard sued the casino on a common law theory of dram shop
liability. California was clearly interested in ensuring full compensation
for its injured citizen. Nevada, however, was also an interested jurisdic-
tion: it had purposely refrained from enacting dram shop legislation in
order to protect its vital casino and nightclub industry. The true conflict
was resolved, not by the Currie method of presumptive lex fori, but ac-
cording to a concept known as comparative impairment, 69 by which a
court evaluates each state's interest and determines "which state's inter-
est would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy
of the other state."' 70 Using this analysis, the court noted that the de-
66. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
67. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
68. Id. at 315, 546 P.2d at 720, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
69. The phrase was first used by Professor Baxter, in Choice of Law and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8-22 (1963).
70. Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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fendant had advertised heavily in California and, therefore, "by the
course of its chosen commercial practice ha[d] put itself at the heart of
California's regulatory interest, namely to prevent tavern keepers from
selling alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated persons who are
likely to act in California in the intoxicated state." 71 California's interest
would, therefore, be every bit as impaired by excepting Harrah's Club
from California's rule of dram shop liability as by excepting a tavern in
San Jose or Placentia. Conversely, Nevada's interests were not as acute.
Although the state attempted to protect casinos and taverns from mone-
tary liability, it by no means condoned the defendant's actions in this
case. In fact, it was a criminal violation in Nevada to serve liquor to an
intoxicated person.72 Accordingly, California law was applied and the
trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was reversed.73
California courts have applied Currie's interest analysis not only in
tort,7 4 but elsewhere as well. Less than sixty days after its decision in
Reich, the California Supreme Court applied interest analysis to find Cal-
ifornia law applicable to separate questions of agency and contract law.75
Lower courts have even extended interest analysis to the traditionally
procedural context of statute of limitations conflicts. 76
California's devotion to interest analysis has not been lost on federal
71. Id. at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
72. Id. (citing NEv. REV. STAT. § 202.100 (repealed)).
73. Comparative impairment was used again in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978). The court highlighted as a true
conflict resolution factor the degree to which each state was committed to the soundness of its
law. It found that California's "key employee" statute, allowing corporations to recover for
harm done to certain employees, was "unusual and outmoded," Id. at 168, 583 P.2d at 728,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 874, and rarely enforced by California courts. On that basis, it refused to
apply California law.
74. See Zimmerman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 179 Cal. App. 3d 840, 224 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1986)
(applying Oklahoma law and refusing to allow bad faith suit against insurer by one not a party
to the insurance contract); Nicolet, Inc. v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 7, 224 Cal. Rptr.
408 (applying California rule allowing recovery of punitive damages in bad faith tort claim
against insurer), vacated, Cal.3d, 719 P.2d 987, 227 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1986); Hernandez v. Bur-
ger, 102 Cal. App. 3d 795, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980) (a strange decision applying Mexico's
$2,000 limit on personal injury damages in favor of a California defendant); Cable v. Sahara
Tahoe Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 384, 155 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1979) (distinguishing Bernhard and
refusing to impose dram shop liability on Nevada casino); Kelley v. Von Kuznick, 18 Cal.
App. 3d 805, 96 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1971) (refusing to apply New Mexico guest statute to bar suit
between Californians injured in New Mexico car accident).
75. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 7, 13-14, 434
P.2d 992, 996, 64 Cal. Rptr. 440, 444 (1967).
76. See North Am. Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 902, 906-07, 225
Cal. Rptr. 877, 881 (1986); see also American Bank of Commerce v. Corondoni, 169 Cal. App.
3d 368, 373, 215 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334 (1985); Ashland Chem. Co. v. Provence, 129 Cal. App. 3d
790, 794, 181 Cal. Rptr. 340, 341 (1982).
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courts sitting within the state. These too have applied the Currie method
without exception. 77
Colorado
Colorado is a leading proponent of the Second Restatement ap-
proach to conflict of laws. In First National Bank v. Rostek,78 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court announced that it would apply the Second
Restatement prospectively. 79 Rostek was a guest statute case involving
an airplane crash in South Dakota that killed a Colorado pilot and his
passenger spouse. The guardian of the surviving children brought an ac-
tion against the father's estate, which asserted the South Dakota Aircraft
Guest Statute80 as a complete defense. The court "consider[ed] this issue
a narrow one, occurring with enough frequency and repetitiveness to en-
able us to extract specific guidelines that will satisfactorily regulate this
issue," 81 and it therefore turned for guidance to Judge Fuld's guest stat-
ute rules, first announced in Tooker v. Lopez 82 and adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals in Neumeier v. Kuehner.83 Specifically, the Rostek
court utilized the first of Judge Fuld's rules, that of applying the law of
the parties' common domicile regardless of where the accident occurred.
Colorado law was applied and the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment to defendant was reversed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals, following Rostek's lead, has ap-
plied the Second Restatement in three tort cases. 84 In the most sophisti-
cated of these opinions, the court evaluated the relevant contacts and
77. See In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th
Cir. 1986); Paulo v. Bepex Corp., 792 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1986); Fleury v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 698 F.2d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Kilroy
Indus. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 847, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Handel v. Artukovic,
601 F. Supp. 1421, 1434-35 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Weinberger v. Jackson, 102 F.R.D. 839, 847
(N.D. Cal. 1984); In re Victor Technologies Sec. Litigation, 102 F.R.D. 53, 59-60 (N.D. Cal.
1984), aff'd, 792 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973).
79. Id. at 448, 514 P.2d at 320.
80. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 50-13-15 (1967).
81. 182 Colo. at 446, 514 P.2d at 319. The court here cited Professor Reese's article,
Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 7 CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972), in which the author argues
that replacement of the outmoded lex loci delicti rule does not require abandonment of con-
flicts rules generally.
82. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 249 N.E.2d 394, 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532-33 (1969) (Fuld, J.,
concurring).
83. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 129, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70 (1972).
84. See Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, Inc., 41 Colo. App. 237, 240, 588 P.2d 877, 880
(1978); Pust v. Union Supply Co., 38 Colo. App. 435, 448, 561 P.2d 355, 365 (1976), aff'd, 196
Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Sabell v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 36 Colo. App. 60,
536 P.2d 1160 (1975).
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interests in a negligence suit involving an accident in Iowa between a
Colorado plaintiff and a nationwide truck line. The court held that Iowa
law would govern the minimum standards of conduct because of its over-
riding interest in highway safety, but that Colorado's pro-plaintiff law of
comparative negligence would be applied in lieu of Iowa's contributory
negligence law, since Iowa was relatively unconcerned with apportioning
liability between nonresident parties.85 Federal courts sitting in diversity
have consistently applied the Second Restatement in Colorado. 86
The Rostek approach was extended to contract cases in Wood Broth-
ers Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau,87 which involved a suit for
breach of an interstate construction contract. Later, in 1986, the
supreme court applied section 191 of the Second Restatement to deter-
mine that Texas law applied to a breach of warranty claim.88 Contract
cases in federal court have been similarly handled. 89
Connecticut
In 1986, the Connecticut Supreme Court formally abandoned lex
loci delicti and adopted in its stead sections 6 and 145 of the Second
Restatement. The case was O'Connor v. O'Connor.90 O'Connor involved
a suit by a woman against her husband for injuries sustained in an acci-
dent in Quebec. The law of Connecticut, the site of the marital domicile,
would have allowed the suit to proceed, but the law of Quebec, which has
a scheme of exclusive compensation by the provincial government, would
not have allowed recovery from the tortfeasor.
After rejecting several arguments which had been advanced in favor
of the lex loci delicti rule, the court decided it would no longer follow
85. Sabell, 36 Colo. App. at 64-70, 536 P.2d at 1163-66. Sabell is commonly cited as an
example of depecage, the practice of applying the laws of different states to different issues. See
generally Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 58
(1973); Wilde, Depecage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S. CAL. L. RaV. 329 (1968).
86. See Kinnett v. Sky's West Parachute Center, 596 F. Supp. 1039, 1040-41 (D. Colo.
1984); Hickman v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (D. Colo. 1984); Con-
lin v. Hutcheon, 560 F. Supp. 934, 935-36 (D. Colo. 1983); Niven v. Falkenburg, 553 F. Supp.
1021, 1023 (D. Colo. 1983).
87. 198 Colo. 444, 447, 601 P.2d 1369, 1372 (1979).
88. See Webb v. Dessert Seed Co., 718 P.2d 1057, 1066 (Colo. 1986); see also Dworak v.
Olson Constr. Co., 191 Colo. 161, 163, 551 P.2d 198, 200 (1976) (utilizing Second Restatement
in determining law applicable to construction of covenant not to sue).
89. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Sandvick, 732 F.2d 783, 785-88 (10th Cir. 1984); Power
Motive Corp. v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (D. Colo. 1985); Zim-
merman v. Board of Publications of Christian Reformed Church, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 1002,
1006-07 (D. Colo. 1984).
90. 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986).
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that rule in all conflicts cases. 91 Perceiving a choice among the Second
Restatement, interest analysis, and Leflar, the court adopted the former
approach "as the governing principles for those cases, in which applica-
tion of the doctrine of lex loci would produce an arbitrary, irrational
result." 92 The court, emphasizing Quebec's total lack of interest in the
apportionment of liability between two residents of Connecticut, refused
to apply Quebec law. 93
In contract cases, Connecticut courts apply the traditional rules of
the First Restatement. The place of making approach was reaffirmed by
the Connecticut Supreme Court as recently as 1980.94 Federal courts,
likewise, adhere to this approach.95
Delaware
There is little doubt but that the Delaware courts continue to follow
the lex loci delicti rule in tort conflicts. The leading case is Friday v.
Smoot,9 6 where the Delaware Guest Statute97 was held inapplicable to a
suit by a Delaware automobile passenger against a Delaware driver aris-
ing from an accident in New Jersey. The Delaware Supreme Court spe-
cifically rejected an invitation to adopt section 379 (now section 145) of
the proposed Second Restatement, due to the perceived uncertainty of
the new rule and because the court thought adoption of such a choice of
law theory was best left to the legislature. All later state98 and federal99
91. The court stated:
We are, therefore, persuaded that the time has come for the law in this state to
abandon categorical allegiance to the doctrine of lex loci delicti in tort actions. Lex
loci has lost its theoretical underpinnings. Its formerly broad base of support has
suffered erosion. We need not decide today, however, whether to discard lex loci in
all of its manifestations. It is sufficient for us to consider whether, in the circum-
stances of the present case, reason and justice require the relaxation of its stringent
insistence on determining conflicts of law solely by reference to the place where a tort
occurred.
Id. at 648, 519 A.2d at 21.
92. Id. at 648-49, 519 A.2d at 21-22.
93. Id. at 654-58, 519 A.2d at 24-26.
94. Morin v. LeMieux, 179 Conn. 501, 503, 427 A.2d 397, 398 (1980).
95. See Schirm v. Auclair, 597 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D. Conn. 1984). But see Economu v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1242, 1247-48 (D. Conn. 1987) (applying §§ 187 and 188 of
Second Restatement in reliance on rejection by Connecticut Supreme Court of lex loci delicti
in O'Connor).
96. 58 Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594 (1965).
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101 (1965).
98. See Melson v. Allman, 244 A.2d 85, 87 (Del. 1968); Folk v. York-Shipley, Inc., 239
A.2d 236, 237-38 (Del. 1968); Sterling v. Carr, 59 Del. 70, 70, 213 A.2d 704, 704 (1965);
Cooper v. Ross & Roberts, Inc., 505 A.2d 1305, 1305 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Tew v. Sun Oil
Co., 407 A.2d 240, 242 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979); Hopkins v. Chesapeake Util. Corp., 290 A.2d 4,
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cases in Delaware follow the lex loci delicti rule. Escape devices have
been used occasionally.'co
Until 1978, it was crystal clear that Delaware courts followed the
traditional place of making rule in contract cases.10 1 Today that asser-
tion would be highly dubious, though not without some support in the
cases. In Oliver B. Cannon and Son v. Dorr-Oliver, 0nc., 2 the Delaware
Supreme Court had before it a claim for attorney fees by a contractor
entitled under a painting contract to be indemnified for any loss caused
by conduct of the subcontractor. Delaware case law construed such an
agreement to cover only attorney fees resulting from third party claims
against the indemnified party, and not attorney fees incurred in defend-
ing against an action brought by the indemnifying party itself. Delaware
was not the place of making of the contract. Nevertheless, the court ap-
plied Delaware law, citing section 188 of the Second Restatement and
identifying other contacts connecting Delaware to the contract.10 3 A
6 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Lumb v. Cooper, 266 A.2d 196, 197 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970); Perez v.
Short Line Inc., 231 A.2d 642, 643 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 238 A.2d 341 (Del. 1968).
99. See Burke v. Elliott, 606 F.2d 375, 378 (3d Cir. 1979); Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 464 F.2d 976, 979 (3d Cir. 1972); Candelora v. Clouser, 621 F. Supp. 335, 341 (D. Del.
1985), aff'd, 802 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1986); Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Bank-
ing Corp., 576 F. Supp. 107, 127-28 (D. Del. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 956-58 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Sports Eye, Inc. v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 634,
639 (D. Del. 1983); Johnston Assoc., Inc. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 560 F. Supp. 916, 917 (D. Del.
1983); Dymond v. National Broadcasting Co., 559 F. Supp. 734, 737 (D. Del. 1983); Ricci v.
Quality Bakers of Am. Coop., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D. Del. 1983); Thornton v. Carroll,
490 F. Supp. 455, 457 (D. Del. 1980); Quandt v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1009,
1013 (D. Del. 1970); Dunn v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 271 F. Supp. 662, 663 (D. Del. 1967);
Culley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 244 F. Supp. 710, 714 (D. Del. 1965).
100. See Thouron v. McCoy, 477 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying law of marital domi-
cile, which barred suit for alienation of affections); Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 562 F. Supp.
1324 (D. Del. 1983) (applying law of place of defendant's conduct, rather than place of injury,
in claim of intentional tort); Short Line, Inc. v. Perez, 238 A.2d 341 (Del. 1968) (Delaware
public policy forbids suits between spouses, even when injury occurs outside state).
101. See Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 248 A.2d 625, 628 (Del. 1968); Wil-
mington Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 40 Del. Ch. 1, 8, 172 A.2d 63, 66 (1961); Hill v. Hill,
262 A.2d 661, 664 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 269 A.2d 212 (Del. 1970); Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v.
Continental Oil Co., 43 Del. Ch. 366, 378, 231 A.2d 450, 457, aff'd, 43 Del. Ch. 516, 239 A.2d
629 (Del. 1968); Norse Petroleum A/S v. LVO Int'l, Inc., 389 A.2d 771, 773 (Del. Super. Ct.
1978); Unit, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 304 A.2d 320, 327 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973);
United Aircraft Corp. v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 58 Del. 66, 75, 204 A.2d 396, 403 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1964).
102. 394 A.2d 1160 (Del. 1978).
103. The court stated as follows:
In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties to the contract, we conclude
that this state has such a close relationship to the transaction and the parties that we
should apply Delaware law. Two of the four parties are Delaware corporations, the
property which gives rise to the claim is located here and the indemnification sought
is for legal fees and expenses involved in this lawsuit.
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year later, an appellate court applying the place of injury rule in a tort
case felt constrained to distinguish Cannon as an invocation of the "rela-
tionship test" confined to contract cases. 1°4 Then in 1986, the supreme
court, without citation to any precedent, applied section 146 of the Sec-
ond Restatement in finding that a second mortgage loan executed in
Pennsylvania fell within the intended range of the Delaware Secondary
Mortgage Loan Act, even though the loan agreement was executed in
Pennsylvania. 105
The federal courts sitting in diversity have not been nearly as reti-
cent in abandoning the place of making rule. Often invoking Cannon,
these courts have held, with only one exception, 10 6 that Delaware now
follows the Second Restatement in contract cases. 107 Were the Delaware
Supreme Court to be faced with the choice today, it too would doubtless
opt for the Second Restatement.
District of Columbia
Interest analysis is the current method of conflicts resolution in tort
cases brought in the District of Columbia courts. This is, however, a
recent development. Originally, the District was committed to lex loci
delicti.108 In 1967, the court of appeals espoused a contacts theory of
Id. at 1166 (citation omitted).
104. Tew v. Sun Oil Co., 407 A.2d 240, 242 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979).
105. See Johnson v. Ronamy Consumers Credit Corp., 515 A.2d 682, 687 (Del. 1986); see
also In re Asbestos Litigation, 517 A.2d 697, 698 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (law of state of most
significant relationship applies to successor liability issue).
106. Curiously, the only federal case not following the Delaware Supreme Court's refer-
ence to the Second Restatement in Cannon was a related case in which the losing party sought
coverage from its insurance carrier for damages and costs of litigation. The insurance contract
was construed according to the law of Pennsylvania, where the policy was issued. Oliver B.
Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 484 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 n.29 (D. Del. 1980).
107. See Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Jefferson, 628 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Del. 1986); F. E.
Myers Co. v. Pipe Maintenance Serv., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 697, 702 (D. Del. 1984); Whiteside v.
New Castle Mut. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (D. Del. 1984); Gillespie v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc., 590 F. Supp. 1111, 1114-15 (D. Del. 1984); Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 562 F.
Supp. 1324, 1334 (D. Del. 1983); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1372,
1379 (D. Del. 1983); Johnston Assoc., Inc. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 560 F. Supp. 916, 917 (D.
Del. 1983); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 98 F.R.D. 254, 266 (D. Del. 1983);
Process & Storage Vessels, Inc. v. Tank Service Inc., 541 F. Supp. 725, 729-30 (D. Del. 1982),
aff'd, 760 F.2d 260 (3rd Cir. 1985); Sellon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F. Supp. 978, 981-82
(D. Del. 1981).
108. For earlier cases espousing the place of injury rule, see Carr v. Bio-Medical Applica-
tions, 366 A.2d 1089, 1093 n.3 (D.C. 1976); May Dep't Stores Co. v. Devercelli, 314 A.2d 767,
770 (D.C. 1973); Shaw v. May Dep't Stores Co., 268 A.2d 607, 609 (D.C. 1970); Miller &
Long Co. v. Shaw, 204 A.2d 697, 699 (D.C. 1964); Knight v. Handley Motor Co., 198 A.2d
747, 749 (D.C. 1964); Hardy v. Hardy, 197 A.2d 923, 925 (D.C. 1964).
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true conflicts resolution. 10 9 This approach, predicated on the latest draft
of the Second Restatement,110 has not re-appeared in later cases. The
District of Columbia federal courts have overwhelmingly come down on
the side of an interest analysis approach,1  and their decisions are often
cited as precedent by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.112
Moreover, in 1985 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was
faced with two conflicts cases and each time came down squarely in favor
of an interest analysis approach. Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health
Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman,113 was a medical malpractice suit brought by a
Virginia plaintiff employed in the district against two Washington, D.C.
health care organizations for treatment received in Virginia. Interest
analysis revealed a false conflict: the District of Columbia had an interest
in compensating its resident employee but Virginia had no interest in
protecting District of Columbia corporations from excess liability, and its
public policy would not be hindered by allowing plaintiff full recovery.
Accordingly, the court applied District of Columbia common law, rather
than the Virginia Malpractice Act, which would have mandated prior
screening of plaintiff's malpractice claim and would have limited the
amount of damages recoverable.
109. See Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577, 583-84 (D.C. 1967).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964)
(now § 145).
111. For a sampling of opinions from the federal appellate court, see Nepera Chem., Inc.
v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 794 F.2d 688, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Webster v. Sun Co., 790 F.2d
157, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Mazza v. Mazza, 475 F.2d 385, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581, 584-86 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Tramontana v.
S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1965). For
federal trial level decisions applying interest analysis, see Friends for all Children, Inc. v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., 587 F. Supp. 180, 191 (D.D.C. 1984); In re Air Crash Disaster at Wash-
ington, D.C. on January 13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333, 341-42 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 746 F.2d 816
(D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam on April 4, 1975, 476
F. Supp. 521, 526 n. 11 (D.D.C. 1979). Some federal court opinions, while purporting to en-
gage in interest analysis, have utilized an eclectic approach, relying on § 145 of the Second
Restatement. See, eg., Stancill v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 744 F.2d 861, 864 n.16 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Nation-
wide Mortgage Co., 659 F. Supp. 611, 616-17 (D.D.C. 1987); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 597 F. Supp. 934, 938 (D. D.C. 1984). In a recent case, the district court stated that it
would follow interest analysis, but proceeded to apply the law of the place of plaintiff's injury,
using a contact-counting approach. Dowd v. Calabrese, 589 F. Supp. 1206, 1210-11 (D.D.C.
1984).
112. See, eg., McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917, 921 n.6 (D.C. 1969)
(citing two D.C. Circuit opinions for the erroneous proposition that the District of Columbia
courts applied interest analysis to resolve issues of warranty).
113. 491 A.2d 502 (D.C. 1985).
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One month earlier, in Estrada v. Potomac Electric Power Co.,11 4 the
court of appeals had adopted as its own the opinion of the superior court,
finding Maryland law applicable in a suit by a Maryland minor against a
District of Columbia public utility for bums suffered by the child while
playing near a transformer station in Maryland. Because plaintiff was a
trespasser, and there was no intentional misconduct alleged, the only the-
ory of recovery was attractive nuisance, a doctrine recognized in the Dis-
trict of Columbia but not in Maryland. The District's attractive nuisance
policy reflected a governmental interest in regulating the conduct of
landowners, since the property on which the accident occurred was in
Maryland, and since the District of Columbia had no substantial interest
in compensating a Maryland resident, the law of Maryland was applied
and the suit was dismissed.
The court of appeals has three times declined to alter the traditional
rule that the law of the situs governs questions of interests in real prop-
erty. 115 Even here, however, the court has expressed its determination
that this rule is a product of interest analysis, and not an application of
the First Restatement.116 It is, perhaps, as far as any court has gone
toward questioning the traditional conflicts rule of property.
In contract cases, the court of appeals also purports to follow an
interest analysis approach. The case most often cited is Owen v. Owen,11 7
where the court stated that "[i]n determining the formation and validity
of contracts, the District of Columbia applies the law of the jurisdiction
with the more substantial interest in the resolution of the issue." Unfor-
tunately, the Owen court proceeded to apply a pure contact-counting ap-
proach,118 and other opinions purporting to apply interest analysis in
contract cases are similarly bereft of true policy analysis.1 19 Moreover,
the federal courts sitting in diversity have been notably inconsistent in
114. 488 A.2d 1359 (D.C. 1985).
115. See Gabrielian v. Gabrielian, 473 A.2d 847, 851 (D.C. 1984); Anderson v. Anderson,
449 A.2d 334, 335 (D.C. 1982); Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4, 6 (D.C. 1978) (All three
cases concerned divorce-related property settlements involving real estate).
116. See Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4, 5-6 (D.C. 1978). In Anderson v. Anderson,
449 A.2d 334 (D.C. 1982), the superior court had applied interest analysis and had actually
concluded that District of Columbia law applied to a dispute involving a home in Maryland,
since the parties had married in the district and plaintiff wife had left the house and re-estab-
lished residence in D.C. before filing for divorce. The court of appeals, however, reversed. Id.
at 335.
117. 427 A.2d 933, 937 (D.C. 1981).
118. The court stated: "The Agreement was made by Maryland residents in Maryland
and concerned real estate situated in that state. The only connection of this matter to the
District of Columbia is that the husband now resides here. Accordingly, the law of Maryland
applies." Id. at 937.
119. See DeMontmorin v. DuPont, 484 A.2d 582, 585 (D.C. 1984); Fowler v. A & A Co.,
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their approach to contract cases. 120 What the District of Columbia
courts will do in upcoming cases is difficult to predict, but their present
practice, as opposed to their own descriptions of their present practice, is
most properly characterized as a center of gravity approach, with no reli-
ance on the Second Restatement and, as yet, no actual analysis of the
relevant policies of the sovereigns concerned. In short, a contact-count-
ing approach appears to be in vogue.
Florida
Florida applies a two-track approach, having adopted the Second
Restatement in tort cases while clinging to the traditional place of mak-
ing rule in contract cases. The break with the place of injury rule came
in Bishop v. Florida Speciality Paint Co., 1 21 where the Florida Supreme
Court held that South Carolina's aviation guest statute 22 would not be
enforced in a suit between Florida residents merely because the plane
crash happened in South Carolina. In so doing, the court expressly
adopted sections 145 and 146 of the Second Restatement, as well as the
general guidelines of section 6.123 Other Florida courts have followed
Bishop's lead and have applied the Second Restatement in tort cases. 124
The most recent Florida Supreme Court case dealing with contracts
262 A.2d 344, 348 (D.C. 1970); McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917, 921 (D.C.
1969).
120. Several recent federal cases, citing DeMontmorin, Owens, and Fowler, purport to ap-
ply an interest analysis but do not favor the reader with any analysis at all. See Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Home Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 876, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987);
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Bender, 595 F. Supp. 1209, 1223 n.8 (D.D.C. 1984); Anderco, Inc. v.
Buildex Design, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 n.2 (D.D.C. 1982). In fairness, the choice of
law issue did not appear to be in dispute in any of these cases. Section 188 of the Second
Restatement has been cited in several opinions, but one of these relies equally on an interest
analysis. Koro Co. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 568 F. Supp. 280, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1983). The others
do little more than count contacts. Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc., 518 F.2d 1026,
1030 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re Parkwood, Inc., 461 F.2d 158, 172 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Dance v. U.S. Int'l Motors, 647 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D. D.C. 1986). Another case neither
purports to follow interest analysis nor cites the Second Restatement, but merely adds up the
contacts. United States v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
121. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-1-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
123. Bishop, 389 So. 2d at 1001. The court reassured traditionalists that "the conflicts
theory set out in the Restatement does not reject the 'place of injury' rule completely. The
state where the injury occurred would, under most circumstances, be the decisive considera-
tion in determining the applicable choice of law." Id.
124. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1981); AIU
Ins. Co. v. Reese, 498 So.2d 966, 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Gifford, 473 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also Emmart v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 843, 844-46 (1987) (federal case applying § 145).
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expressly held that the place of making rule applied. 125 There have been
no supreme court decisions in this area since Bishop was handed down in
1980. Appellate courts, however, continue to apply the place of making
rule, distinguishing Bishop as applicable only in tort cases. 126 Conse-
quently, Florida should be considered a place of making state, until the
supreme court states otherwise.
Georgia
Georgia applies the traditional First Restatement rules in both tort
and contract cases. The Georgia Court of Appeals has disposed of most
of the recent conflicts cases by applying lex loci delicti unerringly. 127
When finally faced with a conflict case in 1983, the Georgia Supreme
Court, without comment, followed the place of injury rule consistently
applied by the court of appeals.1 28 Federal courts also apply this rule. 129
In 1984, on a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit,130 the
Georgia Supreme Court declined to depart from the rule that contracts
are to be interpreted by the law of the jurisdiction where made. 131 The
court cited difficulties with modem theory in other jurisdictions as its
justification for retaining the old rule.1 32 The court has reaffirmed lex
125. Goodman v. Olsen, 305 So. 2d 753, 754-55 (Fla. 1974), cert denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975).
126. See Brooks v. Sturiano, 497 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); New Jersey
Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Robertazzi, 473 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 484 So.
2d 9 (Fla. 1986); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gifford, 473 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Jemco, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 So. 2d 499, 501 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 412 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1982). Each of the above cases contrasted Florida's tradi-
tional contract approach with its adoption of the Second Restatement in tort. Other cases
applying the place of making rule include Fred Teitelbaum Constr. Co. v. Santa Fe Dev.
Corp., 462 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Andrews v. Continental Ins. Co., 444
So. 2d 479, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 451 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1984); Pfaudler Co. v.
Sylvachem Corp., 400 So. 2d 503, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1106
(Fla. 1981).
127. See Yates v. Lowe, 179 Ga. App. 888, 900, 348 S.E.2d 113,114 (1986); Risdon Enter.,
Inc. v. Colemill Enter., Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 903, 324 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1984); Wallace v.
Harrison, 166 Ga. App. 461, 462-63, 304 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1983); Ellington v. Tolar Constr.
Co., 142 Ga. App. 218, 223, 235 S.E.2d 729, 733 (1977); Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor
Co., 133 Ga. App. 378, 380, 210 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1974).
128. Sargent Indus., Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 251 Ga. 91, 94, 303 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1983).
129. See Lamb v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 712 F.2d 466, 469-70 (11th Cir. 1983); Mor-
gan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 438, 441-42 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Baltimore Football Club, Inc.
v. Lockheed Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1206, 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Harris v. City of Chattanooga,
507 F. Supp. 374, 376 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
130. General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 728 F.2d 494 (11th Cir. 1984).
131. General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95, 96, 311 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1984).
132. The court stated:
Although the "center of gravity" system is a more recent development in choice of
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loci contractus on two more recent occasions as well. 133
Hawaii
The story of conflicts jurisprudence in Hawaii begins and ends with
Peters v. Peters,134 the only Hawaii Supreme Court choice of law decision
issued to date. Mr. and Mrs. Peters, both New Yorkers, were vacation-
ing on the island of Maui and were involved in a car-truck collision in
which Mr. Peters was driving a rental car and Mrs. Peters was injured.
Rather than sue in New York, which has no spousal immunity law and
which undoubtedly would have applied its own law on these facts, Mrs.
Peters somehow decided to sue in Hawaii, which retains the spousal im-
munity law. The Hawaii Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the suit
based on its spousal immunity law, but first addressed the choice of law
issue.
In Peters, the court decided to relinquish lex loci delicti in favor of a
more modem approach. The court considered a variety of theories, 135
but adopted none expressly, instead relying on various policy considera-
tions. It specifically rejected the Second Restatement and did not apply
straight interest analysis. Application of either the Second Restatement
or the Currie interest analysis certainly would have resulted in applica-
tion of the law of New York, the marital domicile. In the course of its
decision, the court cited three of the five factors advocated by Professor
Leflar as choice-influencing considerations for conflict resolution: pre-
dictability of result; simplification of the judicial task; and advancement
of the forum's governmental interests. Indeed, the Leflar approach ap-
pears to be the only modem approach that could have led to the result
reached, with the exception of lex fori, which the court also rejected.
The Peters decision was followed and Leflar was again applied in a
1987 Hawaii Court of Appeals case, California Federal Savings & Loan
Assoc. v. Bell,136 involving the foreclosure of a mortgage covering an
apartment in Honolulu. When the mortgagor defaulted on its land con-
law cases, we are impressed with the findings of other jurisdictions that this approach
is neither less confusing nor more certain than our traditional approach. Until it
becomes clear that a better rule exists, we will adhere to our traditional approach.
Id. (citations omitted).
133. See Geico v. Dickey, 255 Ga. 661, 662, 340 S.E.2d 595, 596 (1986); Menendez v.
Perishable Distrib., Inc., 254 Ga. 300, 302, 329 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1985).
134. 63 Haw. 653, 634 P.2d 586 (1981).
135. In its survey of extant choice of law theories, the court cites, in succession, lex loci
delicti, Cavers' principles of preference, interest analysis, the Second Restatement, Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations, and lex fori. Id. at 661-64, 634 P.2d at 591-93.
136. 735 P.2d 499 (1987).
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tract, the mortgagee foreclosed. Receipts from the judicial sale of the
apartment were insufficient to make the mortagee whole. A deficiency
judgment was entered in a Hawaii court. The deficiency judgment would
not have been permitted under the law of California, where the land con-
tract was executed. The court held Hawaii law applicable but it declined
to rely exclusively on the venerable lex situs rule of property. Instead,
the court utilized the five Leflar factors. The court decided that the fac-
tors of predictability, maintenance of interstate order, and advancement
of the forum's governmental interests mandated that Hawaii law be ap-
plied to investments in Hawaii real estate, an important cog in the island
state's economic well-being.137
Two federal decisions also emphasized the choice-influencing con-
siderations posited by Leflar. 138 The more recent of these cases, how-
ever, could also be read as an application of the Second Restatement, an
approach inconsistent with the Peters decision.139
There have been no Hawaii choice of law cases involving contracts
since statehood. The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, may be willing to
apply its eclectic Peters approach here as well.
Idaho
Idaho has adopted the Second Restatement in both tort and con-
tract cases. The Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed this approach in two
1985 tort cases. In the first, Johnson v. Pischke,14° four residents of Sas-
katchewan were involved in a plane crash in the Idaho mountains, in
which the pilot and one passenger died. The survivors and their families
brought suits against the pilot's survivors and the airplane manufacturer.
The choice of law issue was whether the wrongful death laws of Sas-
katchewan or Idaho applied. Under Saskatchewan law, all claims would
have been barred because they were brought more than one year after the
crash date. Idaho, however, had-a two-year statute of limitations, under
which the claims were timely filed. The supreme court specifically reaf-
firmed Idaho's adherence to the Second Restatement in contract and tort
137. Id. at 505-06.
138. See DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 558 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (D. Haw. 1983); Jenkins v.
Whittaker Corp., 545 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (D. Haw. 1982).
139. See DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 558 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 n.4 (D. Haw. 1983) (in which
the district court followed a "most significant relationship" approach and specifically cited § 6
of the Second Restatement); see also Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 724-25 (9th
Cir.) (wrongful death action in which the court held that Peters created a presumption of lex
fori, to be displaced only when another state had a greater interest in having its law applied),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 324 (1986).
140. 108 Idaho 397, 700 P.2d 19 (1985).
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cases,141 and then resolved two distinct choice of law issues differently.
Saskatchewan law was applied in the suit against the pilot's survivors,
since all relevant parties were from Saskatchewan.1 42 Idaho law, how-
ever, was applied in the suit against the manufacturer, a Kansas corpora-
tion, since, under one of the Restatement's presumptive reference, 143 no
jurisdiction had a more significant relationship to the case than did
Idaho.144 The manufacturer, therefore, was left to bear the damages.
Two months after Johnson, the supreme court decided Estates of
Braun v. Cactus Pete's, Inc.,145 a dram shop case with a fact pattern iden-
tical to that in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,146 except that the plaintiffs
were, at the time of the accident, driving to work at a Nevada casino.
The court reached a result opposite to that of the California Supreme
Court in Bernhard, finding Nevada law applicable and dismissing the
complaint. The court's application of sections 6 and 145 focused largely
on the fact that the allegedly negligent conduct occurred entirely in Ne-
vada. 147 A dissenter argued for application of Idaho law, relying on the
Bernhard rationale that the Nevada casino "advertises and caters in large
part to residents of Idaho." 148
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the Second Restatement for use
in contract cases in 1968, even before the ALI officially approved it.149
When the court was called upon a decade later to resolve a conflict of
laws in a case involving interpretation of insurance contracts, it again
141. Id. at 399-400, 700 P.2d at 21-22.
142. Id. at 401, 700 P.2d at 23.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1969). The Restatement
provides:
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particu-
lar issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied.
144. Johnson, 108 Idaho at 402, 700 P.2d at 24.
145. 108 Idaho 798, 702 P.2d 836 (1985).
146. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976); see supra notes 65-73 and
accompanying text.
147. "[T]he place where the conduct causing the injury occurred" is listed as one of four
"[c]ontacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6," according to RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969). This contact pointed to application of
Nevada law, as did "the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered."
A third factor, "the place where the injury occurred," pointed to Idaho law, while a fourth, the
domiciles of the parties, was mixed.
148. Cactus Pete's, 108 Idaho at 801, 702 P.2d at 839 (Huntley, J., dissenting).
149. Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, 92 Idaho 718, 722-23, 449 P.2d 378, 382-83 (1968).
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relied upon section 188 of the Second Restatement. 150 A recent federal
case has applied section 187(2) of the Second Restatement in holding the
parties' choice of Illinois law inapplicable.' 5'
Illinois
Illinois adheres to the most significant relationship test of the Sec-
ond Restatement. The first case to adopt the Second Restatement in tort
was Ingersoll v. Klein,152 a wrongful death action in which all parties
were from Illinois but the death occurred by drowning in the Mississippi
River, allegedly in Iowa. The plaintiff's complaint relied on defendant's
violation of two provisions of the Iowa Motor Vehicle Code,153 a statute
that would not have been applicable if Illinois law were applied. The
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the place of wrong rule and, after citing
the most recent draft of the Second Restatement, 154 announced that it
was adopting a most significant contacts approach to the choice of
law. 155 Illinois law was applied and the suit was dismissed.
Ingersoll has been followed in several recent Illinois Appellate
Court cases. 156 Federal courts, too, apply the Second Restatement in
150. See Unigard Ins. Group v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 123, 126, 594 P.2d 633,
636 (1979).
151. See Industrial Idemn. Ins. Co. v. United States, 757 F.2d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 1985).
152. 46 III. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970).
153. Id. at 43, 262 N.E.2d at 594 (applying IOwA CODE ANN. § 321.493-94 (1985), (re-
pealed 1984)).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964)
(now § 145).
155. Ingersoll, 46 Ill. 2d at 48, 262 N.E.2d at 596. At another point in the opinion, the
court appeared to espouse a more forum-preferential approach than that advocated by the
Second Restatement. The court stated that "the local law of the state where the injury oc-
curred should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless Illinois has a more
significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties, in which case, the law of
Illinois should apply." Id. at 45, 262 N.E.2d at 595 (emphasis added). By contrast, the Second
Restatement provides that "[ifn an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to
the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state
will be applied." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 175 (1969) (emphasis
added). Read in context, however, the Ingersoll statement appears to have reference only to
the facts of that case, Le., that Iowa law would apply because Iowa was the place of injury,
unless Illinois, the only other interested state, had a more significant relationship to the parties
and the occurrence. In any event, subsequent cases have not adopted a forum-preferential
approach, and the Illinois courts' application of the Second Restatement in tort has been con-
sistent with that of other states.
156. See Rosett v. Schatzman, No. 86-1680, slip op. (Ill. App. June 18, 1987); Vickrey v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 146 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1025, 497 N.E.2d 814, 816-17 (1986); Estate of
Barnes, 133 Ill. App. 3d 361, 366, 478 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (1985); Mech v. Pullman Standard,




The Illinois Supreme Court has not had occasion to hear a conflicts
case involving a contract since before the dawn of the choice of law
revolution. 158 The appellate level courts, however, have read Ingersoll as
approving the extension of the Second Restatement approach beyond the
tort area. 159
Federal courts have taken a variety of approaches toward contract
cases. Several courts have held that Illinois applies the Second Restate-
ment in contract cases. 160 But two courts have rejected this approach.1 61
Two other decisions note that the same law is selected under either
rule, 162 and yet another court avoids the issue by determining that the
law of each jurisdiction produces the same result.1 63 Until recently, the
most frequent approach had been to apply the place of making rule when
questions of execution were at issue, and when questions of performance
157. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 644 F.2d 594, 611 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 878
(1981); Kunz v. Deitch, No. 86-9563, slip op. (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1987); Anabaldi v. Sunbeam
Corp., 651 F. Supp 1343, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Toomer v. United Resin Adhesives, Inc., 652
F. Supp. 219, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Tamura, Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1065, 1068
n.4 (N.D. Il1. 1986); Fleet Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F. Supp. 550,
563 (C.D. Ill. 1986); Dixie-Portland Flour Mills, Inc. v. Nation Enter., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 985,
986 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 510 (N.D. Ill. 1985); R
& L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 204-05 (N.D. Ill. 1981); DP Serv., Inc.
v. AM Inter., 508 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Still other federal cases have used some
variant of the "most significant relationship" test, without citing the Second Restatement. See
Newkirk v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1422, 1424 (S.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd,
805 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1986); Intamin, Inc. v. Figley-Wright Contractors, Inc., 605 F. Supp.
707, 710 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Ross v. Ross, 104 F.R.D. 439, 440 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
158. The last contract case was Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co., 388 Ill. 474, 477-78, 58
N.E.2d 460, 461-62 (1944), a typically rigid place of making/place of performance decision.
159. The first case to extend Ingersoll to contracts was Champagnie v. W. E. O'Neil Con-
str. Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d 136, 145, 395 N.E.2d 990, 996 (1979). Later cases following
Champagnie's lead are Codo, Banks, Zumstein & Konzelman, P.C. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 148 I1. App. 3d 698, 701, 499 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (1968); Illinois Tool Works v. Sier-
racin Corp., 134 Ill. App. 3d 63, 69, 479 N.E.2d 1046, 1050-51 (1985); Boise Cascade Home &
Land Corp. v. Utilities, Inc., 127 Ill. App. 3d 4, 13, 468 N.E.2d 442, 449 (1984).
160. Florida Risk Planning Consultants v. Transportation Life Ins. Co., 732 F.2d 593, 595
(7th Cir. 1984); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 642 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (C.D. I1. 1986);
Robin v. Rudolf Wolff Commodity Brokers, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 258, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Freeman v. Liu, 112 F.R.D. 35, 37 n.4 (N.D. IIl. 1986); see Wonderlic Agency v. Acceleration
Corp., 624 F. Supp. 801, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (advocating adoption of the Second
Restatement).
161. NIl Metals Servs., Inc. v. ICM Steel Corp., 514 F. Supp. 164, 166 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
DP Serv., Inc. v. AM Int'l, 508 F. Supp. 162, 164 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also State Sec Ins. Co. v.
Frank B. Hall & Co., 109 F.R.D. 95, 96 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
162. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S.
1017 (1982); Letter-Rite, Inc. v. Computer Talk, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 717, 722 (N.D. Il1. 1985).
163. See Fabe v. Facer Ins. Agency, 588 F. Supp. 1330, 1332 n.1 (C.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd,
773 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1192 (1986).
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were litigated, the usual approach had been to apply the place of making
rule if performance was to occur in only one state but the Second Re-
statement was to be applied if performance was to take place in more
than one state.164 Federal court decisions will likely follow the lead of
recent opinions from the Illinois Appellate Court 65 and gravitate toward
an application of the Second Restatement in all cases.
Indiana
The Indiana Supreme Court has not entertained a conflicts case in
forty years. Forty years ago, not surprisingly, Indiana law provided that
tort cases were governed by the law of the place of the injury. 166 Later
Indiana Court of Appeals decisions also used the traditional rule.1 67
There has been only one exception.1 68 Federal courts sitting in diversity
ordinarily apply lex loci delicti as well. 169
In contract cases, however, the story is decidedly different. In the
164. In P.S. & E., Inc. v. Selastomer Detroit, Inc, 470 F.2d 125, 127 (7th Cir. 1972), the
court first suggested that this approach be used in the absence of any controlling Illinois case
law. It has also been utilized in Dr. Franklin Perkins School v. Freeman, 741 F.2d 1503, 1515
n.19 (7th Cir. 1984); Zlotnick v. MacArthur, 550 F. Supp. 371, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Adams
Laboratories, Inc. v. Jacobs Eng'g Co., 486 F. Supp. 383, 389 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Ehrman v.
Cook Elec. Co., 468 F. Supp. 98, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
166. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Revlett, 224 Ind. 313, 321, 65 N.E.2d 731, 734
(1946).
167. See Lambert v. Yellowbird, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind. Ct. App.), reh'g denied,
498 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Umbarger v. Bolby, 496 N.E.2d 128, 128 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986); Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 487 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Eby v. York-
Division, Borg-Warner, 455 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Lee v. Lincoln Nat. Bank
& Trust Co., 442 N.E.2d 1147, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Maroon v. State Dept. of Mental
Health, 411 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
168. Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind. App. 655, 670, 237 N.E.2d 116, 124 (1968). Wither-
spoon, a guest statute case, prescribed an interest analysis approach. The decision, however,
was later reversed by a decision that rendered the choice of law question unnecessary to re-
solve. See Witherspoon v. Salm, 251 Ind. 575, 243 N.E.2d 876 (1969). Later cases have not
followed the appellate court's choice of law decision.
169. See Powell v. American Bank & Trust Co., 640 F. Supp. 1568, 1581 (N.D. Ind.
1986); Knoblett v. Kinman, 623 F. Supp. 805, 807 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Wagner v. Freightliner
Corp., 622 F. Supp. 790, 791 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Western Smelting & Metals, Inc. v. Slater Steel,
Inc., 621 F. Supp. 578, 582 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Hafner v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 616
F. Supp. 735, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924, 930 (N.D. Ind.
1984); Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1981). But
see Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1965) (applying a contact-counting
approach based on Barber, infra note 170); see also Sharp v. Egler, 658 F.2d 480, 483-84 (7th
Cir. 1981); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978) (each holding that the
result would be the same under either the Barber "significant contacts" approach or the place
of injury rule).
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now classic case of W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 170 Indiana became the
first state in the nation to depart conclusively from traditional choice of
law rules. Relying exclusively on scholarly writings in the field, 171 the
Indiana Supreme Court decided to apply a most significant contacts ap-
proach to the contract dispute before it.172 In that case, the Barber Com-
pany of Illinois, sold petroleum products to the Hughes Brothers, an
Indiana partnership. When the Hughes' fell behind on their account,
they agreed to execute a promissory note. The note was prepared in Illi-
nois after negotiations there and was mailed by the Barber Company to
the Hughes Brothers in Elkhart, Indiana. The note was signed by both
Hughes brothers and deposited in the mail in Indiana, no further signa-
tures being required for its completion. The note contained a cognovit,
or confession of judgment, clause, whereby, if the debtor did not make
scheduled payments, the creditor could obtain a judgment in the Illinois
courts without serving the Hughes' with process in Indiana. The
Hughes' again fell behind on payments, and this time the Barber Com-
pany obtained an Illinois judgment against them in the amount of $1800.
The Barber Company then sought to enforce that judgment against the
Hughes' in Indiana, relying upon the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution. 173
Under the place of making rule, the legal effect of the Barber-
Hughes promissory note would have been governed by the law of Indi-
ana, since the last act needed to make the contract binding was the signa-
ture of the Hughes brothers in Elkhart. Indiana law forbade the use of
confession of judgment clauses and, in fact, made it a criminal offense to
attempt to recover in Indiana upon a judgment obtained elsewhere
through a confession of judgment clause.174 After first putting forth an
argument that Illinois was, in fact, the place of making, 175 the court ex-
amined the contact points to find Illinois law controlling under its new
170. 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).
171. The court cited two contemporary conflict of law texts: CHEATHAM, DOWLING,
GOODRICH & GRISWOLD, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1941) and HARPER & TAIN-
TOR, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937). See Barber, 223 Ind. at 586, 63 N.E.2d at 423.
172. The court formulated its rule as follows: "The court will consider all acts of the
parties touching the transaction in relation to the several states involved and will apply as the
law governing the transaction the law of that state with which the facts are in most intimate
contact." Barber, 223 Ind. at 586, 63 N.E.2d at 423.
173. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
174. See Barber, 223 Ind. at 576, 63 N.E.2d at 419 (quoting IND. CODE § 2-2904; (current
version at § 34-2-25-1) (West 1976); citing IND. CODE § 2-2906 (current version at § 34-2-26-1
(West 1976))).
175. The court stated that the promissory note could be viewed as unaccepted, and there-
fore inoperative, until received by the creditor in Illinois. Barber, 223 Ind. at 584-85, 63
N.E.2d at 422. It refused, however, to rest on this analysis.
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theory.176 Under Illinois law, the cognovit clause was valid as written.
Thus, the judgment obtained in Illinois was entitled to full faith and
credit in Indiana.
Indiana Court of Appeals decisions occasionally confuse the Barber
approach with that set out in section 188 of the Second Restatement, but
the courts have generally utilized a contact-counting or center of gravity
approach more in line with Barber.177 Federal courts, too, have some-
times treated the Second Restatement and Barber as one in the same. 178
However, until such time as the Second Restatement is actually used,
rather than merely cited, Indiana is best characterized as a center of
gravity state in contract cases.
Iowa
The Iowa approach in tort cases has been somewhat inconsistent
and sporadic. The Iowa Supreme Court abrogated the place of injury
rule in Fuerste v. Bemis, 179 but it was unclear in that case what method of
conflict resolution the court was adopting. In Fuerste, a guest statute
case, the court purported to apply the most significant relationship
176. The court stated:
Looking for the contact points in the present case, we observe first that the parties
were at all times engaged in purely business transactions. They transacted this busi-
ness almost exclusively in Illinois. The accumulated indebtedness on September 30,
1940, arose solely from Illinois transactions. The place of their conferences to arrive
at a settlement was in Illinois. The note was payable in Illinois. It was on an Illinois
form. It was prepared in Illinois. It was valid in that state and was there to be
performed. It was actually intended that Illinois law control, as expressly found by
the court. On the other hand the only contact points with Indiana were the residence
of the debtors, their signing of the note in Indiana and their placing it in the mail in
Indiana.
Id. at 587, 63 N.E.2d at 423.
177. See Kaszuba v. Zientara, 495 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Eby v. York-
Division, Borg-Warner, 455 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Suyemasa v. Myers, 420
N.E.2d 1334, 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Clow Corp. v. Ross Township School Corp., 179 Ind.
App. 125, 130, 384 N.E.2d 1077, 1082 (1979); Utopia Coach Corp. v. Weatherwax, 177 Ind.
App. 321, 326-27, 379 N.E.2d 518, 522 (1978).
178. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spray, 547 F.2d 397,400 (7th Cir. 1977); Rockwood
Ins. Co. v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, 646 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (N.D.
Ind. 1986); Western Smelting & Metals, Inc. v. Slater Steel, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 578, 582 (N.D.
Ind. 1985); see also Sullivan v. Savin Bus. Mach. Corp., 560 F. Supp. 938, 939-40 (N.D. Ind.
1983) (using § 187 of the Second Restatement to uphold parties' choice of New York law as
governing). Other federal decisions have followed the center of gravity approach without ref-
erence to the Second Restatement. See Hafner v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 616 F.
Supp. 735, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Idem. Co.,
420 F. Supp. 92, 94 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
179. 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968).
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rule,180 but actually utilized an interest analysis approach. The court
found a "spurious conflict" 181 requiring application of the Iowa Guest
Statute 8 2 to bar a suit between Iowa residents for an automobile accident
which occurred just across the Wisconsin border during a trip between
two Iowa cities. Five years later, the court made brief reference to the
Second Restatement in a conversion case.18 3 The only other modem
supreme court cases in tort have involved questions of marital rights,
with the court each time applying the law of the place of marital domicile
rather than the place of injury. 184 The court has cited to the Second
Restatement in two of these decisions.185
The Iowa Supreme Court has been more certain in its approach to
contract cases. In Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros.,186 the
court quoted extensively from sections 218, 188 and 6 of the Second Re-
statement to find New York law applicable to an arbitration agreement.
Again, in Cole v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters,18 7 the court
used section 188, to find Minnesota law applicable to an insurance
contract.
Given the Iowa Supreme Court's clear commitment to the principles
of the Second Restatement in contract cases, there is little doubt that it
will utilize the same approach in tort cases when a suitable opportunity
presents itself.
Kansas
The Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the place of
injury rule in Ling v. Jan's Liquors,88 a 1985 dram shop case. Ling, a
Kansas resident, lost both legs when she was struck by a passing vehicle
while attending her stalled car on a Kansas road. The driver of the car
was a highly intoxicated 19-year-old Kansas resident who had been
180. Id. at 833.
181. Id. at 834. A "spurious conflict" is a false conflict. The phrase was taken from Wein-
traub, A Method for Solving Conflicts Problems - Torts, 48 CORNELL L. Q. 215, 216 (1963).
182. Fuerste, 156 N.W.2d at 834 (applying IOWA CODE § 321.494 (repealed 1984)).
183. See Zeman v. Canton State Bank, 211 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Iowa 1973).
184. See Berghammer v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1971); Flogel v. Flogel, 257
Iowa 547, 551, 133 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1965).
185. Flogel, 133 N.W.2d at 908; see also Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 275-76, 132
N.E.2d 410, 414 (1965) (citing Second Restatement in support of applying formulas, rather
than lex loci delicti, to issues of capacity to sue and damages recoverable).
186. 258 N.W.2d 317, 326 (Iowa 1977).
187. 296 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Iowa 1980); see also Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros.
Mfg. Co., 679 F.2d 1264, 1272 n.19 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Cole and applying Second
Restatement).
188. 237 Kan. 629, 634, 703 P.2d 731, 735 (1985).
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served liquor illegally by the defendant tavern in Missouri. When Ling
sued, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim since
Kansas, the place of injury, had no dram shop law. The plaintiff argued
for application of Missouri's common law dram shop liability, but the
Kansas Supreme Court refused, stating that lex loci delicti governed.
The court specifically rejected an interest analysis approach, which ar-
guably might have called for application of Missouri common law.18 9
The latest conflicts case in tort prior to Ling took place in 1965,
when the Kansas Supreme Court determined that Missouri's limit on
recovery for wrongful death would govern an action between Kansas
parties for an auto accident in Missouri. 190 Various federal court deci-
sions in the years preceding Ling had also applied the place of injury
rule. 191
Apparently, Kansas continues to follow lex loci contractus in con-
tract cases. This can be surmised from the recent Kansas Supreme Court
decision of Brown v. Kleen Kut Manufacturing Co. 192 In Brown, a six-
teen-year-old restaurant cook was injured by a meat grinder manufac-
tured by an Ohio corporation. The manufacturing corporation had
dissolved years prior to the accident and had sold all of its assets to an-
other Ohio corporation. Later, the successor corporation merged with
another company. A second merger subsequently took place. The plain-
tiff sued all four corporations. The court held that the liability of both the
predecessor and successor corporations would be determined according
to the law of Ohio, where the contract to transfer the assets of the dis-
solved corporation was executed. 193
Kentucky
The Kentucky Supreme Court has adopted a simple and unique ap-
proach to choice of law problems in tort: it simply applies Kentucky
law.
The Kentucky experience began with a rejection of lex loci delicti
and an adoption of the Second Restatement in Wessling v. Paris, 194 where
189. See id. at 634, 703 P.2d at 735.
190. See McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 629, 400 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1965).
191. See Hawley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625 F.2d 991, 993 (10th Cir. 1980); Miller v.
Lear Siegler, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 46, 56 (D. Kan. 1981); Woods v. Homes and Structures, Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1297-98 (D. Kan. 1980).
192. 238 Kan. 642, 714 P.2d 942 (1986).
193. Id. at 646, 714 P.2d at 945. For recent federal cases applying lex loci contractus, see
First Nat. Bank v. Hough, 643 F.2d 705, 706 (10th Cir. 1981) and Dow Chem. Corp. v.
Weevil-Cide Co., 630 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D. Kan. 1986).
194. 417 S.W.2d 259, 259-61 (Ky. 1967).
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Kentucky's court of last resort avoided the Indiana guest statute by ap-
plying Kentucky law in a suit between Kentucky residents over a car
accident taking place across the Ohio River in Indiana.
A year later, in another guest statute case, Arnett v. Thompson,19 5
the court had a change of mind. It rejected the Second Restatement and
opted instead for a lex fori approach, applying Kentucky law to any
transaction or occurrence touching upon Kentucky in any way.196 The
decision in Arnett to abandon the Second Restatement was clearly result-
oriented. The suit concerned a car accident in Kentucky between Ohio
spouses. Application of the Second Restatement would have required
dismissal, under either the Ohio guest statute or the Ohio rule of spousal
immunity. Only a lex loci delicti or a lex fori approach would have re-
sulted in Kentucky law being applied and the suit being allowed to
proceed.
Arnett was followed in Foster v. Leggett,1 97 another guest statute
case, in which an Ohio plaintiff was allowed to recover damages from a
Kentucky defendant for an auto accident occurring in Ohio, even though
Ohio had a guest statute. Under lex fori, Kentucky's status as defend-
ant's place of domicile and plaintiff's place of employment, combined
with the fact that the trip began and was to have ended in Kentucky, was
enough to warrant application of Kentucky law. 198 The court appeared
to reaffirm its commitment to the lex fori approach.199 There have been
195. 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
196. The court explained its approach in the following paragraph:
Upon further study and reflection the court has decided that the conflicts question
should not be determined on the basis of a weighing of interests, but simply on the
basis of whether Kentucky has enough contacts to justify applying Kentucky law.
Under that view if the accident occurs in Kentucky (as in the instant case) there is
enough contact from that fact alone to justify applying Kentucky law. Likewise, if
the parties are residents of Kentucky and the only relationship of the case to another
state is that the accident happened there (as in Wessling), there is enough contact
with Kentucky to justify applying our law. The fact that we will apply Kentucky law
where Kentucky people have an accident in Ohio or Indiana does not require that we
apply Ohio or Indiana law where people of one of those states have an accident here,
because the basis of the application is not a weighing of contacts but simply the exist-
ence of enough contacts with Kentucky to warrant applying our law.
433 S.W.2d at 113.
197. 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
198. Id. at 829.
199. The court stated: "We are now reaffirming our position taken in Wessling v. Paris
... that if there are significant contacts-not necessarily the most significant contacts-with
Kentucky, the Kentucky law should be applied." Id. at 829. The court's citation here to
Wessling is perplexing; it was not Wessling but Arnett that adopted the lex fori approach. Two
astonished dissenters were "at a loss to understand the statement in the majority opinion that
this court is now reaffirming the position it took in the Wessling case." Id. at 830 (Reed, J.,
dissenting).
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no more recent tort conflicts cases in the Kentucky state courts. A Sixth
Circuit panel, however, correctly remarked that "Kentucky courts have
apparently applied Kentucky substantive law whenever possible. '200
Interestingly, the Kentucky courts have not yet extended their
unique lex fori approach beyond the realm of personal injury torts. In
1977, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Second Restatement in
an insurance contract case.20 1 Five years later, the court paid lip service
to its prior case and then applied a contact-counting approach to find an
insurance policy governed by Kentucky law even though the policy
stated that it was to be governed by Delaware law, the place of deliv-
ery.20 2 The court attached no significance whatsoever to the choice of
law clause.
Due to its express adoption of the Second Restatement in 1977,
Kentucky is properly viewed as a most significant relationship state with
regard to contracts. It remains to be seen whether future contract cases
will find the Kentucky courts applying the Second Restatement or some
variant of a contacts analysis, or whether, instead, the courts will decide
contract cases as they have tort cases, by applying lex fori to the constitu-
tional limits.
Louisiana
The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted interest analysis as its ap-
proach to tort cases in Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co.,203 thereby allowing
a Louisiana plaintiff to sue her adult son for a car accident occurring in
Mississippi, even though the latter state forbade suits between family
members. The Jagers court specifically overruled an earlier lex loci
delicti decision involving the Arkansas guest statute.204 Jagers was a
false conflict, as was the next conflicts decision, handed down just six
weeks later.20 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to resolve a
true conflict. In 1974, however, an appellate court applied the Second
Restatement to find Louisiana law applicable and plaintiff's suit barred
200. Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069, 1071 (6th Cir. 1983).
201. Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Ky. 1977).
202. Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky. 1982).
203. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
204. Id. at 313; see Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216
(1970).
205. See Romero v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 649, 651 (La. 1973); see
also Sullivan v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 278 So. 2d 30, 32 (La. 1973) (This was a guest statute
case in which the trial court, before Jagers, had applied Texas law to deny recovery. The
supreme court remanded for further findings of fact in light of Jagers.).
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in light of her earlier recovery under a worker's compensation law;20 6 the
Second Restatement had been consulted only after the court had first
determined that Louisiana and Arkansas were both concerned jurisdic-
tions.207 In 1984, however, an appellate court held that true conflicts
were to be resolved by reference to the principles of the Second Restate-
ment.208 Another appellate court held likewise in 1986.209 Moreover, a
number of federal courts in the years following Jagers have found refuge
in the Second Restatement when confronted with true conflict cases. 210
The Louisiana approach in contract cases parallels the approach ad-
vocated by the appellate and federal courts in tort actions. Here, there
have been no Louisiana Supreme Court decisions since Jagers,21 1 but a
number of appellate panels have interpreted Jagers as reaching beyond
tort. The leading case is Sutton v. Langley,212 an insurance case involv-
ing an attempt by a Texan to recover for injuries caused by an uninsured
motorist in Louisiana. The court opined that Jagers was a refutation of
206. Wayne v. Olinkraft, Inc., 293 So. 2d 896, 898-901 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 294 So.
2d 827 (La. 1974).
207. See id. at 898.
208. Lee v. Ford Motor Co., 457 So. 2d 193 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 461 S.2d 309 (La.
1984). According to Lee:
Interest analysis is a two-step process. We must first determine whether a true or
false conflict exists. If a false conflict exists, the law of the state that has the exclusive
interest is applied and the second step is unnecessary. If a true conflict exists, the law
of the state with the most significant contacts is applied.
Id. at 194. Lee was a products liability suit by a Louisiana resident against a Georgia manu-
facturer. Georgia allowed recovery for punitive damages while Louisiana did not. The court
determined that a true conflict existed because Georgia had a policy of deterring domestic
manufacturers from making defective products and Louisiana had an interest "in protecting
the integrity of its judicial system, rather than domestic defendants, from what it might con-
sider inherently speculative awards." Id. at 194-95 (quoting Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp.
78, 83 (E.D. La. 1976)). The court then applied §§ 145 and 6 of the Second Restatement and
found Louisiana law applicable, since Georgia's only connection with the case was the fact that
the defective manufacturing occurred there. Id. at 195-96.
209. See Brown v. DSI Transports, Inc., 496 So. 2d 478, 481 (La. Ct. App. 1986). In
Brown, the court found a true conflict between Alabama's contributory negligence rule and
Louisiana's comparative negligence rule. Defendant was engaged in business in Alabama and
plaintiff was a Louisianan. Thus, the purposes behind each state's law would have been served
by its application on these facts. The court applied Louisiana law in reliance on § 145 and § 6
of the Second Restatement.
210. See Brinkley & West, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir. 1974);
Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. La. 1976); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp. 453, 456 (W.D. La. 1976).
211. A pre-Jagers decision, Deane v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972), an-
nounced the general rule that "the nature, validity and interpretation of an insurance contract
is governed by the law of the place where made." Id. at 696, 260 So. 2d at 673. The court,
however, acknowledged that its choice of law decision did not affect the result in the case. Id.
at 697, 260 So. 2d at 673.
212. 330 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 332 So. 2d 805, 820 (La. 1976).
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lex loci contractus as well as lex loci delicti.213 After weighing the gov-
ernmental interests relevant to the dispute, the court applied Louisiana
law and granted coverage. 214 A similar decision was reached in Wilson v.
State Farm Insurance Co., 215 again after a weighing of governmental in-
terests. Three other Louisiana appellate decisions have also applied in-
terest analysis in contract cases. 216 Federal courts, too, generally have
applied the Jagers approach in contact cases. 217
Maine
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has expressly adopted the Sec-
ond Restatement approach for resolution of choice of law issues in both
tort and contract cases. In a guest statute case, Beaulieu v. Beaulieu,218
the court, after discarding lex loci delicti, appeared to adopt an interest
analysis approach. The court applied Maine law rather than the Massa-
chusetts guest statute because both driver and passenger were Maine resi-
dents, and Massachusetts, because it was merely the situs of the accident,
had "no real concern in the application of its rule of gross negligence to
the guest-driver relationship of the parties to this litigation. '219 The
court, however, also relied on a comment to what is now section 145 of
the Second Restatement, calling for application of the law of the state of
common domicile in all guest statute cases.220
213. Id. at 327.
214. Id. at 328.
215. 448 So. 2d 1379, 1382 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
216. See Armstrong v. Land & Marine Applicators, Inc., 463 So. 2d 1327, 1328-29 (La.
Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 466 So. 2d 1299, 1307 (La. 1985); Bloodworth v. Carroll, 455 So.
2d 1197, 1206-07 (La. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 463 So. 2d 1313 (La. 1985);
Wickham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 366 So. 2d 951, 954 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
217. See Paull v. Zolfoghary, 616 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. La. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 1411
(5th Cir. 1986); Silver v. Nelson, 610 F. Supp. 505, 513 (E.D. La. 1985); Business Air Center,
Inc. v. Puritan Ins. Co., 593 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (W.D. La. 1984); Highlands Ins. Co. v.
Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 169, 171 (E.D. La. 1980); Brawner v. Kauf-
man, 496 F. Supp. 961, 962-63 (E.D. La. 1980); Southern Ins. Co. v. Consumer Ins. Agency,
Inc., 442 F. Supp. 30,31 (E.D. La. 1977). But see Porter v. Am. Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128,
1144 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 418,
421 (5th Cir. 1979) (each applying the place of making rule on the strength of pre-Jagers
Louisiana authority).
218. 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970).
219. Id. at 614-15.
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 comment d (1969) states:
[Tihe circumstances under which a guest passenger has a right of action against the
driver of an automobile for injuries suffered as a result of the latter's negligence may
be determined by the local law of their common domicile, if at least this is the state
from which they departed on their trip and that to which they intended to return,
rather than by the local law of the state where the injury occurred.
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In Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 2 2 1 the Maine high court made it
clear that it would apply the Second Restatement to all conflict cases
sounding in tort.222 In Adams, a factory worker was injured when a drill
press accidentally activated while the worker was changing drill bits. His
suit against the manufacturer of the drill press, a New York company,
failed to state a cause of action under Maine law due to the doctrine of
privity. The court applied sections 145 and 146, and found the latter
section's presumptive reference to the place of injury, Maine,
controlling.223
Finally, in Baybutt Construction Corp. v. Commerical Union Insur-
ance Co.,224 the supreme judicial court specifically extended its previous
tort approach to an insurance contract case, applying sections 188 and
193 of the Second Restatement, and following the latter section's pre-
sumptive reference to application of the law of the state where the princi-
pal risk is located. 225
The First Circuit followed Beaulieu and Adams in Mason v. South-
ern New England Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists, 226 a
case in which a Maine plaintiff was injured in a Massachusetts parochial
school building when a motion picture screen fell on her. Applying sec-
tions 6, 145, and 146 of the Second Restatement, the court resolved a
conflict in favor of Massachusetts' charitable immunity statute, which
limited plaintiff's recovery to $20,O0.227
221. 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982).
222. Id. at 934.
223. Id. at 934-35. Section 146 of the Second Restatement provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particu-
lar issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF" CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1969).
224. 455 A.2d 914, 918 (Me. 1983).
225. Section 193 of the Second Restatement provides:
The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance and the rights created
thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the parties understood was
to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy, unless
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relation-
ship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which
event the local law of the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193 (1969).
226. 696 F.2d 135, 136-38 (1st Cir. 1982); see also Kenerson v. Stevenson, 621 F. Supp.
1179, 1180-81 (D. Me. 1985) (relying on § 146 and applying the law of New Hampshire in
malpractice action).
227. 696 F.2d at 136 (applying MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85K (West Supp.
1982)); see also Burley v. General Motors Corp., 650 F. Supp. 90, 92 (D. Me. 1986); Kenerson
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These cases demonstrate that the state of Maine is serious in its
commitment to the Second Restatement approach. Unlike many other
courts, Maine courts actually apply the Second Restatement as it was
intended to be used, utilizing the presumptive references when possible
and displacing the law so selected only when another state has a more
significant relationship to the parties and the transaction.
Maryland
The Maryland Supreme Court has had two recent opportunities to
discard traditional choice of law concepts. Each time, the court has
steadfastly refused to do so.
In Hauch v. Connor,228 the court reaffirmed its adherence to the
place of injury rule in tort cases. In that case, Maryland workers sued a
co-employee for negligence in connection with an automobile accident
that happened in Delaware. The plaintiffs asked the court to adopt sec-
tion 145 of the Second Restatement and apply Maryland tort law. The
court expressly rejected this invitation, instead adhering to lex loci delicti
for reasons of stare decisis, predictability, and recognition of "the legiti-
mate interests which the foreign state has in the incidents of the act giv-
ing rise to injury. ' 229 The court found, however, that the question of
whether injured workers could sue a coemployee was a matter governed
by the worker's compensation statute of the state where the workers re-
sided. Thus, despite the fact that Delaware tort law applied, Maryland's
worker's compensation laws, which permitted suits against a co-em-
ployee, took precedence. Because the case was characterized as one in-
volving the implementation of Maryland worker's compensation law,
plaintiffs' suit was allowed to proceed.
Two years later, the Maryland Supreme Court applied the tradi-
tional place of making rule in a contract dispute.230 Again, however, the
court found a way to avoid the harshness of its selected choice of law
rule, this time by invoking Maryland public policy. The court refused to
enforce a provision in an industrial painting contract, valid under the law
of Pennsylvania, where the contract was made, but invalid under Mary-
land law, in which a corporate contractor agreed to indemnify its sub-
v. Stevenson, 621 F. Supp. 1179, 1180-81 (D. Me. 1985) (each applying "most significant rela-
tionship" test in tort).
228. 295 Md. 120, 125, 453 A.2d 1207, 1210 (1983).
229. Id. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210.
230. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985). The
court stated that "[i]n deciding questions of the validity and construction of contracts, a Mary-
land court ordinarily looks to the law of the place of making of the contract (lex loci contrac-
tus)." Id. at 188, 498 A.2d at 607.
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contractor for amounts which the subcontractor was forced to pay to
third parties as damages resulting solely from the subcontractor's negli-
gent acts.
These two cases indicate the ease with which the traditional conflict
of law rules can be circumvented. Recharacterization from tort to
worker's compensation and invocation of a public policy exception pro-
vided ready means for avoiding the severity of the traditional rules. At
the same time, the fact that the court chose to use escape devices rather
than adopt a modem choice of law theory indicates that strong support
for the First Restatement approach still exists on the Maryland Supreme
Court.
Other Maryland courts have also applied lex loci delicti in conflicts
cases. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has held that the District
of Columbia's no-fault automobile insurance law governs the rights of
parties involved in car accidents occurring in the District, even if all par-
ties involved are Maryland residents. 231 In addition, federal courts in
Maryland have, on several occasions, noted the state's continued adher-
ence to the place of injury rule in tort cases. 232
Massachusetts
In the last ten years, the Massachusetts courts, like many others,
have slowly gravitated away from the traditional choice of law rules to-
ward the system described in the Second Restatement.
The first sign of departure from the traditional rule in tort cases
came in Pevoski v. Pevoski,233 where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, even while reaffirming lex loci delicti for use in tort cases gener-
ally,234 carved an exception to that rule whereby the law of the state of
the marital domicile would govern issues of interspousal immunity. 235
The First Restatement was again denied application a year later, in
Saharceski v. Marcure,236 where the court held that the question of an
employee's right to sue a coemployee in tort for injuries occurring in the
231. Jacobs v. Adams, 66 Md. App. 779, 505 A.2d 930, cert denied, 306 Md. 513, 514,
510 A.2d 259, 260 (1986).
232. Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 511 (4th Cir. 1986); Rockstroh v. A.H.
Robins Co., 602 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (D. Md. 1985); Korotki v. Goughan, 597 F. Supp. 1365,
1379 (D. Md. 1984).
233. 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976).
234. "In this Commonwealth, lex loci delicti has been firmly established as the general tort
conflicts rule. This rule has provided, and will continue to provide, a rational and just proce-
dure for selecting the law governing the vast majority of issues in multi-State tort suits." Id. at
359, 358 N.E.2d at 417. In fact, the court has not relied upon the lex loci delicti rule since.
235. Id. at 361, 358 N.E.2d at 418.
236. 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977).
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course of employment would be governed by the law of the employees'
common domicile rather than the law of the place of injury.237
In Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,238 the break with the tradi-
tional rule became even wider. There, the court referred to the place of
injury rule, but ultimately quoted from the presumptive reference in sec-
tion 146 of the Second Restatement and determined that Massachusetts
had the greatest interest in having its law applied to plaintiff's claim for
breach of warranty. 239 The court denied recovery.
While the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has been less than
resolute in its tort conflict decisions, the Massachusetts federal courts
sitting in diversity have, without exception, read Pevoski and its progeny
as mandating a resort to the Second Restatement for tort conflict
resolution.240
Fortunately, in contract cases, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court has been more explicit in its decisions. A pair of 1985 cases seem
to indicate that the court has endorsed the Second Restatement approach
for contract issues.
In the first of these cases, Bushkin Associates, Inc. v. Raytheon
Co.,241 the court indicated its rejection of the place of making rule, but
then stated that it had resolved "not to tie Massachusetts conflict law to
any specific choice-of-law doctrine, but seek instead a functional choice
of law approach that responds to the interests of the parties, the States
involved, and the interstate system as a whole. ' 242 However, the court
went on to quote extensively from sections 188 and 6 and, in fact, to
apply those provisions in finding Massachusetts law applicable to an oral
contract negotiated over the telephone and across state lines, thereby up-
holding the agreement over a Statute of Frauds defense. 243
237. Id. at 310-11, 366 N.E.2d at 1249; see also Frassa v. Caulfield, 22 Mass. App. 105,
108, 491 N.E.2d 657, 659, review denied, 398 Mass. 1101, 495 N.E.2d 310 (Mass. 1986).
238. 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983).
239. Id. at 333-37, 450 N.E.2d at 585-86.
240. See Bi-Rite Enter., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 443 (1st Cir. 1985);
Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 627 F. Supp. 358, 362 (D. Mass. 1985); Free-
man v. World Airways, 596 F. Supp. 841, 845 (D. Mass. 1984); Emery Corp. v. Century
BanCorp., 588 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D. Mass. 1984); Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp.,
571 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 59 (lst Cir. 1984); Bushkin Assoc.,
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 570 F. Supp. 596, 599 (D. Mass. 1983); King v. Williams Indus., Inc.,
565 F. Supp. 321, 324 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 240 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
980 (1984); Schulhof v. Northeast Cellulose, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (D. Mass. 1982);
McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (D. Mass. 1980).
241. 393 Mass. 622, 473 N.E.2d 662 (1985).
242. Id. at 631, 473 N.E.2d at 668.
243. See Computer Sys. of Am. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 795 F.2d 1086,
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In the second case, Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Zotal, Ltd.,244 the
court stated flatly that it had, in its prior decision, "adopted the general
principles advanced in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(1971) with respect to the resolution of conflicts problems involving con-
tracts." 245 It then utilized the presumptive reference of section 191, and
found that Massachusetts, as the place of delivery, was the state of the
applicable law in an international sale of goods case.
As a result of its two recent forays into the Second Restatement, the
Massachusetts approach in contract disputes is now well settled.
Although the matter is not free from doubt, the supreme judicial court's
commitment to the Second Restatement in contract cases will likely in-
fluence its decisions in upcoming tort cases as well.
Michigan
Michigan, traditionally a lex loci delicti state,2 4 6 departed from that
rule in the 1982 companion cases of Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.,
and Storie v. Southfield Leasing, Inc.247 The facts of the two cases are
parallel. In Sexton, the Michigan plaintiff was a passenger in a leased
truck which overturned in Virginia. Rather than suing the driver, a co-
employee, the injured plaintiff sued the lessor, a Florida corporation do-
ing business in Michigan. Under the Michigan motor vehicle owner's
liability statute,248 the owner of a motor vehicle was liable for any injury
caused by the negligence of one to whom the owner had entrusted the
vehicle. Virginia law imposed no such owner's liability. In Storie, plain-
tiff's Michigan spouse was a passenger in an airplane piloted by the presi-
dent of the corporation which employed him. The plane, which had been
leased from a Michigan corporation, crashed in Ohio, killing both pilot
and passenger. The plaintiff instituted a wrongful death action against
the lessor, relying on Michigan's aircraft owner's liability statute, 249
1091-92 (Ist Cir. 1986) (another Statute of Frauds case, although here, the court quoted § 6
and § 188 of the Second Restatement, but applied Texas law on a contacts basis).
244. 394 Mass. 95, 474 N.E.2d 1070 (1985).
245. Id. at 97, 474 N.E.2d at 1073.
246. See Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 516, 170 N.W.2d 137, 139 (1969). The
supreme court carved out an exception to the lex loci delicti rule in Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402
Mich. 234, 242, 262 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1978), in which the court held that the law of the state
of common domicile would govern questions of intra-family tort immunity.
247. 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1982).
248. Id. at 414, 320 N.W.2d at 845 (applying MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.401 (West
1977)).
249. Id. at 418, 320 N.W.2d at 846 (applying MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 259.180a (West
1977)).
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which made an aircraft owner liable for injuries caused by the negligence
of the pilot. Ohio imposed no such owner's liability.
The Michigan Supreme Court allowed recovery in each case, re-
jecting strict adherence to lex loci delicti and adopting instead a lex fori
approach. Five of the seven justices voted to allow recovery, but there
was no majority opinion. Justice Williams, in an opinion joined by Jus-
tices Moody and Levin, stated that Michigan courts would apply Michi-
gan law in any case in which all parties were from Michigan, regardless
of where the occurrence giving rise to suit took place.250 Justice Kava-
nagh wrote separately, joined by Justices Levin and Fitzgerald, in an
opinion that appeared to express no particular disagreement with Justice
Williams.251
It was left to Justice Levin, in a third opinion signed only by himself,
to indicate the apparent disagreement. Justice Levin, making clear his
preference for Kavanagh's approach, proceeded to rewrite the latter's
opinion in such a way as to eliminate the requirement that all parties be
from Michigan and to substitute a forum-favoring brand of interest anal-
ysis in place of Justice Williams' lex fori approach.25 2 Finally, in a part-
ing shot, Justice Levin emphasized that the consensus of the court was
that the new approach would be limited to personal injury and property
damage cases, and that lex loci delicti would continue to bind lower
courts in other areas of the law.25 3
In the 1987 case of Olmstead v. Anderson,254 it became clear that
application of the rule of lex fori would not be confined to cases in which
all parties were Michigian residents. In short, Justice Levin's opinion in
250. Id. at 433, 320 N.W.2d at 854. The court, however, qualified its holding, stating:
"We reach this conclusion on the facts and reasoning herein developed. We do not here adopt
the law of dominant contacts or any other particular methodology, although any such reason-
ing may, of course, be argued where persuasive and appropriate." Id.
25 1. In his brief concurrence, Justice Kavanagh expressed his agreement with the plural-
ity's opinion that lex loci delicti should be discarded. In a cryptic conclusion, he continued:
The power of a state to effect legal consequences is not limited to occurrences within
the state if it has control over the status which gives rise to those consequences. The
status of ownership giving rise to the legal consequence of liability has been regulated
in Michigan by [the owner's liability statutes] and so the occurrence of the accident
beyond Michigan's boundaries is not controlling under these Michigan laws.
Id. at 440-41, 320 N.W.2d at 857 (Kavanagh, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
252. Justice Levin wrote:
I... agree with Justice Kavanagh that we should go the distance and declare that
Michigan law will apply in all personal injury and property damage actions without
regard to whether the plaintiffs and defendants are all Michigan persons unless there
is compelling reason for applying the law of some other jurisdiction.
Id. at 442, 320 N.W.2d at 858 (Levin, J., concurring).
253. Id.
254. 428 Mich. 1, 400 N.W.2d 292 (1987).
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Sexton, although signed only by the writer, was the opinion that ulti-
mately prevailed.
The facts of Olmstead were as follows: Two residents of Minnesota
and one resident of Wisconsin went on a camping trip together in Michi-
gan's Upper Peninsula. En route home, the three campers were involved
in a head-on automobile accident in which all three were killed. The
driver of the other vehicle, a Michigan resident, was also killed. The
accident occurred in Wisconsin. Where the legal representative of the
two deceased Minnesotans' estates brought an action against the admin-
istrator of the Michigan's resident estate, they were met with the defense
of Wisconsin's $25,000 limit on recovery for wrongful death. Neither
Minnesota nor Michigan had any such limitation on a plaintiff's tort
recovery.
The Michigan Supreme Court, faced with a case in which only one
party was from Michigan, nevertheless interpreted Sexton as calling for
the application of lex fori, rather than lex loci delicti, on these facts. Fur-
thermore, although Sexton contemplated occasions where forum law
would be displaced if another state had a greater interest in having its law
applied than did Michigan, this was not such a case given the fact that
Minnesota's law, like Michigan's, permitted unlimited recovery for
wrongful death. Michigan law was therefore applied.255
In contract cases, Michigan continues to follow the traditional place
of making and place of performance rules. The most recent supreme
court cases are from the 1940s, 256 but a 1970 decision of the Michigan
Court of Appeals attests to the continued vitality of the traditional rules
in contract cases. 257
Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court has been a consistent advocate of
255. The court stated:
In this case, plaintiff was not a Michigan resident. However, that fact does not affect
the conclusion reached in Sexton that the chief conceptual underpinnings of lex loci
delicti--certainty and predictability-are no longer viable. The court arrived at that
conclusion without reference to the parties' citizenship. Therefore, to apply lex loci
delicti in this case would advance those rationales no more than it would have in
Sexton.
Id.
256. See Keehn v. Charles J. Rogers, Inc., 311 Mich. 416, 425, 18 N.W.2d 877, 880
(1945), cert denied, 326 U.S. 797 (1946); Rubin v. Gallagher, 294 Mich. 124, 128, 292 N.W.
584, 586 (1940).
257. See Waldorf v. KMS Indus., Inc., 25 Mich. App. 20, 23, 181 N.W.2d 85, 87 (1970)
("The general rule is that contractual rights are governed by the law of the state in which the
contract was executed").
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Leflar's choice-influencing considerations since the classic guest statute
case of Milkovich v. Saari.258 In that case, two residents of Thunder Bay,
Ontario, drove across the border to Minnesota for a day of entertain-
ment. A one-car accident occurred and plaintiff passenger sued for inju-
ries sustained. Defendant asserted the Ontario guest statute as a defense,
but the supreme court held the guest statute inapplicable. After exten-
sive reliance on Kell v. Henderson259 and Clark v. Clark260 two guest
statute cases with identical fact patterns, the court indicated a "prefer-
ence for the better-law approach" advocated by Professor Leflar.2 61 Ap-
plying the five Leflar factors, the court found only two to be important,
and each pointed toward application of Minnesota law: Minnesota had
an interest as a "justice-administering state" that its "courts not be called
upon to determine issues under rules which, however, [sic] acceptable
they may be in other states, are inconsistent with our own concept of
fairness and equity"; and Minnesota common-law liability was a better
rule of law than the Ontario guest statute.262 The guest-host suit was,
therefore, allowed to proceed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's next opportunity to apply the Le-
flar factors in a tort case came in Bigelow v. Halloran.263 In that case, the
court was faced with the question of whether an Iowa plaintiff's cause of
action against a Minnesota defendant for an intentional shooting on the
plaintiff's Iowa farm would survive the death of the defendant, who com-
mitted suicide the same day. Again, the court held that "only the last
two elements of Professor Leflar's five-point methodology are relevant to
tort cases."' 264 The court found no important governmental interests of
Minnesota to be advanced. It further found that Iowa's survival statute,
because of its compensatory nature, was a better law than Minnesota's
statutory bar of survival in intentional tort cases. A plaintiff's verdict
was affirmed.
The latest invocation of Leflar's model in tort cases took place in In
re Discipline of Hoffman,265 where the supreme court heard a client's
258. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
259. 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965).
260. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
261. Milkovich, 295 Minn. at 164, 203 N.W.2d at 413.
262. As for the other three choice-influencing considerations, the need for predictability
of result had no application to a wholly unforeseen tort incident, maintenance of interstate and
international order was not threatened so long as the state whose law was selected had a sub-
stantial connection with the case, and simplification of the judicial task was inapposite where
applying either forum law or foreign law was equally easy. Id. at 170, 203 N.W.2d at 416-17.
263. 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981).
264. Id. at 12.
265. 379 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Minn. 1986).
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attack on an attorney's fee. Both attorney and client were Minnesota
residents. The client had been injured on the job while working in
Alaska and had received an award under that state's workers' compensa-
tion laws. A provision of the Alaska workers' compensation statute pro-
hibited an attorney representing an injured employee from collecting a
fee without the prior approval of the state workers' compensation board.
The attorney's fee in this case was not submitted for prior approval. Re-
lying on the Leflar factors, the court held the fee illegal under the appli-
cable Alaska law.
The Minnesota courts have repeatedly applied the Leflar approach
to insurance contract disputes. The first case was Hague v. Allstate In-
surance Co., 26 6 where the laws of Minnesota and Wisconsin differed on
the legality of stacking multiple insurance policies owned by the same
insured so as to allow increased coverage. The supreme court chose to
apply Minnesota law, which was the better law because it allowed stack-
ing. Shortly thereafter came Hime v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 267
The court cited advancement of Minnesota's governmental interest as fo-
rum in support of a decision to strike a clause in an insurance contract,
valid under the law of Florida where the policy was issued, which ex-
cluded recovery in cases of intra-family liability. Later, in another stack-
ing case, Hoeschen v. South Carolina Insurance Co.,268 the court of
appeals again chose Minnesota law as the better law because it allowed
stacking. The most recent contract case in the supreme court269 involved
the initial permission rule, whereby insurance coverage continues even
when the borrower of a motor vehicle exceeds the scope of the permis-
sion given by the owner. Minnesota law, which allowed recovery under
the initial permission rule, was applied here as well.
The Minnesota experience demonstrates several significant facts
concerning the Leflar approach. First, it is extremely pliant, often al-
lowing a court to reach a result not attainable under any other commonly
accepted modem theory. Milkovich is a good example. Both the Second
Restatement and interest analysis clearly favor application of the law of
the state of common domicile in guest statute cases. Judge Fuld's rules
and Cavers' principles of preference apply the same rule. The Minnesota
court, however, used the Leflar system and reached a different result.
266. 289 N.W.2d 43, 46-49 (Minn. 1978), aff'd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). This is the well-
known case in which the United States Supreme Court gave a liberal reading to the forum's
constitutional authority to apply its own law in conflicts cases.
267. 284 N.W.2d 829, 833-34 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
268. 349 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 378 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. 1985).
269. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 163
(Minn. 1983).
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Second, the Leflar approach is extremely forum-favoring. In fact,
the fourth Leflar factor, advancement of the forum's government inter-
est, is blatantly proforum. This point takes on added importance when it
is observed that only two of the five Leflar factors are even given consid-
eration by the Minnesota Supreme Court in tort cases, an approach not
at all at odds with that taken in other Leflar states. In this context, it is
obvious that a litigant arguing for application of a foreign law has little
chance of success unless he can demonstrate, as in the Bigelow case, that
the forum's governmental interests are not affected and that the foreign
law is the decidedly superior one.
Finally, the Leflar approach is distinctly proplaintiff: the plaintiff
prevailed in each of the Minnesota cases discussed above. This, too, is
consistent with the results in other Leflar states. Whatever one's opinion
of the Leflar system may be, it certainly has found favor with the Minne-
sota Supreme Court. The court can be expected to continue to use this
approach in future cases.
Mississippi
Mississippi is strictly a Second Restatement state. The leading tort
case is Mitchell v. Craft, 270 a wrongful death suit between two Mississippi
residents over a car accident occurring in Louisiana. The question for
decision was whether Louisiana's rule of contributory negligence would
completely bar the plaintiff's recovery. The Mississippi Supreme Court
refused to apply the law of Louisiana merely because the accident took
place there. Instead, it applied Mississippi's rule of comparative fault,
citing at length to sections 175, 145, 164, and 6 of the Second Restate-
ment.2 71 In an alternative holding, the court also found Mississippi law
applicable under the five-factor approach advocated by Professor Leflar.
Only the final two factors, advancement of the forum's governmental in-
terest and application of the better rule of law, were deemed relevant in
automobile collision cases such as this, and both pointed to Mississippi
law.272
Although an interim case, Vick v. Cochran,273 appeared to espouse a
center of gravity approach, the supreme court settled the matter in
270. 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
271. Id. at 515-16.
272. Id. at 514. Precisely the same facts were presented in Fells v. Bowman, 274 So. 2d
109 (Miss. 1973), the court again holding that Mississippi comparative fault would govern in a
suit between Mississippi residents over an accident in Louisiana.
273. 316 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975). Vick involved an accident between Alabama residents
in Mississippi. In holding that the Alabama guest statute applied to the case, the court stated
that "the 'center of gravity or of most substantial relationships' unquestionably is in Ala-
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Spragins v. Louise Plantation, Inc. ,274 when it stated that it had adopted
"the center of gravity doctrine or the most significant relationship test,"
and that "in order to determine the most significant relationships, this
court has looked to Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for gui-
dance. ' 275 Spragins involved a contract to sell real estate, but the court's
broad language indicates that it will apply the Second Restatement in all
cases.
If more confirmation of Mississippi's adherence to the Second Re-
statement was needed, it came in Boardman v. United Services Automo-
bile Association,276 where, while still referring to its method as a center of
gravity approach, the court, in response to a certified question from the
Fifth Circuit,2 7 7 announced no less than three times that Mitchell v. Craft
had endorsed the Second Restatement approach to conflict of laws.278
The court then found Nebraska law applicable in a dispute over interpre-
tation of an insurance contract, after citation to sections 6, 188, and 193.
The Mississippi federal courts sitting in diversity have repeatedly
applied the Second Restatement to choice of law issues.279
Boardman illustrates the Mississippi Supreme Court's commitment
to the Second Restatement approach in all areas of substantive law.
Though occasionally labeled a center of gravity approach, the Mississippi
standard is clearly the Second Restatement. Beyond question, that stan-
dard will be at the heart of future conflicts decision in Mississippi.
Missouri
The Missouri Supreme Court expressly adopted the Second Restate-
ment in Kennedy v. Dixon.280 In that case, Missouri residents were in-
volved in a tragic car accident on an interstate freeway in Indiana while
on their way home from a vacation in New York. The driver of the
bama." Id. at 246. It arrived at this conclusion through a pure contact-counting method, but
it is apparent from the facts that the Second Restatement would have led to the same result.
274. 391 So. 2d 97 (Miss. 1980).
275. Id. at 99-100.
276. 470 So. 2d 1024 (Miss.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 384 (1985).
277. See Boardman v. United Services Auto. Assoc., 742 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 384 (1985).
278. Id. at 1030.
279. See Moore v. United States Auto. Assoc., 808 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1987); Nich-
ols v. Anderson, 788 F.2d 1140, 1142 (5th Cir. 1986); Price v. Litton Sys., Inc., 784 F.2d 600,
602 (5th Cir. 1986); Davis v. National Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir. 1984);
Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057, 1066 (5th Cir. 1984); Perry v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 606 F. Supp. 270, 272-73 (S.D. Miss. 1985); Raynes v. Hassie-Hunt Trust, 595 F.
Supp. 818, 821 (S.D. Miss. 1984). But see Bock v. Thompson, 818 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1987)
(applying center of gravity in tort case).
280. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969).
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vehicle was killed in the accident. The plaintiff, who had been riding in
the back seat was injured, and sued the driver's estate for damages. The
estate pleaded the Indiana guest statute2 1 in defense. After a discussion
of various choice of law authorities, and a review of Schwartz v.
Schwartz,28 2 the Arizona case which was the first to adopt the Second
Restatement in tort a year earlier, the Missouri Supreme Court an-
nounced that it was adopting section 145 of the Second Restatement and
that it would use Missouri law on these facts.283 The Indiana guest stat-
ute was not applied.
The court most recently applied section 145 of the Second Restate-
ment in Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,284 a suit by a worker against his
employer for illness created by long-term exposure to asbestos in the
workplace. The court applied the law of the state of employment rather
than the state of the plaintiff's domicile. All recent conflicts decisions of
the Missouri Court of Appeals have featured section 145 of the Second
Restatement, 285 as have the decisions of the federal courts sitting in
diversity. 286
281. IND. CODE § 47-1021 (current version at § 9-3-3-1 (West 1976)).
282. 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
283. Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 184-85.
284. 673 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Mo. 1984).
285. See Nelson v. Hall, 684 S.W.2d 350, 352-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Carver v. Schafer,
647 S.W.2d 570, 576 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Huff v. LaSieur, 571 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); Byrn v. American Universal Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 186, 188-89 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977). But see Hicks v. Graves Truck Lines, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(court of appeals indicated "that the doctrine of comparative impairment should be adopted to
resolve choice of law cases in which the facts indicate significant contacts with Missouri and
another state under the Restatement § 145 test and in which both states have legitimate state
interests in the law choice.")
In Hicks, the court held that Missouri's system of pure comparative fault would be ap-
plied to allow a Missouri plaintiff to recover against a Kansas defendant for injuries sustained
in a car-truck accident in Kansas, even though a jury found that the plaintiff was 60% at fault
and therefore ineligible for recovery under the comparative fault law of Kansas. The court
recognized the Missouri Supreme Court's adoption of the Second Restatement, but found that
Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969), was not a true choice of law case and, there-
fore, was not controlling authority in the the context of a true conflict. Hicks, 707 S.W.2d at
443.
286. See Ewing v. St. Louis-Clayton Orthopedic Group, 790 F.2d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 1986);
Institutional Food Assoc., Ltd. v. Golden State Strawberries, Inc., 747 F.2d 448, 454 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1984); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d
1040, 1054 n.20 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Daniel Hamm Drayage Co.
v. Waldinger Corp., 508 F. Supp. 390, 395 (E.D. Mo.), modified on other grounds, 666 F.2d
1213 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Nika Corp. v. City of Kansas City, 582 F. Supp. 343, 354 n.5
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (citing Daniel Hamm Drayage Co. and Kennedy without referring to the
Second Restatement); Hansen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 641, 644 (E.D. Mo.
1983) (holding in alternative that Indiana's "statute of repose" was procedural and, therefore,
not to be applied in Missouri forum).
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In Miller v. Home Insurance Co.,287 the Missouri Supreme Court
was presented with an opportunity to apply section 188 of the Second
Restatement to a dispute over the interpretation of an insurance contract,
but specifically declined to do so. Again, in State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co. v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co.,288 the court indicated
that the law of the place where the policies were issued would govern in
an insurance case. A federal district court concluded flatly that "Mis-
souri law employs lex loci contractus analysis to determine which law
applies in insurance contract suits. '289
Significantly, however, in both Miller and State Farm, the supreme
court issued alternative holdings under the Second Restatement. 290 Even
more significantly, in neither case did the court criticize the persistent
use of section 188 in the court of appeals. In a flurry of cases, numbering
at least eight, the court of appeals has held that choice of law issues in
contract will be determined with reference to section 188 and the Second
Restatement. 291 All but two of these cases postdate Miller, giving evi-
dence that the Second Restatement is alive and thriving in Missouri in
contract as well as in tort.
Montana
There are only two modern conflicts decisions in Montana, and one
of those cases was resolved by statute. That case was Kemp v. Allstate
Insurance Co. 292 A Vermont plaintiff who was insured under policies
issued in Vermont and New York was killed on an interstate highway in
Montana while riding as a passenger in a car driver by another Vermont
resident. The accident was caused by a Montana resident in another ve-
hicle. The Montana Supreme Court held that insurance issues would be
governed by a Montana statute293 requiring application of the law of the
287. 605 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Mo. 1980).
288. 671 S.W.2d 276, 277 n.2 (Mo. 1984).
289. Perkins v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 586 F. Supp. 296, 300 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd,
755 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1985);
290. See Miller, 605 S.W.2d at 780; State Farm, 671 S.W.2d at 277-78.
291. See Crown Center Redevelopment Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 716 S.W.2d
348, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Ranch Hand Foods, Inc. v. Polar Pak Foods, Inc., 690 S.W.2d
437, 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Nooter Corp. v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985); Brown v. Brown, 678 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Bigham v. McCall Serv.
Stations, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State ex rel. Geil v. Corcoran, 623
S.W.2d 555, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Nakao v. Nakao, 602 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980); National Starch and Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978).
292. 183 Mont. 526, 601 P.2d 20 (1979).
293. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102 (1985).
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place of performance in all contract disputes. The court determined that
the place of performance was Montana, where the insurance benefits
would be paid. The court then noted the convergence of the statutory
choice of law rule and the traditional rule requiring resort to the law of
the place of making or the place of performance. The language used by
the court seems to indicate a preference for the traditional rule.294 The
result of applying the statutory directive was favorable to plaintiff's es-
tate, since Montana allowed for stacking of the uninsured motorist bene-
fits awarded under the two insurance policies.
The other choice of law case to reach the Montana Supreme Court
in the modem era was In re Estate of Murnion,295 where the court ap-
plied sections 283 and 6 of the Second Restatement to uphold the legality
of a common law marriage in Montana not recognized in the State of
Washington where the couple first resided. Recognition of the validity of
the marriage allowed the surviving spouse to obtain workers' compensa-
tion benefits when the other died, and also to participate in a wrongful
death award. The opinion was highly result-oriented and should not be
taken as a general endorsement of the Second Restatement for resolution
of conflict cases.
Finally, there is some support for application of lex loci delicti in
tort cases as a result of Haker v. Southwestern Railway Co.,296 a wrongful
death action instituted by the spouse of a Montana resident killed in a
private airplane crash in Montana. Some of the named defendants were
from Arizona. The court did not discuss the relevance of the interstate
connections, but simply applied Montana law to all aspects of the case.
Given the fact that Montana clearly had the closest relationship to the
case, the court's choice of law was not surprising.
These cases provide scant evidence for assessing the current state of
Montana conflicts law. Kemp makes clear that the Montana courts will
apply the traditional rules in contract cases, looking to the place of mak-
ing or place of performance. Dicta in Kemp also seems to indicate that in
1979 the Montana Supreme Court was satisfied with this result as a mat-
ter of judicial policy. Absent any evidence of intention to adopt a mod-
294. The court stated:
This ruling is in harmony with the long-standing rule that the law of place of per-
formance of an insurance contract controls as to its legal construction and effect, but
the law of the place where the contract was made governs on questions of execution
and validity, unless the terms of the contract provide otherwise, or circumstances
indicate a different intention.
Kemp, 183 Mont. at 533, 601 P.2d at 24.
295. 686 P.2d 893 (Mont. 1984).
296. 176 Mont. 364, 578 P.2d 724 (1978).
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ern choice of law methodology, it can be assumed that the Montana
courts will apply lex loci delicti in tort as well.
Nebraska
The Supreme Court of Nebraska appears to have adopted the Sec-
ond Restatement for use in both tort and contract, but the issue is not
free from doubt. In a 1977 case, Crossley v. Pacific Employers Insurance
Co.,297 the court applied the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations
Act,298 a no-fault law precluding recovery against an insured driver ex-
cept in case of serious injury or death, to a Nebraska resident's claim
against a Colorado resident insured for an accident in Colorado. The
court first reiterated the traditional place of injury rule, which it had
applied unhesitatingly in two earlier automobile accident cases. 299 The
court added, however, that the result would have been the same "[u]nder
virtually any rationale of the current principles of conflict of laws which
apply to actions for personal injuries. ' ' 3°° Specifically, the court quoted
from section 146 of the Second Restatement, a presumptive reference to
the place of injury rule.30 1
Harper v. Silva,302 a 1987 decision, appeared to go somewhat farther
along the route to application of the Second Restatement. The plaintiff
in a medical malpractice case sought recovery from a Nebraska state-
administered fund designed to compensate malpractice victims. Plaintiff
was a Kansas resident, and his injuries were incurred in Kansas. The
defendant physician was licensed to practice in both Kansas and Ne-
297. 198 Neb. 26, 251 N.W.2d 383 (1977).
298. COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-4-701 to -723 (1974).
299. "This court has consistently held that in an action for personal injuries or death re-
sulting from an automobile accident, the law of the place where the accident occurred will be
applied, and that law governs not only the amount of recovery but also the right to recover."
Crossley, 198 Neb. at 30, 251 N.W.2d at 386. The two prior lex loci delicti cases were Peterson
v. Dean, 186 Neb. 716, 719, 186 N.W.2d 107, 109 (1971) (applying Iowa guest statute in suit
between Nebraskans) and Lorenzen v. Continental Baking Co., 180 Neb. 23, 31, 141 N.W.2d
163, 168 (1966) (applying Iowa law of damages to a wrongful death suit brought by a Ne-
braska resident after an accident in Iowa).
300. Crossley, 198 Neb. at 30, 251 N.W.2d at 386.
301. Id. at 30, 251 N.W.2d at 386. The court gave § 146 a rather niggardly construction,
however, stating that "in virtually all instances where the conduct and the injury occur in the
same state, that state has the dominant interest in regulating that conduct and in determining
whether it is tortious in character, and whether the interest affected is entitled to legal protec-
tion." Id. The myriad guest statute and spousal immunity cases decided since the promulga-
tion of the Second Restatement attest to the inaccuracy of this interpretation. In fact, perhaps
the universal rule in all modern choice of law methods is that the law of the place of wrongful
conduct and injury will not govern where the parties share a common domicile in another
jurisdiction.
302. 224 Neb. 645, 399 N.W.2d 826 (1987).
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braska. Unsurprisingly, the supreme court denied recovery, applying
Kansas law. However, the court did not rely on lex loci delicti. Instead,
it cited section 146 of the Second Restatement. 30 3 The court said Ne-
braska "appears to follow" the Second Restatement,304 citing only
Crossley case.
Two federal district court decisions handed down in the interim be-
tween Crossley and Harper reached different conclusions regarding Ne-
braska choice of law in tort cases. A 1978 case held that "Nebraska still
follows the concept of lex loci delicti in the area of tort law. ' 30 5 A 1983
case, however, noting that "the clear trend of the court has been to adopt
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws approach to the choice of
law problem," applied sections 147 and 6 of the Second Restatement in a
conversion case.306 The evidence is not clear as to what the Nebraska
Supreme Court will do next in tort. Because the court has not yet actu-
ally applied the Second Restatement, Nebraska is, for now, properly clas-
sified as a lex loci delicti jurisdiction. Probably it will apply the Second
Restatement.
In a 1978 usury case,307 the supreme court had no hesitation in ap-
plying section 203 of the Second Restatement 30 8 in order to uphold the
validity of a contractual interest rate which was usurious under the law
of Minnesota, where the last act necessary to make the contract binding
had been taken. Since one of the parties to the contract was a Nebraska
resident, and since the other party had an office in Nebraska, the contract
had a substantial relationship to that state and the interest rate chosen by
the parties was given effect. In the course of its decision, the court also
quoted from section 188 of the Second Restatement and indicated its ap-
proval of modem choice of law methodology. The opinion strongly indi-
cates that the Nebraska courts may apply the Second Restatement to
other facets of contract law in the future.
303. Id. at 647-48, 399 N.W.2d at 828.
304. Id. at 647, 399 N.W.2d at 828.
305. United States v. Neal, 443 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (D. Neb. 1978).
306. See Myers v. Columbus Sales Pavilion, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 805, 807 (D. Neb. 1983).
307. Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 201 Neb. 260, 267 N.W.2d 517 (1978).
308. Section 203 of the Second Restatement provides:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it provides
for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a substan-
tial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the general
usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 188.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 (1969).
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Nevada
It has been two decades since the last Nevada Supreme Court deci-
sion dealing with a conflict of laws in tort. Its last decision was Braddock
v. Braddock,30 9 a 1975 case involving a contract dispute. In that case, the
court judged the validity of an ante-nuptial agreement according to the
law of Ohio because the agreement was executed and to be performed
there.310 Similarly, in a prior case, the court held that the modifiability
of a separation agreement would be determined according to the law of
New York, where the agreement was executed and under whose law the
parties had stipulated the contract was to be construed. 311 In neither
case was the law of the marital domicile given consideration. In three
recent cases, the supreme court has given effect to contractual choice of
law clauses without hinting at a more general departure from lex loci
contractus. 312 The court has also indicated that it will follow the tradi-
tional rule that issues concerning the performance of a contract are to be
governed by the law of the state where such performance is to take
place.313
As mentioned above, the precedents in tort conflicts are quite dated.
The most recent Nevada Supreme Court case is Tab Construction Co. v.
Eighth Judicial District Court,314 a 1967 case presenting the question of
the permissibility of common law tort recovery by an injured construc-
tion worker who had previously received workers' compensation benefits.
The court applied Nevada law, which prohibited such recovery, even
though the plaintiff employee was from Arizona. Rather than relying on
Nevada's status as the place of injury, the court identified Nevada's gov-
ernmental interest in the application of its own workers' compensation
scheme.3 15 Earlier cases had applied lex loci delicti unhesitatingly. 316
309. 91 Nev. 735, 542 P.2d 1060 (1975).
310. Id. at 738, 542 P.2d at 1062.
311. Jones v. Jones, 86 Nev. 879, 883, 478 P.2d 148, 150 (1970).
312. See Engel v. Ernst, 102 Nev. 90, 724 P.2d 215 (1986); Constanzo v. Marine Midland
Realty Credit Corp., 101 Nev. 277, 701 P.2d 747 (1985); Ferdie Sievers & Lake Tahoe Land
Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 95 Nev. 811, 603 P.2d 270 (1979).
313. See David v. Jouganatos, 81 Nev. 333, 339, 402 P.2d 985, 988 (1965).
314. 83 Nev. 364, 432 P.2d 90 (1967).
315. The court stated:
The interest of Nevada in the instant case does not derive solely from the occurrence
of the injury within its borders. Significant is the fact that it is the state of the forum.
If the forum state is concerned, it will not favor the application of a rule repugnant to
its own policies, and the law of the forum will presumptively apply, unless it becomes
clear that non-forum incidents are of greater significance.
Id. at 366, 432 P.2d at 91.
316. See Karlsen v. Jack, 80 Nev. 201, 204, 391 P.2d 319, 320 (1964); Campbell v. Baskin,
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Despite the equivocal language in Tab Construction Co., the federal
courts sitting in diversity have continued to apply the place of injury rule
in tort cases. 317 The only two courts not to apply the rule applied section
150(2)318 of the Second Restatement to determine that the law governing
in libel actions should be the law of the plaintiff's domicile, a result cer-
tainly not inconsistent with the place of injury rule.319
Thus, only once has a Nevada court expressed hesitation in applying
the rules of the First Restatement, and even in that case the court ulti-
mately applied the law of the place of injury.320 Nevada, therefore, re-
mains a First Restatement jurisdiction.
New Hampshire
The tiny state of New Hampshire has had a surprisingly broad expe-
rience with conflict of laws disputes. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court was at the vanguard of modem choice of law in the nineteen-six-
ties. It first applied the law of the state of marital domicile, rather than
the law of the place of injury, in interspousal immunity suits. 321 Then in
Clark v. Clark, 322 it completely abandoned the traditional rule in favor of
then untested methodology: Leflar's choice-influencing considerations.
Clark v. Clark presented the issue of whether the Vermont guest
statute323 would apply to bar recovery by a New Hampshire resident, in a
negligence suit, against her spouse for an automobile accident occurring
in Vermont. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that it
would not. The opinion relied exclusively on the five-factor Leflar test,
69 Nev. 108, 117, 242 P.2d 290, 294 (1952); Mitrovich v. Pavlovich, 61 Nev. 62, 66, 114 P.2d
1084, 1086 (1941).
317. See Poindexter v. United States, 752 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1984); Tweet v.
Webster, 610 F. Supp. 104, 105 (D. Nev.), reh'g denied, 614 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Nev. 1985);
Cambridge Filter Corp. v. International Filter Co., 548 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (D. Nev. 1982);
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 358 F. Supp. 1065, 1078 (D. Nev. 1973),
vacated, 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
318. Section 150(2) of the Second Restatement provides: "When a natural person claims
that he has been defamed by an aggregate communication, the state of the most significant
relationship will usually be the state where the person was domiciled at the time, if the matter
complained of was published in that state." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 150(2) (1969).
319. See Hanley v. Tribune Publishing Co., 527 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1975); Newton v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 109 F.R.D. 522 (D. Nev. 1985).
320. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
321. See Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966); Thompson v. Thompson,
105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963). These decisions, at the leading edge of the law when
decided, were themselves repudiated as mechanistic in Gordon v. Gordon, 118 N.H. 356, 387
A.2d 339 (1978).
322. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
323. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1491 (repealed 1969).
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and particularly on the last two factors, advancement of the forum's gov-
ernmental interests and application of the better rule of law. As to these
two, the court determined that it had a strong governmental interest in
applying the New Hampshire rules of tort recovery to New Hampshire
residents, and that New Hampshire common law liability was a better
rule of law than the Vermont guest statute.324 New Hampshire law was
applied and the suit was allowed to proceed.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has consistently followed the
Clark mandate in tort conficts over the last two decades.325 Several facts
concerning these cases are immediately apparent. First, the court has
never given any consideration to the first three Leflar factors, but instead
has either relied exclusively on the fourth and fifth factors, or simply
selected what it thought to be the better rule of law. Second, in all but
two of these cases, 326 the court held that New Hampshire had the better
law. Finally, it has applied New Hampshire law in all but one case,
LaBounty v. American Insurance Co.327
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has not yet applied the Leflar
approach in a contract case. Originally, New Hampshire followed the
lex loci contractus rule,328 but it abandoned this approach in the 1968
case of Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Radio Foods Corp.,329 with-
out ever referring to its seminal decision in Clark or to the Leflar choice-
influencing considerations. Instead, the court utilized the Second Re-
324. Clark, 107 N.H. at 356-57, 222 A.2d at 209-10.
325. See In re Estate of Wood, 122 N.H. 956, 453 A.2d 1251 (1982); Spherex, Inc. v.
Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982); LaBounty v. American Ins. Co.,
122 N.H. 738, 451 A.2d 161 (1982); Gordon v. Gordon, 118 N.H. 356, 387 A.2d 339 (1978);
Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974); Gagne v. Berry,
112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972); Taylor v. Bullock, 111 N.H. 214, 279 A.2d 585 (1971);
Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968).
326. In LaBounty v. American Ins. Co., 122 N.H. 738, 743-44, 451 A.2d 161, 164 (1982),
the court did not decide whether the former New Hampshire law, which had allowed an em-
ployee to bring a tort action against a co-worker, was a better law than the laws of Massachu-
setts and Maine, which prohibited such suits. Rather, by the time the court decided the case,
the New Hampshire law had been changed so as to disallow such suits. Accordingly, the court
disallowed the suit. In Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589, 592, 325 A.2d
778, 780 (1974), the court held that New Hampshire's limitation on dollar recovery in wrong-
ful death actions was inferior to the law of Maine, which had no such limitation. It neverthe-
less felt constrained to apply New Hampshire law because Maine's only relationship to the
case was that it was the residence of the deceased, an employee of a New Hampshire surveying
firm, who was killed in an employment-related accident in New Hampshire, allegedly due to
the negligence of a New Hampshire public utility.
327. 122 N.H. 738, 451 A.2d 161 (1982).
328. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Coman, 106 N.H. 364, 365, 212 A.2d 703, 704 (1965).
329. 108 N.H. 494, 240 A.2d 47 (1968).
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statement, and particularly the presumptive reference in section 193330 to
the law of the state of the insured in insurance policy interpretation
cases.
Despite its apparent adoption of the Second Restatement in Consoli-
dated Mutual, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has often not fol-
lowed that approach. Since 1968, at least five cases, all involving
insurance contracts, appear to have been decided on the basis of lex loci
contractus. 331 Two cases have applied the most significant relationship
test, but each time without reference to the Second Restatement. 332 The
only case actually to have applied the Second Restatement merely in-
yoked the aid of section 187 to affirm a contractual choice of law stipula-
tion entered into by the parties.333 A First Circuit panel attempting to
make sense of the New Hampshire choice of law morass, has concluded
that the later New Hampshire Supreme Court cases, in which lex loci
contractus was applied,334 were in fact consistent with Consolidated Mu-
tual. In each case, the state in which the contract was made was also the
principal location of the insured, the contact point cited in Consolidated
Mutual and section 193 of the Second Restatement as most significant in
determining the applicable law. 335 Accordingly, that case, as well as a
later First Circuit case,336 applied the law of the state where the principle
insured was located, citing Consolidated Mutual as authority.
This convergence of the two competing rules, when combined with
the fact that the supreme court has at least twice since 1968 resolved a
conflict in favor of a jurisdiction other than where the contract was
made, 337 leads to the conclusion that the New Hampshire Supreme
Court will apply the Second Restatement, rather than lex loci contractus,
in future contract cases. Plainly, it will continue to apply Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations in tort cases.
330. See supra note 223.
331. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. O'Shaughnessy, 118 N.H. 66, 69, 384 A.2d 486, 487 (1978);
Vigneault v. Travelers Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 75, 78, 382 A.2d 910, 912 (1978); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Steams, 116 N.H. 285, 286, 358 A.2d 402, 403 (1976); Greemore v. American Home
Assurance Co., 113 N.H. 250, 252, 305 A.2d 681, 682 (1973); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 109
N.H. 108, 109, 244 A.2d 199, 201 (1968).
332. See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Lost Valley Corp., 119 N.H. 254, 256,
400 A.2d 1178, 1180 (1979); Currier v. Tuck, 112 N.H. 10, 11, 287 A.2d 625, 627 (1972).
333. Allied Adjustment Serv. v. Heney, 125 N.H. 698, 700, 484 A.2d 1189, 1191 (1984).
334. See supra note 331.
335. See Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1498, 1501 (1st Cir. 1983).
336. See Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 31
(Ist Cir. 1984).
337. Allied Adjustment Serv. v. Heney, 125 N.H. 698, 700, 484 A.2d 1189, 1191 (1984).
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New Jersey
New Jersey applies an interest analysis approach in tort cases. The
leading case is Mellk v. Sarahson,338 a guest statute case involving New
Jersey residents and a car accident in Ohio. A unanimous New Jersey
Supreme Court decided not to apply the Ohio guest statute.339 The court
adopted no particular choice of law method, but relied heavily on Bab-
cock v. Jackson 340 and took a very policy-oriented approach.3 41 Despite
the emphasis on the public policy of the forum, the court seemed to indi-
cate that it was not merely invoking an exception to lex loci delicti, but
that it was, in fact, discarding it.342
Later New Jersey tort cases have demonstrated a definite interest
analysis approach. Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.3 43 was an interesting
guest statute case in which the plaintiff was a Connecticut resident, the
defendant was from New Jersey, and the injury-causing accident oc-
curred in Iowa. Of these three states, only Iowa had a guest statute.344
The plaintiff and the defendant, while not domiciliaries of Iowa, were
attending college there at the time of the accident. The court began its
analysis by discounting the fact of the parties' temporary Iowa residence.
It found that the governmental interests behind Iowa's guest statute
would not be served by application of the statute on the facts presented.
Relying on a leading interest analysis case from California3 45 the court
held that the law of the state where an automobile accident occurred
would not be applied to displace the congruent laws of the respective
jurisdictions where the parties resided. Since the parties resided in Con-
338. 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967).
339. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (1982).
340. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); see infra note 370 and
accompanying text.
341. The Mellk court stated:
The advantages of uniformity, certainty and predictability often attributed to the lex
loci delicti approach must yield when an unvarying and mechanical application of
this rule would cause a result which frustrates a strong policy of this State while not
serving the policy of the state where the accident occurred.
Mellk, 49 N.J. at 234, 229 A.2d at 629.
342. The judicial doctrine of stare decisis has not prevented this court in the past
from changing rules which we determined were no longer right and just, and does
not preclude us here from adopting a choice of law principle in tort cases which we
believe responsive to the purposes and policies of the law.
Id. at 234-35, 229 A.2d at 629.
343. 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970).
344. IOWA CODE § 321.494 (repealed 1984).
345. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); see supra note
65 and accompanying text.
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necticut and New Jersey, and neither of these states had a guest statute,
the Iowa guest statute would not be applied.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has applied its form of interest anal-
ysis on three other occasions since Mellk. In Rose v. Port of New York
Authority,346 the court demonstrated the manipulability of the rule.
Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, brought an action against the quasi-pub-
lic body in charge of operating New York City's John F. Kennedy Inter-
national Airport, claiming that he had been injured at the airport when
he was struck by an automatic glass door that malfunctioned. The court
managed to find New Jersey law applicable by characterizing the defend-
ant, Port Authority of New York, as a "bi-state governmental agency in
which this State has an interest no different than that of New York. '347
In these circumstances, "[w]hether the misadventure took place at Ken-
nedy Airport or at Newark Airport would seem of no significance; the
situs of the event seems of little moment.1348 Later, in Heavner v. Uni-
royal, Inc.,349 the court departed from precedent in holding that the fo-
rum's statute of limitations would no longer apply automatically if
another jurisdiction had a greater interest in the case.350 Finally, in
Veazey v. Doremus,351 the court held that Florida's rule of interspousal
immunity barred a tort suit between a Florida husband and wife, even
though the car accident on which the suit was based occurred in New
Jersey, a nonimmunity state.
The New Jersey Superior Court has proven to be less adept at apply-
ing interest analysis than has the supreme court. In a curious interpreta-
tion of Mellk, the superior court, in Wuerffel v. Westinghouse Corp.,352
held that New Jersey choice of law required a two-step analysis involving
both governmental interest analysis and section 145 of the Second Re-
statement. The court cited no authority for its invocation of section 145.
Five later cases also applied the two-step, contacts-interests approach,
but none of these decisions cited the Second Restatement. 353
346. 61 N.J. 129, 293 A.2d 371 (1972).
347. Id. at 140, 293 A.2d at 377.
348. Id.
349. 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
350. Most courts hold that statute of limitations issues are procedural and therefore, ab-
sent a borrowing statute, are to be governed by the forum's own limitations periods. This rule
cuts across theoretical choice of law lines. But see Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d 173 (3d Cir.
1986) (citing Heavner and applying New Jersey's statute of limitations on the strength of an
interest analysis approach).
351. 103 N.J. 244, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986).
352. 148 N.J. Super. 327, 333-34, 372 A.2d 659, 662 (1977).
353. See Seckular v. Celotex, 209 N.J. Super. 242, 507 A.2d 290 (1986); Seals v. Langston
Co., 206 N.J. Super. 408, 502 A.2d 1185, cerL denied, 104 N.J. 386, 517 A.2d 392 (1986);
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New Jersey has so far declined to extend its interest analysis ap-
proach to contract cases. The supreme court adopted an eclectic ap-
proach in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Estate of
Simmons, 35 4 emphasizing a preference for the place of making but a will-
ingness to consider other contacts and governmental interests as well. 355
Left to interpret these criteria, the New Jersey Superior Court has gener-
ally applied the place of making rule.35 6 Federal courts sitting in diver-
sity, have, however, on several occasions, displaced the place of making
rule in favor of an interest analysis approach. 357
The New Jersey conflicts rule in contract cases escapes easy charac-
terization. Depending upon how one interprets the supreme court's deci-
sion in State Farm, it could be stated that New Jersey applies either lex
loci contractus, interest analysis, the Second Restatement, or a center of
gravity approach. Lex loci contractus probably would be a mischaracter-
ization, since the supreme court is clearly prepared to depart from the
place of making presumption in appropriate cases. Nor does interest
Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 475 A.2d 648 (1984); Beckwith v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 185 N.J. Super. 50, 447 A.2d 207 (1982); Litarowich v. Weiderkehr,
170 N.J. Super. 144, 405 A.2d 874 (1979).
354. 84 N.J. 28, 417 A.2d 488 (1980).
355. The court stated its new rule as follows:
[T1he law of the place of the contract ordinarily governs the choice of law because
this rule will generally comport with the reasonable expectations of the parties con-
cerning the principle situs of the insured risk during the term of the policy and will
furnish needed certainty and consistency in the selection of the applicable law. At
the same time, this choice-of-law rule should not be given controlling or dispositive
effect. It should not be applied without a full comparison of the significant relation-
ship of each state with the parties and the transaction. That assessment should en-
compass an evaluation of important state contacts as well as a consideration of the
state policies affected by, and governmental interest in, the outcome of the
controversy.
Id. at 37, 417 A.2d at 492-93 (citations omitted).
356. See Muto v. Kemper Reins. Co., 189 N.J. Super. 417, 421-22, 460 A.2d 199, 201
(1983); Melick v. Stanley, 181 N.J. Super. 128, 129,436 A.2d 954, 955 (1981). Butsee Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Perlman, 187 N.J. Super. 499, 504, 455 A.2d 527, 530 (public policy
exception), cert denied, 93 N.J. 292, 460 A.2d 690 (1983); see also Winer Motors, Inc. v.
Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 666, 673, 506 A.2d 817, 821 (1986) (interpreting
contractual choice-of-law clause to require application of selected state's choice of law rules
rather than substantive law); Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc., 196 N.J. Super. 16,
21, 481 A.2d 553, 555-56 (1984) (applying § 187 of the Second Restatement to uphold parties'
choice-of-law clause), aff'd, 98 N.J. 266, 486 A.2d 334 (1985).
357. See McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525, 529 n.5 (D.N.J. 1986);
Lac d'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1554
(D.N.J. 1985); Hardaway Constructors, Inc. v. Conesco Indus., Ltd., 583 F. Supp. 617, 623
(D.N.J. 1983); see also Impex Agricultural Commodities v. Parness Trucking Corp., 576 F.
Supp. 587, 589 (D.N.J. 1983) (applying New Jersey law to contract executed there, but also
noting that both contracting parties were New Jersey residents).
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analysis seem to be the appropriate label, since the court is well accus-
tomed to applying interest analysis in tort cases and has not expressly
extended that method to contract cases. Finally, labeling New Jersey as
a Second Restatement state is problematic because the supreme court has
cited the Restatement only once, in State Farm, where it based its deci-
sion on other, more general, considerations. By process of elimination,
New Jersey is best classified as a center of gravity state, with a presump-
tion that the law of the place of making will govern.
New Mexico
New Mexico follows the traditional rules in both contract and tort.
In both areas, the more recent decisions have come from the New Mex-
ico Court of Appeals rather than from the New Mexico Supreme Court.
The last tort case to reach the supreme court was Zamora v. Smal-
ley,358 in 1961. There, the court, citing section 378 of the First Restate-
ment, 359 held that Colorado law governed the question of liability for an
accident occurring in that state. The court of appeals reaffirmed the lex
loci delicti rule in two more recent cases. In 1976, it held that a wrongful
death suit between Missouri residents was governed by New Mexico law,
which included a longer statute of limitations and no limit to recovery,
since the airplane accident occurred in New Mexico. 360 In 1981, the
court of appeals held Virginia's spousal immunity law barred a claim of
fraud between New Mexico spouses since the spouses resided in Virginia
at the time of the alleged fraud.361
The two most recent contract cases to reach the New Mexico
Supreme Court arose in the 1960s. In each case, the court, without elab-
358. 68 N.M. 45, 358 P.2d 362 (1961).
359. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) ("The law of the place of wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.").
360. First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Benson, 89 N.M. 481, 553 P.2d 1288 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976). The court spoke disparagingly of the New York
experience with modem choice of law theory.
In New York, for ten years, this doctrine began with dissent and ended with dissent.
Confusion over the application of the new rule has become confounded. "Center of
gravity," "grouping of contacts," "interests," "concerns" have become catchwords
and so interpreted as to reflect the innate beliefs of each member of the court. These
decisions lack a precise consistency. The results depend on what the court believes
the public policy of a State should be. It depends upon what we believe "U]ustice,
fairness and 'the best practical result' " would be in each case. Although each mem-
ber of a court has definite beliefs that the law of the jurisdiction which has the great-
est interests in the litigation should control, a review of the cases discloses that
speculation plays an important role.
Id. at 482, 553 P.2d at 1289.
361. Church v. Church, 96 N.M. 388, 630 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1981).
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oration, held that the contract was governed by the law of the state
where it was made.362 The court of appeals followed this rule on at least
two occasions. 363 In 1971 the Tenth Circuit Court also applied the place
of making rule in construing a group accident insurance policy. 364 The
Tenth Circuit added that it would not consider applying a modern choice
of law approach since "New Mexico courts have never even intimated
that they would adopt the 'substantial contacts' theory. ' 365 Two other
federal courts have also applied the place of making rule.3 6 6 The New
Mexico courts, however, have made clear that the traditional exception
for public policy considerations applies. 367
As stated by the Tenth Circuit,368 the New Mexico courts have
shown no inclination at this point toward abandonment of the traditional
rules of the First Restatement. The place of injury and place of making
rules still govern here.
New York
New York conflict of laws jurisprudence has a long and storied his-
tory, beginning with early opinions of Judges Cardozo and Lehman, and
culminating in the 1985 decision of Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America,
Inc. 3
69
The classic case, and the one most often-cited in modern choice of
law decisions, is Babcock v. Jackson,370 where the New York Court of
Appeals held that Ontario's guest statute did not bar a suit between New
Yorkers involved in an automobile accident while on a weekend trip to
Canada.
A number of prior court of appeals decisions, however, molded the
context from which Babcock emerged. Early on, Judge Cardozo, in
362. Miller v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assoc. of Omaha, 76 N.M. 455, 457, 415
P.2d 841, 843 (1966); Boggs v. Anderson, 72 N.M. 136, 140, 381 P.2d 419, 422 (1963).
363. Eichel v. Goode, Inc., 101 N.M. 246, 250, 680 P.2d 627, 631 (Ct. App. 1984); Satter-
white v. Stolz, 79 N.M. 320, 321, 442 P.2d 810, 811 (Ct. App. 1968).
364. Pound v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 439 F.2d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir. 1971).
365. Id. at 1063.
366. Brashar v. Mobil Oil Corp., 626 F. Supp. 434, 436 (D.N.M. 1984); In re Bennett, 51
Bankr. 619, 620 (D.N.M. 1984).
367. See Ratzlaffv. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 98 N.M. 159, 163, 646 P.2d 586, 590 (Ct.
App.), cerL denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); Sandoval v. Valdez, 91 N.M. 705, 708,
580 P.2d 131, 134 (Ct. App. 1978); see also Wittkowski v. State, 103 N.M. 526, 529, 710 P.2d
93, 96 (1985) (public policy dictates that New Mexico law determine the standard of care owed
to civilians in Colorado by New Mexico state police and corrections officials who failed to
apprehend escapees from New Mexico State Penitentiary).
368. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
369. 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
370. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 371 defined a "public policy"
exception to the lex loci delicti rule. In holding Massachusetts statutory
limitations on recovery for wrongful death applicable to this suit between
New York residents over an automobile accident in Massachusetts, the
court, however, gave the public policy exception a limited scope.372
Even before Babcock, lex loci delicti was not always applied. In
Herzog v. Stern,373 an opinion by Judge Lehman, the court applied New
York law to a New Yorker's cause of action against another New Yorker
arising out of an automobile accident in Virginia. Under New York law
the death of the wrongdoer extinguished the cause of action. Virginia,
however, allowed the cause of action to survive the death of the
tortfeasor. In Mertz v. Mertz,374 the court held that New York's spousal
immunity statute barred a suit by one spouse against another even
though the law in Connecticut, where the injury occurred, allowed inter-
spousal suits. As in Herzog, Judge Lehman characterized the issue as
one of whether the New York courts had the authority to remedy a rec-
ognized wrong. Quoting from the First Restatement, 375 the court held
that the forum alone could determine a particular defendant's amenabil-
ity to suit.376 Finally, in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,377 decided
two years prior to Babcock, the court, held that the law of the forum
determined the amount of damages recoverable for an airplane accident,
occurring in Massachusetts, in which a New Yorker was killed. A sepa-
rate opinion accused the majority of abandoning the traditional place of
injury rule in choice of law. 378
371. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
372. The court warned:
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the
judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their
doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some preva-
lent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.
Id. at 111, 120 N.E. at 202.
373. 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934).
374. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
375. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 608 (1934) ("If no form of action is pro-
vided by the law of a state for the enforcement of a particular foreign right, no action to
enforce that right can be maintained in the State.").
376. Mertz, 271 N.Y. at 473-74, 3 N.E.2d at 599-600.
377. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
378. Judge Froesser in his concurrence warned:
The court is laying down a new rule of law whereby we disregard the Massachusetts
limitation as to damages in a wrongful death action, thereby undermining the ac-
cepted pattern of conflict of law rules, in effect overruling numerous decisions of this
court, and completely disregarding the overwhelming weight of authority in this
country.
Id. at 46, 172 N.E.2d at 532, 211 N.Y.S. at 142.
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As Kilberg and the other pre-Babcock decisions make clear, by 1963
the court of appeals had gone a long way toward repudiating the place of
injury rule. In addition, the court, in Auten v. Auten,379 nearly a decade
before Babcock, adopted a "center of gravity" approach to conflicts in
contract cases. In fact, Judge Fuld in Babcock 380 quoted extensively
from his Auten opinion. Fuld viewed the "center of gravity" or "group-
ing of contacts" approach adopted in Babcock as consistent with both the
Auten approach in contract cases and the new "most significant relation-
ship" approach propounded in what became section 145 of the Second
Restatement. In truth, Fuld's Babcock opinion utilized straight interest
analysis in choosing to apply New York common law liability to an acci-
dent involving New Yorkers. New York's interest in compensating its
injured plaintiff was not matched by any comparable interest of the prov-
ince of Ontario, since both parties and defendant's insurance carrier were
New Yorkers. 381
The first conflicts case to reach the court of appeals after Babcock
was Oltarsh v. Aetna Insurance Co. 382 The court allowed a New York
couple, injured in Puerto Rico, to bring a direct action against the
tortfeasor's insurer. Puerto Rico law allowed direct actions, although
New York generally did not. The court cited Babcock, Auten and the
Second Restatement in holding that Puerto Rico had "the most signifi-
cant relationship and contacts with respect to the matter in dispute. 383
The next conflicts, case decided by the court of appeals was Dym v.
Gordon,384 which presented a fact pattern similar to Babcock. Plaintiff
and defendant, both New York domiciliaries attending summer classes at
379. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
380. The "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine adopted by this
court in conflicts cases involving contracts impresses us as likewise affording the ap-
propriate approach for accommodating the competing interests in tort cases with
multi-State contacts. Justice, fairness and "the best practical result" may best be
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of
its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern
with the specific issue raised in the litigation. The merit of such a rule is that "it
gives to the place 'having the most interest in the problem' paramount control over
the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context" and thereby allows the
forum to apply "the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the
outcome of [the] particular litigation.'"
Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 481-82, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749 (quoting Swift & Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 141, 19 N.E.2d 992, 995 (1939) and Auten, 308 N.Y. at 161,
124 N.E.2d at 102).
381. Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
382. 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
383. Id. at 118, 204 N.E.2d at 626, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
384. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
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the University of Colorado, were involved in an automobile accident in
the defendant's car. The defendant was not liable for damages under the
Colorado guest statute. The court conceded the inapplicability of the
place of injury rule and analyzed the case under Babcock. It nevertheless
decided to apply the Colorado guest statute.
The Dym court described its choice of law task as a two-part, poli-
cies-contacts inquiry. 385 On each score, the court found Babcock distin-
guishable. With regard to state policies, the accident here was a two-car
collision; a Kansas resident was also involved. Therefore, Colorado had
an interest which Ontario lacked in Babcock, namely, assuring that the
defendant's limited assets would not be so depleted by the guest-host suit
that the innocent KanSas resident would have his recovery diminished.38 6
On the contacts side of the equation, Colorado's connection with the liti-
gants was significantly closer than Ontario's. In Babcock, the parties'
trip began in New York and was to end thereafter a short, weekend ex-
cursion across the border. In Dym, by contrast, the accident occurred
during a trip between two Colorado points, and the guest-host relation-
ship arose in Colorado, where the parties first met. After determining
that Colorado law was applied on a "contacts" basis, the Dym court
severely criticized several other choice of law approaches, including lex
loci delicti, governmental interest analysis, "better law" considerations,
and the policy favoring compensation of New York tort victims. 38 7
There were three dissenters, including Judge Fuld.
In the next case, Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,388
Pennsylvania plaintiffs brought suit against a New York airline, doing
business nationwide, for an airplane accident occurring in Maryland.
Maryland imposed greater limitations on the available recovery for
wrongful death than Pennsylvania. The court decided unanimously to
apply Pennsylvania law, allowing the greater recovery, in light of state's
interest in vindicating the rights of its resident plaintiffs.
Macey v. Rozbicki 389 was another application of Babcock in a guest
statute case. The facts were the same as in Babcock except that the plain-
385. Id.
Following our approach in Babcock, it is necessary first to isolate the issue, next to
identify the policies embraced in the laws in conflict, and finally to examine the con-
tacts of the respective jurisdictions to ascertain which has a superior connection with
the occurrence and thus would have a superior interest in having its policy or law
applied.
Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
386. Id.
387. See id. at 126-27, 209 N.E.2d at 795-96, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69.
388. 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
389. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
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tiff and the defendant had been in Ontario for a week on vacation at the
time of the accident, and the excursion on which the injury-causing acci-
dent occurred began and was to end in Ontario. The court found this
case more akin to Babcock than to Dym, and allowed recovery under
New York law.
In the next few cases, occurring in the late 1960s, the court of ap-
peals' approach took on even more of an interest analysis slant. In re
Estate of Crichton3 90 was the first of a trilogy of decisions, written by
Judge Keating, heavy-laden with interest analysis language. In that case,
the court held that since New York was the marital domicile, its com-
mon law determined a widow's interest in personal property acquired
during marriage and left by her decedent husband in Louisiana. The
community property laws of Louisiana would not apply. Opposing par-
ties emphasized Louisiana's significant contacts with the estate, espe-
cially its status as situs of the property. The court, however, analyzed
the case solely in terms of governmental interests, 391 and found that
"New York, as the domicile of Martha and Powell Crichton, has not
only the dominant interest in the application of its law and policy but the
only interest. '392
The second of Judge Keating's three interest-analysis opinions was
Miller v. Miller.393 The court applied New York law, allowing unlimited
recovery for wrongful death, in lieu of Maine law, allowing only a limited
recovery. The plaintiff's New York husband was killed in a car accident
in Maine while riding in a car driven by his brother and owned by his
sister-in-law. Both were Maine residents at the time of the accident. An
apparent true conflict proved to be a false conflict upon closer analysis.
Only three months after the accident, and before guit was filed, the owner
and driver moved to New York and established permanent residence. By
the time of the court of appeals' decision, they had resided in New York
390. 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
391. The court explained:
Contacts obtain significance only to the extent that they relate to the policies and
purposes sought to be vindicated by the conflicting laws. Once these contacts are
discovered and analyzed they will indicate (1) that there exists no true conflict of
laws, as in the case at bar and as in most choice of law cases, or (2) that a true
conflict exists, i.e., both jurisdictions have an interest in the application of their law.
In the former case, of course, the law of the jurisdiction having the only real interest
in the litigation will be applied. In the case of a true conflict, while our decisions
have normally resulted in application of forum law, we are not as yet prepared to
formulate what may be deemed a rule of general application but prefer rather to give
further consideration to the question as the cases arise.
Id. at 135 n.8, 228 N.E.2d at 806 n.8, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820 n.8 (citations omitted).
392. Id. at 134, 228 N.E.2d at 806, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
393. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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for six and one-half years. Maine, therefore, had no interest in protecting
these defendants from high damages. 394 Moreover, even to the extent
that Maine had a "paternalistic interest in protecting its residents against
liability while they were in Maine," this interest had clearly been repudi-
ated by the Maine legislature. The legislature repealed the limitation on
recovery statute three years prior to the court of appeals' decision. 395
The third of the Keating trilogy was Tooker v. Lopez,396 a guest stat-
ute case presenting the same fact pattern as Dym. In Tooker, two Michi-
gan State University women, domiciliaries of New York, were killed
when their car overturned on a Michigan highway. Michigan had a guest
statute,397 but New York did not. The court applied New York law. In
doing so it announced that it had misread the purposes of the Colorado
guest statute in Dym when it had held that one such purpose was to
preserve a fund for recovery of damages in favor of the innocent passen-
gers of the other involved vehicles. In fact, the court stated this could
not be a true purpose behind the guest statutes since all such statutes
allow recovery upon a showing of gross negligence. "If the purpose of
the statute is to protect the rights of the injured 'non-guest,' as opposed
to the owner or the insurance carrier, we fail to perceive any rational
basis for predicating that protection on the degree of negligence which
the guest is able to establish. '398 Tooker thus held that the true purpose
behind guest statutes was to prevent the filing of fraudulent insurance
claims, and that this purpose would not be served by application of the
guest statute in this case since defendant's insurer was a New York
carrier.399
According to Tooker, the misreading of the purposes behind the
guest statute in Dym led to a contorted decision in Macey because the
Macey court avoided consideration of Ontario's purported "interest" in
preserving defendant's insurance coverage. Because the Macey court felt
constrained to avoid conflict with its decision in Dym, it emphasized
"contacts" to the exclusion of truly affected governmental interests. As a
result, "[s]ubstituted for a rational choice of law rule was a method of
394. The court cautioned that a post-accident change in domicile might be disregarded
under certain circumstances in order to prevent a party from making the choice of law on his
own. In this case, however, the move could not have been made for tactical litigation reasons
because the defendants, by moving from Maine to New York, actually exposed themselves to
greater liability. Id. at 22, 237 N.E.2d at 882-83, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
395. Id. at 21-22, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
396. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
397. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 257.401 (West 1977).
398. Tooker, 24 N.Y.2d at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
399. Id.
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decision based on contact counting-a method open to the same criti-
cism of unreasonableness as the earlier lex loci delictus rule."'4 Tooker
thus re-established for guest statute cases the interest analysis, which was
temporarily and unintentionally abandoned in Macey.
There were three separate opinions in Tooker. Dissenting Judge
Breitel, joined by two others, argued for application of the "center of
relationship" test utilized in Dym. 40 1 This test mandated application of
Michigan law. Judge Burke, author of the Dym decision, was an advo-
cate of a "grouping of contacts" approach under which it was "quite
obvious that the Michigan guest statute would be sustained." Neverthe-
less he concurred in the application of New York law because he felt
bound by the stare decisis effect of the post-Macey opinions promoting
the interest analysis approach.402
Finally, Chief Judge Fuld, convinced that the court's opinions in
guest statute cases had been inconsistent in both approach and result,
determined in his concurrence to "proceed to the next stage in the evolu-
tion of the law-the formulation of a few rules of general applicability,
promising a fair level of predictability. '40 3 He propounded three broad
rules for application in guest statute cases. In general, these rules pro-
vide: first, that the law of common domicile will be preferred to the law
of the place of injury; second, that the law of the jurisdiction where the
injury occurred will be applied if either party is domiciled there and that
party's legal position would be advanced by application of that law; and
third, that the law of the place of injury will generally govern in situa-
tions where the parties do not share the same domicile with one another
and the second rule is otherwise inapplicable. Application of the first
rule to the facts of Tooker called for resort to New York law.
Three years later, in Neumeier v. Keuhner,404 a majority of the court
of appeals adopted Judge Fuld's rules. In Neumeier, a New Yorker
drove to Ontario and there picked up a friend for a trip to another point
in Ontario. Both driver and passenger were killed when their car was hit
by a train belonging to the Canadian National Railway Company. The
passenger's widow brought an action for wrongful death against both the
Canadian National Railway Company and the New York host-driver's
estate. The estate argued that the Ontario guest statute barred recovery
from the driver's estate. The court applied the foreign guest statute. In
400. Id. at 576, 249 N.E.2d at 398, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
401. Id. at 594-95, 249 N.E.2d at 409-10, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 590-91, 249 N.E.2d at 407, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 537 (Burke, J., concurring).
403. Id. at 584, 249 N.E.2d at 403, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532 (Fuld, C.J., concurring).
404. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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doing so, Chief Judge Fuld once again expressed a need for readily avail-
able rules for the governance of guest statute cases. 4° 5 Here the third
Tooker rule called for application of the law of the place of injury,
Ontario.
Years of inactivity, insofar as the court of appeals is concerned, fol-
lowed the decision in Neumeier. The next tort case did not arise until
1978 when, in Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc.,4°6 the court avoided the
conflicts issue entirely by holding that the plaintiff waived any opportu-
nity to raise a choice of law issue by waiting until all of the proof was in
and the jury was about to be charged before suggesting application of a
foreign law. In dictum, however, the court stated that "lex loci delicti
remains the general rule in tort cases to be displaced only in extraordi-
nary circumstances."'407
Finally, in 1985, the court of appeals decided Schultz v. Boy Scouts
of America, Inc.,408 its first choice of law decision since Neumeier twelve
years earlier. Schultz was a complicated case because there were two
defendants from different jurisdictions and the court's choice of law ap-
proach required separate analyses for each defendant. The plaintiff was
the father of two boys, aged eleven and thirteen. The boys attended a
Catholic school in their home state of New Jersey. The first defendant,
Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc., supplied teachers for the Catho-
lic school. One teacher was Edmund Coakeley. Mr. Coakeley had also
been appointed a scoutmaster by the second defendant, the Boy Scouts of
America. The plaintiff's children attended Mr. Coakeley's classes at
school and were also members of his Boy Scout troop. The complaint
alleged that Mr. Coakeley had sexually abused the boys both at school in
New Jersey and at a Boy Scout camping retreat in upper New York. The
complaint further alleged that the younger of the two boys suffered such
psychological distress as a result of Mr. Coakeley's advances that he was
405. The single all-encompassing rule which called, inexorably, for selection of the
law of place of injury was discarded, and wisely, because it was too broad to prove
satisfactory in application. There is, however, no reason why choice-of-law rules,
more narrow than those previously devised, should not be successfully developed, in
order to assure a greater degree of predictability and uniformity, on the basis of our
present knowledge and experience. "The time has come," I wrote in Tooker "to
endeavor to minimize what some have characterized as an ad hoc case-by-case ap-
proach by laying down guidelines, as well as we can, for the solution of guest-host
conflicts problems." Babcock and its progeny enable us to formulate a set of basic
principles that may be profitably utilized, for they have helped us uncover the under-
lying values and policies which are operative in this area of the law.
Id. at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69 (citations omitted).
406. 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978).
407. Id. at 699, 376 N.E.2d at 915, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
408. 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
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driven to commit suicide. The complaint sought damages from each de-
fendant corporation on the ground that each was negligent in allowing
Mr. Coakeley to educate and train young people.
The case presented a conflict because the plaintiff was from New
Jersey, the defendant Boy Scouts of America was headquartered in New
Jersey, the defendant Brothers of the Poor was located in Ohio, and the
tort occurred in New Jersey and New York. New Jersey recognized a
doctrine of charitable immunity which entirely barred plaintiff from re-
covering against either defendant. Although Ohio also had a charitable
immunity law, that law did not immunize organizations who had been
negligent in hiring decisions. New York had no charitable immunity
law.
The court applied Judge Fuld's rules, substituting each defendant
for the host-driver and the plaintiff for the guest-passenger and held New
Jersey law applicable to each claim. As to the defendant Boy Scouts, the
facts presented a clear case for application of rule number one: the plain-
tiff and the defendant shared a New Jersey domicile and therefore that
state's laws applied in the action. Since New Jersey had a charitable im-
munity law, this claim was dismissed. 40 9 As to the Brothers of the Poor,
rule number three was applicable. The place of injury with regard to this
claim was New Jersey since that was where Mr. Coakeley taught school
and that was also the home of the plaintiff's children. New York had no
interest in compensating New Jersey residents for injuries inflicted in
New Jersey by an Ohio corporation. Ohio was uninterested because its
immunity law did not extend to these facts. Therefore, the presumption
of lex loci delicti was sustained and New Jersey law was applied once
again. 410 Finally, the public policy concerns of the forum were held inap-
plicable because the contacts with New York were too insignificant. 411
409. Id. at 199-201, 480 N.E.2d at 685-87, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 96-98.
410. Id. at 201-02, 480 N.E.2d at 687, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
411. Id. at 203, 480 N.E.2d at 688-89, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100. The third Neumeier rule
has been applied on three other occasions in New York since the Schultz decision was handed
down. See Stevens v. Shields, 131 Misc. 2d 145, 147, 499 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (1986) (Florida
law on imputed negligence displaces lex loci delicti); Murphy v. Acme Markets, Inc., 650 F.
Supp. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (New York law of pure comparative negligence, rather than
New Jersey's modified comparative negligence law, would be applied since displacing other-
wise applicable New Jersey rule would "advance the relative substantive law purposes without
impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for
litigants"); Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Garrett Corp., 625 F. Supp. 752, 760 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (Connecticut law allowing recovery in wrongful death actions for the monetary value of
decedent's "lost enjoyment of life" inapplicable where plane crash occurred in New York). In
Scharfman v. National Jewish Hosp. & Research Center, 122 A.D.2d 939, 506 N.Y.S.2d 90
(App. Div. 1986), the appellate division utilized a straight interest-analysis approach in refus-
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The Schultz decision represents a rejection of the "contact-count-
ing" approach of Babcock and a reaffirmation of the interest-analysis ap-
proach advocated by Judges Keating and Fuld. The Neumeier rules will
be given broader application than originally foreseen, but situations will
eventually arise where the rules do not neatly fit. In these cases, the
court can be expected to employ a governmental interest-analysis ap-
proach, an approach which the court itself in Schultz found consistent
with Judge Fuld's rules. Both the unfortunate "center of relationship"
test, propounded in Dym and the Cousins place of injury dictum, have
clearly been repudiated. So, too, has the "contact-counting" aspect of
Babcock.
The preeminent New York conflicts decision in contract cases is Au-
ten v. Auten,412 decided in 1954. In an opinion by Judge Fuld, the court
of appeals unanimously held that the law of England, rather than that of
New York, governed the question of whether institution of a separation
action in England by one English spouse against another was a repudia-
tion of a separation agreement formerly executed by the parties while in
New York. The Auten court conceded the general applicability of the
place of making and place of performance rules. Nevertheless, they de-
cided that a more rational methodology required following the "center of
gravity" or "grouping of contacts" test advocated in the early Indiana
case of Barber Co. v. Hughes.413 According to Judge Fuld, "under this
theory, the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties' inten-
tion or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the
law of the place 'which has the most significant contacts with the matter
in dispute.' ",414 Using this analysis, the court found the connections with
England to be overwhelming.415
ing to apply a Colorado law, immunizing hospitals from tort suits based on the negligence of a
resident physician, where plaintiff was a New Yorker.
412. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
413. 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945). See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
414. Auten, 308 N.Y. at 160, 124 N.E.2d at 101-02 (quoting Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.,
305 N.Y. 288, 305, 113 N.E.2d 424, 431 (1953)). Rubin held that an oral promise to make a
will would be construed under the law of testator's domicile, New York, even though the
promise was made in Florida.
415. It hardly needs stating that it is England which has all the truly significant con-
tacts, while this state's sole nexus with the matter in dispute - entirely fortuitous, at
that - is that it is the place where the agreement was made and where the trustee, to
whom the moneys were in the first instance to be paid, had his office. The agreement
effected a separation between British subjects, who had been married in England, had
children there and lived there as a family for fourteen years. It involved a husband
who, according to the papers before us had willfully deserted and abandoned his wife
and children in England and was in the United States, when the agreement was
signed, merely on a temporary visa. And it concerned an English wife who came to
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The Auten center of gravity test has been remarkably durable. Its
first application after Auten itself was in the 1961 case of Haag v.
Barnes.416 The question in Haag was whether an agreement providing
child support barred a later suit for additional child-support where the
paying spouse had faithfully complied with the terms of the support
agreement. Under Illinois law, where the agreement was executed and
where the defendant resided, the defendant's compliance with the separa-
tion agreement created a complete bar to any legal action for support.
Under New York law, where plaintiff resided at the time of suit, the
court could inquire whether the child was being adequately supported
under the agreement. The court applied Illinois law, not merely because
the agreement was executed in Illinois, but because that state had other
significant contacts as well, and the parties stipulated in the contract that
Illinois law would govern.
The center of gravity test took on a decidedly interest-analysis look
in Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc.,417 which concerned
the enforceability of an oral agreement to pay a finder's fee to a New
York brokerage firm which had assisted a New Jersey corporation in the
acquisition of a business. The agreement was unenforceable under the
New York Statute of Frauds but enforceable under the New Jersey Stat-
ute of Frauds. The agreement was negotiated at a restaurant in New
York City. The court held that the case presented a false conflict. New
York's interest in applying the Statute of Frauds was an economic one:
by ensuring that acquiring firms would not be exposed to unfounded
claims for finder's fees, the statute encouraged these firms to use New
York brokers, thereby contributing to the economic development of New
York.418 New Jersey, by contrast, had no interest in the application of its
law because the result would only be to make its own defendant corpora-
tion liable to pay a fee to a foreign plaintiff in a foreign court.419 As a
result, New York's Statute of Frauds was applied.
There have been no conflict cases involving contracts in the New
York Court of Appeals for many years. The court, however, has always
this country at that time because it was the only way she could see her husband to
discuss their differences. The sole purpose of her trip to New York was to get de-
fendant to agree to the support of his family, and she returned to England immedi-
ately after the agreement was executed.
Id. at 161-62, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
416. 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
417. 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817, rehrg denied, 25 N.Y.2d 959, 252
N.E.2d 864, 305 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1969).
418. Id. at 382-84, 248 N.E.2d at 582-83, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27.
419. Id. at 385, 248 N.E.2d at 584, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
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viewed its contract and tort approaches as consistent with one an-
other.420 While it is difficult to envision the Neumeier rules extending to
contract cases, there is nothing in the recent Schultz opinion that would
indicate that the modem interest-analysis approach embraced by the
court of appeals will not continue to apply in contract disputes as in tort.
Indeed, recent federal cases indicate the continued applicability of inter-
est analysis in contract.421
North Carolina
North Carolina follows the place of injury rule in tort and the place
of making rule in contract.
The leading case in tort is Shaw v. Lee,422 a Babcock-era case in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a suit brought by a
North Carolinia resident against the administrator of the estate of her
deceased spouse over a car accident in Virginia was barred by Virginia's
law of spousal immunity. The court reached this conclusion even though
the state of the marital domicile, North Carolina, did not disapprove of
such suits. The court viewed the suit as a simple case of the wife never
having had a cause of action.423
Two years later, in Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines,424 the court again
followed the place of injury rule. In Petrea, a truck and a car carrying
North Carolina spouses were involved in an accident in West Virginia.
The plaintiff sued the truck line, which filed a third-party action against
the plaintiff's husband. The court held that Shaw barred the third-party
action and rejected the truck line's invitation to adopt the center of grav-
ity approach.425
Another spousal immunity case presented a different fact situa-
420. In fact, the Babcock v. Jackson court quoted extensively from Auten and announced
that it was applying in tort the same center of gravity approach created by the earlier case for
contracts. See supra note 380 and accompanying text.
421. See Fort Howard Paper Co. v. William D. Witter, Inc., 787 F.2d 784, 790-91 (2d Cir.
1986); Hunter v. Greene, 734 F.2d 896, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1984); All State Vehicles v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 444, 446 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Stillman v. Nickel Odeon, S.A., 608 F.
Supp. 1050, 1053-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Gould Entertainment Corp. v. Bodo, 107 F.R.D. 308,
312 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
422. 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
423. We have given thoughtful consideration to the cases and articles to which plain-
tiff, in her well prepared brief, called our attention. In our view it is not a question of
the capacity of the spouse to sue but a question of whether the spouse ever had any
cause of action.
Id. at 615, 129 S.E.2d at 292.
424. 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965).
425. Id. at 231-32, 141 S.E.2d at 279-80.
[Vol. 38THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
CHOICE OF LAW
tion.426 This time, the accident occurred in North Carolina and the
spouses were from Pennsylvania, a state recognizing spousal immunity.
The court allowed the action to proceed because no spousal immunity
existed where the accident took place and specifically rejected an oppor-
tunity to adopt section 145 of the Second Restatement. 427
Although most of the supreme court's recent conflict cases have
dealt with spousal immunity, the court of appeals428 and the federal
courts429 have applied the rule of lex loci delicti to a broad range of tort
claims.
North Carolina courts have followed the traditional rules in con-
tract cases as well. In Fast v. Gulley,430 the court held that the validity of
a North Carolinia resident's claim to certain shares of stock held by her
in joint tenancy with her deceased father would be determined according
to the tenancy laws of New Jersey, where the stock was issued and the
426. See Henry v. Henry, 291 N.C. 156, 229 S.E.2d 158 (1976).
427. The court noted that "[i]t is apparent that there has been an increase in the jurisdic-
tions which reject the rule that this matter is to be determined by the law of the state where
the injury occurs." Id. at 163, 229 S.E.2d at 162. It then quoted § 145 of the Second Restate-
ment in its entirety but declined to apply it:
In our opinion, for us to direct the trial courts of this State to determine the right of
the nonresident wife to maintain an action for negligent injuries against her husband
by considering these and other "contacts" and weighing them in each situation
would be to "voyage into such an uncharted sea" as was envisioned by Justice Rod-
man in Shaw v. Lee.... For the reasons which he there found persuasive against the
same arguments now advanced to us by the defendant in this action, we do not deem
it wise to embark upon such a voyage and leave behind the well established conflict of
laws rules, laid down for the determination of this matter by our predecessors.
Id. at 164, 229 S.E.2d at 163.
428. See Lloyd v. Carnation Co., 61 N.C. App. 381, 387-88, 301 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1983)
(conspiracy to commit unfair business practices); La Grenade v. Gordon, 60 N.C. App. 650,
654, 299 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1983) (child abduction); Williams v. Riley, 56 N.C. App. 427, 428-
29, 289 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1982) (negligent maintenance by landlord). But see Andrew Jackson
Sales v. Bi-Lo Stores, Inc., 68 N.C. App. 222, 225, 314 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1984) (ruling, without
reference to Lloyd, that unfair trade claims would be governed by "the law of the state having
the most significant relationship to the occurrence giving rise to the action."); see also Michael
v. Greene, 63 N.C. App. 713, 715, 306 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1983) (same). Neither of these last two
cases cited to the Second Restatement, however. Section 6 of the Second Restatement was
cited as support for the Court of appeals' decision in Bourdreau v. Baugamean, No. 8721sc42,
slip op. (N.C. App. June 6, 1987) to apply North Carolina's Statute of Repose to a product
liability claim arising from an injury occurring in Florida.
429. See ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., Commercial Div., 722 F.2d 42, 49-50 n.11
(4th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Santana, Inc. v. Levi Strauss and Co., 674
F.2d 269, 272 (4th Cir. 1982); Hassinger v. Tideland Elec. Membership Corp., 622 F. Supp.
146, 149 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir. 1986). But see American Rockwood,
Inc. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 640 F. Supp. 1430-31 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (following
Andrew Jackson Sales and Michael in applying the "most significant relationship" test to an
unfair trade practices claim).
430. 271 N.C. 208, 155 S.E.2d 507 (1967).
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joint tenancy agreement was made.431 In Tennessee Carolina Transporta-
tion, Inc. v. Strick Corp.,432 the court applied the place of performance
rule to a contract to supply tractor-trailers. The court held the contract
would be construed according to the law of Illinois, the state where ship-
ment was to be made, even though the contract was executed in
Pennsylvania.
Other court of appeals cases confirm North Carolina's adherence to
lex loci contractus. 433 A recent decision, however, carved an exception
to this rule where it appeared that the parties intended North Carolina
law to govern their contract, made in Maryland, even though there was
no express choice of law clause in the contract.434
In 1982, the North Carolina Supreme Court departed from the
traditional rules in a warranty case governed by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. In Bernick v. Jurden,435 plaintiff hockey player was hit by a
hockey stick during a college game in North Carolina. Among other in-
juries, the plaintiff lost three teeth and part of a fourth when the mouth-
piece he was wearing crumbled. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of
the mouthguard as well as the opposing hockey player. The court held
that North Carolina law governed the warranty claim against the manu-
facturer even though the plaintiff purchased the mouthguard in Massa-
chusetts.436 The court stated that in warranty cases, UCC section 1-
105437 was "intended to change the rigid conflict of laws rules" of lex loci
contractus and lex loci delicti.438 The court reasoned that since the sale
of the mouthguard bore "an appropriate relation" to the state of North
Carolina, where the alleged product failure occurred, North Carolina law
would be applied.439 The court did not question the continued vitality of
the traditional rules in areas of the law not covered by the UCC.
431. The court stated: "In interpreting a contract made outside of this State our courts
long ago established the principle that the law of the country where the contract is made is the
rule by which the validity of it, its exposition, and consequences are to be determined." Id. at
211, 155 S.E.2d at 509.
432. 283 N.C. 423, 430-31, 196 S.E.2d 711, 716 (1973).
433. See Wallace Butts Ins. Agency v. Runge, 68 N.C. App. 196, 199, 314 S.E.2d 293, 295
(1984); La Grenade v. Gordon, 60 N.C. App. 650, 654, 299 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1983); Williams
v. Riley, 56 N.C. App. 427, 429, 289 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1982); Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C.
App. 264, 268-69, 276 S.E.2d 718, 722-23 (1981); Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner, 30
N.C. App. 686, 690, 228 S.E.2d 478, 482 (1976).
434. See Morton v. Morton, 76 N.C. App. 295, 299, 332 S.E.2d 736, 738-39 (1985).
435. 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
436. Id. at 443, 293 S.E.2d at 411.
437. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-105 (1986).
438. 306 N.C. at 442, 293 S.E.2d at 410.
439. Id. at 443, 293 S.E.2d at 411.
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North Dakota
North Dakota has developed a unique approach to conflict of laws
problems. The state has patterned its method of analysis after the group-
ing of contacts or center of gravity approach adopted by the New York
Court of Appeals in Auten v. Auten 4 0 and Babcock v. Jackson.44 1
Although this approach is essentially codified in the Second Restatement,
the North Dakota Supreme Court has carefully avoided citation to, or
reliance upon, the Restatement. Instead, the court has remained loyal to
the amorphous contact-counting, interest-balancing analysis advocated
by Judge Fuld in the early New York cases.
The supreme court, in Issendorf v. Olson, 442 adopted a significant
contacts approach independent from the popular most significant rela-
tionship test of section 6 of the Second Restatement. In Issendorf, two
North Dakota residents were injured in an automobile accident in Min-
nesota. The passenger brought an action against the owner-operator for
negligence. The jury entered a verdict in favor of the defendant based on
contributory negligence, an absolute bar to recovery under North Dakota
law. On appeal, the plaintiff objected to the trial court's failure to give a
proposed jury instruction on the Minnesota law of comparative negli-
gence, a law which would not have barred recovery entirely. The
supreme court affirmed, abandoning lex loci delicti and applying North
Dakota law on the basis of a quantitative, contact-counting approach.44 3
The court adopted this "contacts" method for use in future cases. 444
The only other application of the significant contacts theory by the
supreme court occurred in Mager v. Mager.445 In Mager, a Minnesota
440. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text.
441. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See supra note 370 and
accompanying text.
442. 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972).
443. Id. at 756. One prominent characteristic of the center of gravity approach is the
tendency of the courts to list every conceivably relevant connection between the litigation and
the state whose law will be selected:
Most of the interest factors point to the application of North Dakota law .... The
plaintiff was a resident of North Dakota at the time of the accident; his loss of in-
come and the medical bills he incurred all affect North Dakota's economy; the vehi-
cle in which he was riding at the time of the accident was registered and garaged in
North Dakota, was insured under North Dakota rates, and was driven by a North
Dakota resident; the trip in which the accident occurred originated in North Dakota,
was to terminate there, and therefore the host-guest relationship originated in North
Dakota.
Id. at 755.
444. "We adopt with this case the significant-contacts approach as the choice of law and
abandon the lex loci delicti doctrine." Id. at 756.
445. 197 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1972).
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woman filed suit against her spouse after they were involved in a car-
train collision in Minnesota. After plaintiff's complaint was dismissed
under the Minnesota spousal immunity law, she appealed, asking the
supreme court to apply North Dakota law on the basis of her extended
hospital stay in that state. The court refused.446 Finally, in two 1984
cases, the supreme court reaffirmed, in dicta, its adherence to the signifi-
cant contacts approach.447
Formerly, North Dakota had a statute to resolve conflicts in con-
tract cases. The statute448 required application of the place of making
and place of performance rules. In 1973, however, the legislature re-
pealed this choice of law rule.
In 1986, the supreme court extended the Issendorf approach to con-
tracts in Apollo Sprinkler Co. v. Fire Sprinkler Suppliers & Design, Inc.,449
an insurance case involving the interpretation of certain policy exclu-
sions. Under Minnesota law, coverage would be excluded; under North
Dakota law it would not. The court held Minnesota law applicable and
denied coverage. 450
In so doing, the Apollo court reiterated North Dakota's adoption of
the significant contacts approach in Issendorf. The court applied the Is-
sendorf test because none of the parties objected, but purported to limit
its application to the present case.451 In an opinion marked by eclecti-
cism and indirection, the court also cited section 188 of the Second Re-
statement and supplemented its analysis with a discussion of each of the
Leflar factors. Nevertheless, the decision to apply North Dakota law was
446. The court reasoned that:
Applying the rule of most significant relationships, as we must do in the light of our
decision in Issendorf the State of Minnesota clearly would be the jurisdiction with
most significant relationships. Both parties were domiciled in that State. The jour-
ney of the parties took place entirely within Minnesota. The alleged wrongful act
and the injuries complained of which resulted therefrom took place in that State.
The only thing that occurred in North Dakota was the hospitalization and treatment
of the plaintiff in Fargo. Therefore, applying the significant-contacts rule in this case,
we conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff's claim was
barred by the Minnesota doctrine of interspousal immunity still in force on the date
of the accident.
Id. at 628.
447. See Barry v. Baker Elec. Coop., Inc., 354 N.W.2d 666, 670 (N.D. 1984); Thoring v.
Bottonsek, 350 N.W.2d 586, 589 n.4 (N.D. 1984); see also Paur v. Crookston Marine, Inc., 83
F.R.D. 466, 473 (D.N.D. 1979).
448. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-11 (1959) (repealed 1973).
449. 382 N.W.2d 386 (N.D. 1986).
450. Id. at 387.
451. "Because both parties to this appeal agree that the Issendorf approach is appropriate,
we shall use it, without deciding whether it is necessary or appropriate in future contract
cases." Id. at 389.
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the result of a contacts-oriented approach, consistent with the court's
past precedents.452
It appears, therefore, that North Dakota courts will continue to ap-
ply a significant contacts or center of gravity approach in both tort and
contract cases.
Ohio
In a pair of decisions handed down in 1984, the Ohio Supreme
Court made a wholesale shift in Ohio conflicts law. The court aban-
doned the traditional rules in both contract and tort, and instead adopted
the Second Restatement. In the tort case, Morgan v. Biro Manufacturing
Co.,453 a plaintiff Kentucky resident brought a products liability action
against the Ohio manufacturer of a meat grinder. The plaintiff was in-
jured on the job in Kentucky. The choice of law issue concerned whether
the trial court should have applied a Kentucky statutory presumption
that a product is not defective if the injury occurs more than five years
after the initial sale of the product or more than eight years after its
manufacture, as was the case here.454 Ohio law entertained no such pre-
sumption. The court, without considering the policies behind the respec-
tive laws, held Kentucky law applicable on the basis of the factors listed
at section 145 of the Second Restatement. The decision to apply the stat-
utory presumption was the result of pure contact-counting.455
A contract case decided the same day was Gries Sports Enterprises v.
Modell.45 6 The case involved a voting agreement between two sharehold-
ers of the Cleveland Browns, Inc., a professional football club and Dela-
ware corporation. In 1965, the parties signed a voting agreement in
452. In light of the foregoing, North Dakota's contacts bearing upon the contractual
relationship between Fire Sprinkler and MSI are "few and relatively insignificant as
compared with those of" Minnesota, and this presents "an easy conflicts case." R.
Leflar, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 267, 289-90. We conclude that Minnesota is the State with
the most significant contacts with the insurance policy at issue.
Id. at 391.
453. 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984).
454. Id. at 343, 474 N.E.2d at 288 (applying KY. REv. STAT. § 411.310 (Cum. Supp.
1986)).
455. Turning to the facts of this case, it is clear that the state of Kentucky has the
most significant relationship to the parties and events herein. The courts below
found that appellant's injury took place in Kentucky and that he was a resident
thereof at the time of his accident. Further, appellant Morgan was employed at a
supermarket in Kentucky, and received workers' compensation benefits under Ken-
tucky law. Finally, the inspection of the meat grinder's condition was the responsi-
bility and within the exclusive interest of the state of Kentucky.
Id. at 342-43, 474 N.E.2d at 289.
456. 15 Ohio St. 3d 284, 473 N.E.2d 807 (1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985).
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Ohio. Delaware corporate law was changed in 1967 to limit the term of
future voting agreements to no more than ten years. The parties modi-
fied the agreement in 1971, signing in Ohio. In 1982, Modell claimed
that he was no longer bound by the voting agreement, since, under Dela-
ware law, it had expired in 1981. The plaintiff contended that Ohio law
applied, and, since Ohio did not limit the duration of shareholder voting
agreements, the agreement remained in effect. The lower court applied
Delaware law, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed. The supreme court
referred to section 188 of the Second Restatement, but once again en-
gaged in a pure contact-counting analysis in reaching the decision that
Ohio law applied.457
Another contract case reached the supreme court in 1985, but this
one was decided under section 187(2) rather than section 188.458 In that
case the parties included a provision in their contract by which the con-
tractor agreed to indemnify the promisee for any injuries caused by the
promisee's negligence. The parties also included a stipulation that Ken-
tucky law would govern the contract. The court upheld the choice of law
clause, despite the fact that the indemnification provision was void under
Ohio law and contrary to state policy.4 59 The court stated that "Ohio
clearly does not have a materially greater interest in the matter than does
the chosen state, Kentucky.' '460 In its most recent contract case, Sekeses
v. Arbaugh,461 the court again applied section 187(2), this time upholding
a provision in a brokerage contract selecting New York Law to govern
the contract. Although the law of Ohio would have applied in the ab-
sence of a contractual choice of law clause, that state did not have "a
materially greater interest than New York in the outcome of the case."' 462
The Ohio Supreme Court has made clear its intention to follow the
457. In the case at bar, the place of contracting was Ohio, the place of negotiation
was Ohio, the place of performance was Ohio, the location of subject matter of con-
tract was Ohio, the place of incorporation was Delaware, and the place of business of
the parties was Ohio. The conclusion is inescapable that Ohio "bears the most signif-
icant relationship to the contract."
Id. at 287, 473 N.E.2d at 810 (quoting Schulke Radio Production v. Midwestern Broadcasting
Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 436, 438, 453 N.E.2d 683, 685-86 (1983)); see also Nationwide Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Ferrin, 21 Ohio St. 3d 43, 45, 487 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1986) (citing § 188 but applying
Florida law to an insurance contract on the basis of superior factual contacts).
458. See Jarvis v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 17 Ohio St. 3d 189, 191, 478 N.E.2d 786, 788-89
(1985).
459. Id. at 192, 473 N.E.2d at 789.
460. Id. at 191, 478 N.E.2d at 789.
461. 31 Ohio St.3d 24, 508 N.E.2d 941 (1987).
462. Id. at 25, N.E.2d at 942; see also Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distrib-
uting Co., 814 F.2d 1120, 1122 (6th Cir. 1987) (also applying § 187(2) and upholding parties'
choice of governing law).
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Second Restatement. Unfortunately, in most of its decisions purporting
to utilize the Second Restatement, the court has done nothing more than
tally the relevant contacts between the litigation and each affected state.
In its two decisions involving contractual choice of law provisions, the
court performed more elegantly, but ultimately applied the age-old rule
of intention validation. Hopefully, in future cases, the Ohio courts will
pay more than lip service to the Second Restatement and will embark
upon a more reasoned analysis.
Oklahoma
Oklahoma has made a clear break with the place of injury rule in
tort cases, but has not yet departed from the place of making rule in
contract actions.
The leading case in tort is Brickner v. Gooden,463 which involved the
crash of a private airplane in Mexico. The owner-operator of the aircraft
as well as all passengers were Oklahoma residents. Mexico law imposed
severe limits on recovery for wrongful death, but Oklahoma law did not.
Finding Oklahoma law applicable, the Oklahoma Supreme Court specif-
ically overruled its prior lex loci delicti holdings concerning recovery for
wrongful death, and expressly adopted section 145 of the Second
Restatement. 464
In White v. Wrhite,465 the supreme court applied its new approach in
a spousal immunity suit. Plaintiff, an Oklahoma resident, sued her
spouse for injuries she suffered when their truck overturned on a Texas
highway. The trial court applied the Texas spousal immunity law and
dismissed the action. The supreme court reversed, instructing the trial
court to apply on remand the most significant relationship test adopted
six years earlier in Brickner.466 The only other tort case involving con-
flict of laws to reach the supreme court in recent years was Flanders v.
Crane Co. ,467 a negligence action brought by an Oklahoma resident who
slipped and fell in a bathtub in a Nebraska motel room. The court held
in a footnote that Nebraska had the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties, and that its substantive law was therefore to
463. 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974).
464. "We hold, as a general principle, that the rights and liabilities of parties with respect
to a particular issue in tort shall be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." Id. at
637. The court then listed the contact points at § 145 as the factors to evaluate in arriving at
the state of the most significant relationship. Id.
465. 618 P.2d 921, 924-25 (Okla. 1980).
466. Id. at 924-25.
467. 693 P.2d 602 (Okla. 1984).
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be applied.468 Federal courts sitting in Oklahoma have applied the Sec-
ond Restatement on at least two occasions.469
Telex Corp. v. Hamilton,470 decided four years after Brickner, indi-
cates the Oklahoma Supreme Court's continued reliance upon lex loci
contractus. In that case, a Florida resident contracted with an
Oklahoma corporation to provide information to aid the corporation in
recovering lost accounts receivable. The corporation agreed to pay the
Florida resident a percentage of the accounts collected through the ar-
rangement. The contract was signed in Oklahoma and included a stipu-
lation that Oklahoma law would govern all questions of contract
interpretation. Apparently, the agreement was invalid under Florida law
because the Florida resident did not register a fictitious name he used in
recovering the lost accounts. The court had no difficulty finding
Oklahoma law applicable, either under the choice of law clause or under
lex loci contractus. 471 The court, however, made no reference to
Brickner.
The two most recent Oklahoma contract cases have been decided in
the court of appeals. That court took a rather bold step in Collins Radio
Co. v. Bell,472 when it applied section 191473 of the Second Restatement,
rather than the place of making or performance rule, to a contract for the
sale of certain radio transmitting equipment. The court found that the
presumptive reference to the law of the place of delivery, Texas, was dis-
placed by the law of Oklahoma, the state with a more significant relation-
ship to the sales agreement.474 At the same time, the court was careful to
limit its holding to UCC sales cases. 475 In 1982 the court of appeals rec-
468. Id. at 605 n.1.
469. See Robert A. Wahsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 778 F.2d 547, 550 (10th Cir. 1985)
(validity of corporations assent to interested director contract); Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum,
Inc., 606 F. Supp. 916, 921-22 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (statute of limitations).
470. 576 P.2d 767 (Okla. 1978).
471. "Even in the absence of an agreement stating what law would apply, the general rule
of law is that the law where the contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its
nature, validity, and interpretation." Id. at 768.
472. 623 P.2d 1039 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
473. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 191 (1968) states:
The validity of a contract for the sale of an interest in a chattel and the rights created
thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by
the local law of the state where under the terms of the contract the seller is to deliver
the chattel unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
474. Collins Radio, 623 P.2d at 1048.
475. The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that:
Oklahoma has determined in the area of torts that the "most significant relationship"
test is a better means of determining which jurisdiction's law will apply. The same
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ognized that the place of making rule still governed in Oklahoma, though
the court held, citing section 6(1) of the Second Restatement, that an
Oklahoma anti-subrogation statute applied in lieu of Arkansas law since
the Oklahoma legislature apparently intended that its law should have
extraterritorial effect.476
A 1985 Tenth Circuit decision, relying heavily on the opinion of the
district court below, opined that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
continue to apply lex loci contractus in non-sales contract cases. 477 This
inference appears to be correct.
Oregon
Oregon courts have traditionally utilized a mixture of the interest
analysis approach and the Second Restatement in resolving conflict of
law cases. In order to make any sense out of the eclectic Oregon ap-
proach, it is necessary to review the decisions historically.
The first modern conflicts decision in Oregon was Lilienthal v. Kauf-
man,478 a contract case. In that case, an Oregon probate court declared
the defendant, an Oregon resident, a spendthrift. The declaration voided
all future contracts made by the defendant during the term of the court-
imposed guardianship. 479 Despite this declaration, defendant Kaufman
proceeded to arrange two joint ventures, one for the purchase and resale
of toys and the other for the purchase and resale of binoculars. Predict-
ably, Kaufman failed to live up to his agreements. Kaufman's partner in
the first venture, an Oregon pharmacist, filed suit for the repayment of a
loan. The Supreme Court of Oregon declared the joint venture agree-
ment void under the spendthrift statute, and cancelled Kaufman's
rationale for accepting the doctrine as to torts dictates that its application should be
made to actions that fall under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. at 1046-47.
476. Pate v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 649 P.2d 809, 811-12 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
477. Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985). But see
Gay & Taylor, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 550 F. Supp. 710, 714 (W.D. Okla.
1981) (observing in an insurance contract that Oklahoma had adopted the most significant
contacts rule in determining conflicts of laws); Robert A. Wachsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l, Inc.,
778 F.2d 547, 549-50 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that the validity or invalidity of a corporate
board of director's ratification of a corporate contract executed by an interested director would
be determined under the law of the state of incorporation, pursuant to § 302 of the Second
Restatement).
478. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
479. The court noted that under Oregon law: "After the appointment of a guardian for a
spendthrift, all contracts, except for necessaries, and all gifts, sales and transfers of real or
personal estate made by such spendthrift thereafter and before the termination of the guardian-
ship are voidable." Id. at 3-4, 395 P.2d at 544 (applying OR. REv. STAT. § 126.335 (repealed
1961)).
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debt.48 0 Undaunted, Kaufman went to California and reached agreement
with Lilienthal on another joint venture. Lilienthal, too, advanced funds
to Kaufman. Kaufman again failed to repay the debt. When Lilienthal
sued Kaufman in Oregon, the trial court voided the agreement, relying
on the Oregon spendthrift statute. The supreme court again affirmed the
judgment in favor of the spendthrift Kaufman. 481
In the Oregon Supreme Court, Lilienthal's argued that the promis-
sory notes on which Kaufman had defaulted were executed in California
and that the courts of Oregon were required under conflict of laws princi-
ples to resolve the controversy in accordance with California law, which
did not recognize the contractual incapacity of spendthrifts. 482
The court rejected the reference to lex loci contractus, but did find
that California had substantial connections with the case. The court
noted that California was both the place of making and performance, and
only California law would uphold the parties' agreement.48 3 In the end,
however, the court disregarded factual contacts entirely and resolved the
choice of law issue via an interest analysis. The court identified at least
two affected state interests in each jurisdiction: Oregon had an interest in
protecting Kaufman's family from impoverishment and an interest in
keeping Kaufman off the public dole; California had an interest in seeing
its resident creditor, Lilienthal, repaid and also a generalized interest in
maintaining the image of California as a state where contracts are en-
forced. Faced with an apparent true conflict, the court applied forum
law and avoided the contract.484
The Lilienthal interest-analysis approach has been applied inconsis-
tently in later Oregon decisions involving contracts. On one occasion,
the supreme court ignored Lilienthal, and instead cited section 188 of the
Second Restatement. 48 5 The court of appeals has also been less than res-
olute in its adherence to the Lilienthal interest-analysis method, follow-
ing it on one occasion,486 but employing a contact-counting approach in
two later cases. 487 The appellate court has also made use of section 187
480. Olshen v. Kaufman, 235 Or. 423, 385 P.2d 161 (1963).
481. 239 Or. at 16, 395 P.2d at 549.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 7-10, 395 P.2d at 545-47.
484. Id. at 14-16, 395 P.2d at 548-49.
485. See Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 264 Or. 547, 549, 507 P.2d 9, 10 (1973),
where the court, without citation to any prior Oregon decisions, made the very uncontroversial
decision that Michigan law would apply to an insurance contract issued to a Michigan resident
in Michigan by a nationwide insurer.
486. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Schriber, 51 Or. App. 441, 448, 625 P.2d 1370, 1373
(1981).
487. See Citizens First Bank v. Intercontinental Express, Inc., 77 Or. App. 655, 657-58,
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of the Second Restatement in judging the validity of a contractual choice
of law clause.488
The first tort case after Lilienthal was Casey v. Manson Construction
and Engineering Co.489 Plaintiff Casey, an Oregon resident, was the wife
of a truck driver who had been seriously injured when his truck went off
the road while he was making a delivery to a construction site in Wash-
ington. Two Washington construction firms controlled the construction
site, and it was determined that their negligence led to the accident which
crippled the plaintiff's husband. The plaintiff brought an action for loss
of consortium. The trial court dismissed the complaint applying Wash-
ington law, which did not recognize a cause of action for loss of consor-
tium. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed, though not on the basis of
lex loci delicti. Instead, the court formally adopted section 6 of the Sec-
ond Restatement. 490 It then found that Washington had the most signifi-
cant relationship to the case because the parties' business relationship
centered there.491
In the next case, DeFoor v. Lematta,492 the court was not required to
espouse any particular choice of law theory. DeFoor and Lematta, both
Oregon residents, were killed in a helicopter crash in the Sierra Nevada
mountains of California. The plaintiff's executor sued the helicopter
manufacturer, an Oregon corporation, and the pilot, also an Oregon resi-
dent, for wrongful death. The law of Oregon imposed a $25,000 cap on
the recovery for wrongful death but California law did not. The court
held Oregon law applicable "[u]nder any choice-of-law theory except
that which would apply the law of the place of injury without regard to
any other considerations. '493 The court relied extensively, however, upon
Reich v. Purcell,494 a leading interest-analysis case from California.
Next came Erwin v. Thomas,495 a pure example of Currie interest
713 P.2d 1097, 1098-99 (1986) (citing Lilienthal but following a contact-counting approach);
Powell v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 57 Or. App. 110, 114, 643 P.2d 1331, 1333 (not citing
Lilienthal and following a contact-counting approach), review denied, 293 Or. 394, 650 P.2d
927 (1982).
488. Young v. Mobil Oil Corp., 85 Or. App. 64, 735 P.2d 654 (1987).
489. 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
490. Id. at 287-88, 428 P.2d at 904-05. "Careful consideration of these decisions, as well
as of the extensive writings on the subject, persuade us that we should adopt for tort actions
the rule of 'most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties' as set forth
in the Tentative Draft of the Restatement." Id.
491. Id. at 293, 428 P.2d at 907.
492. 249 Or. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968).
493. Id. at 120, 437 P.2d at 109.
494. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). See supra note 65 and accom-
panying text.
495. 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
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analysis in a classic, unprovided-for case. The plaintiff's husband, a
Washington resident, was allegedly injured in Washington as a result of
the negligent operation of a truck by the defendant, an Oregon resident.
The plaintiff filed suit to recover damages. The issue here, as in Casey,
was loss of consortium. Again, Oregon law allowed such recovery but
Washington law did not.
A close analysis reveals that the relevant facts in Erwin were the
same as in Casey, except that the domiciles of the parties were reversed.
In Casey, plaintiff was an Oregon resident and the defendants were
Washington corporations. In that case, both states were interested: Ore-
gon sought to provide compensation to its injured plaintiff; Washington
desired to protect its defendant corporations from excess liability im-
posed from without the state. In Erwin, the plaintiff was a Washington
resident and defendant an Oregon resident. Here, neither state was inter-
ested: Washington had expressed a policy of denying loss of consortium
claims entirely, and therefore it could have no interest in compensating
its resident plaintiff where it did not even consider her to have been in-
jured; Oregon, likewise, had no interest in shielding its resident defend-
ant from liability, but instead favored a policy of compensation in loss of
consortium cases.
What was the supreme court to do?
It decided to apply Oregon law, reasoning that "neither state has a
vital interest in the outcome of this litigation and there can be no con-
ceivable material conflict of policies or interests if an Oregon court does
what comes naturally and applies Oregon law."'496 The court relied di-
rectly on the writings of Professor Currie in reaching this resolution.497
Having decided that Oregon law was applicable under a pro-forum
analysis, the court then examined whether this approach was inconsis-
tent with Casey. In Casey, the court refused to invoke Currie's forum-
law presumption in a true conflict case and instead applied the Second
Restatement. The Erwin court held that there was no inconsistency. Be-
cause the Second Restatement would be applied only where there was a
true conflict. The court concluded that the ultimate methodology in
every choice of law decision was a governmental interest analysis. 498
496. Id. at 459-60, 506 P.2d at 496-97.
497. Id. at 460, 506 P.2d at 497. The court quoted from Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 184
(1963). Professor Currie there advocated application of forum law in the unprovided-for case,
"simply on the ground that that is the more convenient disposition." Id.
498. Our confidence in any set body of rules as an all-encompassing and readily ap-
plicable means of solution to conflict cases is not so great that we desire to undertake
the application of such rules except in those situations where the policies and inter-
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In Myers v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,4 99 the plaintiff's husband was
killed in an airplane crash in British Columbia. The plaintiff, an Oregon
resident, brought a wrongful death action against the manufacturer of
the airplane and a Washington corporation that repaired the airplane
prior to its crash. The British Columbia statute of limitations barred the
plaintiff's claim. The suit, however, was timely according to the limita-
tions laws of both Oregon, the plaintiff's place of domicile, and Washing-
ton, the defendant's place of incorporation. The court allowed the action
to proceed, stating that the Second Restatement was controlling and cit-
ing sections 142, 143 and 175.00 In the end, however, the court did
nothing more than eliminate British Columbia from the choice of law
sweepstakes by pointing to the fortuitous nature of that province's con-
nection to the case.50 This was hardly a case of dutifully following the
Second Restatement; nor would application of interest analysis or any
other modem conflicts theory have produced a different result. For this
reason, Myers is singularly unhelpful in analyzing the Oregon approach
to choice of law.502
Finally, came Tower v. Schwabe,503 an opinion written by Justice
Holman, author of the Erwin decision and the leading proponent of inter-
est analysis on the Oregon Supreme Court. Tower was a suit between
two Oregon residents arising out of a car accident in British Columbia.
ests of the respective states are in substantial opposition. We see no such conflict
here and, therefore, find it unnecessary to resort to any such set of rules .... Where
such policies and interests can be identified with a fair degree of assurance and there
appears to be no substantial conflict, we do not believe it is necessary to have re-
course in the "contacts" of Section 145(2) of Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws.
Erwin, 264 Or. at 461-62, 506 P.2d at 497-98.
499. 275 Or. 501, 553 P.2d 355 (1976).
500. Id. at 514-15, 553 P.2d at 366-67.
501. The Myers court's analysis can best be viewed as a process of elimination. Of three
interested jurisdictions, two - Washington and Oregon - had the same three-year statute of
limitations. The court held that British Columbia had insufficient connections with the suit to
have its law applied. It was not put to the difficult decision of choosing between the laws of
Washington and Oregon, two concededly interested states, since their laws were identical. The
court stated that:
As between Oregon/Washington and British Columbia, the only relationship which
British Columbia has to this action is the entirely fortuitous event that it happened to
be the site of the crash. British Columbia could, therefore, have no substantial inter-
est in having its statute of limitations prevent the maintenance of this action. Thus,
the trial court did not err in applying Oregon law.
Id. at 516, 553 P.2d at 367.
502. Myers was cited as controlling in Powell v. Equitable Savings & Loan Assoc., 57 Or.
App. 110, 114, 643 P.2d 1331, 1333 (espousing a "most significant relationship" approach to
choice of law on issue of propriety of Oregon bank's refusal to pay interest to certain Idaho
borrowers), review denied, 293 Or. 394, 650 P.2d 927 (1982).
503. 284 Or. 105, 585 P.2d 662 (1978).
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The Oregon guest statute precluded recovery by the plaintiff,5°4 but Brit-
ish Columbia law allowed recovery. The court began its analysis by
quoting its earlier exposition of false conflict resolution in Erwin.505 The
court then noted that Oregon had an interest, evidenced by its guest stat-
ute, in protecting host-drivers like the defendant from suits brought by
ungrateful guest-passengers. British Columbia, however, had no interest
in the case since its only connection was as the place of the auto accident.
Thus, the court applied Oregon law, specifically rejecting the plaintiff's
request to consider application of the "better rule of law."' 50 6
The remaining decisions have been in the lower state and federal
courts. In Fisher v. Huck,50 7 the Oregon Court of Appeals held British
Columbia's common law guest statute applicable on the following facts:
The plaintiff, originally an Oregon domiciliary, was traveling in British
Columbia, intending to establish a new residence there, when he was in-
jured in an accident caused by a British Columbia native. According to
the court, the case presented a classic false conflict, with Oregon having
no interest in the outcome because neither party was an Oregon domicili-
ary at the time of the accident. 508 In another court of appeals case, the
court gave a perfunctory citation to section 148 of the Second Restate-
ment before determining, on a pure contact-counting basis, that Louisi-
ana law required dismissal of the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation
claim.509 The sporadic federal decisions in Oregon have generally fol-
lowed the Erwin approach, applying interest analysis with true-conflict
resolution via the Second Restatement.510
The result of this line of decisions appears to be that Lilienthal's
interest analysis has survived, although only in the modified form illus-
trated by Casey and Erwin. The Oregon Supreme Court will no longer,
as it did in Lilienthal, resolve true conflicts by the automatic application
504. Id. at 107, 585 P.2d at 663 (applying OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.115 (1983)).
505. Where, in the particular factual context, the interests and policies of one state
are involved and those of the other are not (or, if they are, they are involved in only a
minor way), reason would seem to dictate that the law of the state whose policies and
interests are vitally involved should apply; or, if those of neither state are vitally
involved, that the law of the forum should apply.
Id. at 107-08, 585 P.2d at 663 (quoting Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 458, 506 P.2d 494, 496
(1973)).
506. Id. at 109-10, 585 P.2d at 664.
507. 50 Or. App. 635, 624 P.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 291 Or. 566, 632 P.2d 1260 (1981).
508. Id. at 642, 624 P.2d at 180.
509. See Western Energy, Inc. v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 55 Or. App. 138, 146-47, 637 P.2d
223, 228-29 (1981).
510. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 808 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 852 (1984); Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1975).
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of Oregon law. Rather, it will apply the law of the state of the most
significant relationship when there is more than one interested state.
Pennsylvania
No state has a more convoluted, eclectic approach to choice of law
than Pennsylvania. On various occasions, its courts have applied the
First and Second Restatements, the center of gravity approach, interest
analysis and Professor Cavers' "principles of preference." Because of a
paucity of recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases, it is anyone's guess
what principles will be cited next.
The tort cases decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are
dated. From 1964 to 1970, the court decided five conflicts cases, but it
has not been called upon to decide another since. The first and foremost
case was Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,511 decided only a year after
Babcock v. Jackson512 had heralded the dawn of the modem choice of
law jurisprudence. In Griffith, a Pennsylvania plaintiff bound for Ari-
zona was killed in an airplane crash in Colorado. The defendant was a
Delaware corporation doing business nationwide. The court refused to
apply Colorado's statutory limitations on recovery for wrongful death
and instead applied Pennsylvania law, which allowed compensation for
pain and suffering and loss of future earnings. The court expressly
adopted an interest-analysis approach to choice of law issues.5 13 The
court's analysis revealed a false conflict: Colorado was interested only in
protecting Colorado defendants from huge or speculative damage
awards, and the defendant here had no special connection with Colo-
rado; conversely, Pennsylvania's interest in full compensation was fur-
thered by application of its law because the decedent and his dependents
were Pennsylvania residents.514
The Colorado connection reappeared in McSwain v. McSwain,51 5
where a Pennsylvania resident sued her spouse for negligence after their
infant daughter died in a Colorado automobile accident. The court first
reaffirmed its Grifflth decision, adopting interest analysis for choice of
511. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
512. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See supra note 370 and
accompanying text.
513. Thus, after careful review and consideration of the leading authorities and cases,
we are of the opinion that the strict lex loci delicti rule should be abandoned in
Pennsylvania in favor of a more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies
and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.
Griffith, 416 Pa. at 21, 203 A.2d at 805.
514. Id. at 24-25, 203 A.2d at 807.
515. 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
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law resolution. 516 The court applied the law of the marital domicile, thus
barring the suit due to Pennsylvania's spousal immunity rule.5 17
In Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co, 5 18 a Pennsylvania resident em-
ployed in New Jersey, recovered workers' compensation benefits for inju-
ries sustained while operating a fork-lift truck. He then sued the
manufacturer of the fork-lift for negligence. The fork-lift manufacturer,
a Pennsylvania corporation, sought to join the New Jersey employer in
contribution. New Jersey law did not allow a third-party tortfeasor to
join an employer as a defendant in an action for employment-related in-
juries if the employer was in compliance with state workers' compensa-
tion laws. However, Pennsylvania law allowed joinder in this situation.
The court applied New Jersey law, emphasizing New Jersey's important
state interest in not having its workers' compensation plan disrupted. Be-
cause New Jersey's workers' compensation statute applied, it was neces-
sary that that state's entire compensation scheme be enforced.519
Kuchinic v. McCrory520 was Pennsylvania's first guest statute case.
Four Pennsylvania residents were killed when their small airplane
crashed in Georgia. Survivors of all three passengers sued the pilot's es-
tate. The estate claimed that the Georgia guest statute, which applied to
aviation as well as motor vehicle cases, barred the action.521 Justice Rob-
erts, the author of the Griffith, McSwain, and Elston opinions, reversed
the trial court's decision to apply the guest statute. He reasoned that
Pennsylvania's interests involved compensating survivors of the de-
ceased, all of whom were Pennsylvania residents, and that Georgia's in-
terests in protecting gracious hosts and preventing insurance fraud were
not implicated here since neither the pilot nor his insurer had any con-
nection with Georgia.522
The latest and by far the most difficult case to reach the supreme
516. Whether the policies of one state rather than another should be furthered in the
event of conflict can only be determined within the matrix of specific litigation.
What should be sought is an analysis of the extent to which one state rather than
another has demonstrated, by reason of its policies and their connection and rele-
vance to the matter in dispute, a priority of interest in the application of its rule of
law.
Id at 94, 215 A.2d at 682.
517. Id. at 96-97, 215 A.2d at 683.
518. 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966).
519. Id. at 109-10, 216 A.2d at 324.
520. 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966).
521. Id. at 622, 222 A.2d at 899 (applying GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-107, 105-203 (current
versions at Code of 1981, § 6-2-6, 51-1-4 (1982))).
522. Id. at 624, 222 A.2d at 899-900.
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court was Cipolla v. Shaposka.523 In that case, a Delaware defendant
drove a Pennsylvania plaintiff home from classes at a technical school in
Wilmington, Delaware. Plaintiff was injured in an accident in Delaware,
which had a guest statute that barred suit.5 24 Pennsylvania had no guest
statute. The court recognized that a true conflict existed since Penn-
sylvania sought recovery for its plaintiff and Delaware immunity for its
defendant.5 25
The court applied Delaware law, but it reached this result by two
alternative routes. First, and somewhat unconvincingly, the court held
that Delaware actually had two interests in the case-the protection of
the defendant from tort liability and the maintenance of affordable insur-
ance rates. The fact that Pennsylvania had only one interest-compen-
sating its resident plaintiff-meant "that Delaware's contacts are
qualitatively greater than Pennsylvania's and that it has the greater inter-
ests in having its law applied to the issue before us." '5 26
Much more interesting, and certainly more defensible, was the Ci-
polla court's second rationale for applying Delaware law. The court
quoted extensively from Professor Cavers' The Choice-of-Law Process, 5 27
and applied Cavers' second "principle of preference": the place of de-
fendant's domicile in cases where the injury occurs there and that juris-
diction's law does not hold the defendant liable for the conduct
alleged.5 28 Since the defendant here was from Delaware, and since Dela-
ware's law did not hold the defendant liable for injuries suffered by a
guest in his automobile, that law governed. Accordingly, the court dis-
missed the suit. The court failed to indicate which, if either, of these
approaches to true-conflict resolution it would apply in the future. Ci-
polla remains the only Pennsylvania Supreme Court encounter with a
true conflict of laws.529
523. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
524. Id at 564, 267 A.2d at 855 (applying DEL CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101(a) (1979)).
525. Id. at 565, 267 A.2d at 855-56.
526. Id. at 566, 267 A.2d at 856.
527. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 146-47 (1965).
528. Professor Cavers' second rule states:
Where the liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted and caused an
injury set a lower standard of conduct or of financial protection than do the laws of
the home state of the person suffering the injury, the laws of the state of conduct and
injury should determine the standard of conduct or protection applicable to the case,
at least where the person injured was not so related to the person causing the injury
that the question should be relegated to the law governing the relationship.
Id at 146.
529. Justice Roberts, the court's foremost advocate of interest analysis, dissented in Ci-
pollo, arguing that each of the majority's alternative approaches was flawed. First, the Dela-
ware legislature's sole purpose in passing a guest statute was the protection from liability of
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Subsequent choice of law decisions in Pennsylvania have not been
particularly helpful in resolving the uncertainties left by Cipolla. Two
decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, as well as one federal deci-
sion, involved the question of whether a Pennsylvania plaintiff could re-
cover from a foreign property owner for injuries occurring on the foreign
property where Pennsylvania law attached liability but the foreign law
did not.5 30 In each case, the court held there could be no recovery due to
the locus state's paramount interest in regulating the conduct of its citi-
zens within the state. In each case, the court also held itself bound by
Griffith to apply an interest-analysis approach in its decision.531 A recent
Third Circuit case involving the issue of contribution among joint
tortfeasors was resolved on a significant contacts basis.5 32 No case since
Cipolla has relied upon the Cavers test in making a choice of law deci-
sion, although one panel of the Third Circuit, applying the Second Re-
statement, noted that its decision was also consistent with the Cipolla
rationale.5 33
The latest state court case in Pennsylvania was a sovereign immu-
nity case decided in the commonwealth court. In Davis v. School District
of Philadelphia,534 the Pennsylvania parents of a junior high school stu-
dent brought a wrongful death action against the local school district
after their child drowned in a motel swimming pool during a school field
gracious host drivers; the statute's potential effect on insurance rates was not a legislative con-
cern. Cipolla, 439 Pa. at 569-71, 267 A.2d at 857-59 (Robert, J., dissenting). Second, the
Cavers principles were based on a party expectation rationale. This rationale was inapposite
here, because it was unlikely that defendant had actually been relying upon the Delaware guest
statute when he offered his Pennsylvania friend a ride in his automobile; it was also unlikely
that defendant's father was relying upon the guest statute when he paid the insurance premi-
ums. Id. at 571-72, 267 A.2d at 859. Justice Roberts would have applied a "better rule of
law" approach to resolution of true conflicts. Using this approach, Pennsylvania's common
law liability was clearly a better rule of law than was Delaware's guest statute. Id. at 573-78,
267 A.2d at 859-62.
530. See Levin v. Desert Palace, 318 Pa. Super. 606, 465 A.2d 1019 (1983); Hager v.
Etting, 268 Pa. Super. 416, 408 A.2d 856 (1979); Kabo v. Summa Corp., 523 F. Supp. 1326
(E.D. Pa. 1981). The facts of Kabo and Levin are strikingly similar. In each case, a Penn-
sylvania family vacationing in Nevada was victimized by a hotel room burglary. When the
victims sued, the Nevada defendant hotels set up in defense the Nevada Innkeeper's Statute,
NEv. REv. STAT. § 651.010 (1983), which imposes liability in such circumstances only if the
innkeeper acts with "gross neglect."
531. See Levin, 318 Pa. Super. at 609, 465 A.2d at 1021; Hager, 268 Pa. Super. at 419, 408
A.2d at 858; Kabo, 523 F. Supp. at 1327-28. Significantly, the result in each case is consistent
with Professor Cavers' second principle, adopted by the supreme court in Cipolla. In each of
these three cases, the court absolved a defendant from liability in a situation where the defend-
ant was acting in its own state and that state's law did not attach liability to the conduct.
532. Shields v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 397, 400-01 (3d Cir. 1987).
533. See Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 242-43 (3d Cir. 1986).
534. 91 Pa. Commw. 27, 496 A.2d 903 (1985).
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trip to Virginia. Pennsylvania had a rule of governmental immunity
which barred the suit but Virginia did not. Unsurprisingly, the court
held Pennsylvania law applicable, and dismissed the case. What was sur-
prising in Davis, however, was that the court cited Griffith as authority
for applying section 145 of the Second Restatement.5 35 The court's inter-
pretation of Griffith was totally wrong; unfortunately, the superior court
has perpetuated the myth by applying the Second Restatement in a con-
tract case, as well.
5 3 6
Discounting the mistaken lower court decision in Davis, it is clear
that the Pennsylvania courts follow an interest analysis approach in tort
cases. How the courts will resolve true conflicts in future cases is uncer-
tain, but for now, Cipolla and the two most recent superior court cases
indicate that Professor Cavers' principles will be utilized where applica-
ble. Eventually, a case will arise which is not covered by any of these
rules. At that time, the courts will be forced to select a broader
methodology. 537
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never officially discarded the
old place of making rule in contract cases. In fact, as late as 1971, a full
seven years after Griffith, it applied that rule in an international contract
case.5 38 In 1983, the court, in puzzling dictum, stated that Pennsylvania
law, governed a legal malpractice suit when the contract was made in
Pennsylvania. The court cited section 188 of the Second Restatement
and a number of federal court cases whose analyses "show Pennsylvania
following a flexible conflicts methodology combining interest analysis
535. Id. at 30, 496 A.2d at 904-05.
536. See Gillan v. Gillan, 236 Pa. Super. 147, 150, 345 A.2d 742, 744 (1975); see also
Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying § 145 of the Second
Restatement).
537. The Third Circuit has gone beyond Cipolla and relied upon the resolution of a con-
flicts hypothetical by Professor Cavers in D. CAVERS, supra note 527, at 143-44. See Broome
v. Antlers' Hunting Club, 595 F.2d 921, 925 (3d Cir. 1979), where the court held that a New
York plaintiff's wrongful death claim against a Pennsylvania defendant would be decided
under the more liberal damage laws of Pennsylvania, the state where the accident occurred,
rather than the laws of New York, where plaintiff was domiciled. This fact pattern presents an
unprovided-for case, rather than a true conflict, but Professor Cavers argued in a hypothetical
case that the law imposing higher damages should be applied in order to serve interests of
deterrence and retribution expressed by the legislature in defendant's state. Adoption by the
court of appeals of this rule, a rule which is not expressed in any of the seven Principles of
Preference, marked the first time that a Pennsylvania court had gone beyond Cavers' second
principle. The other federal court cases following Griffith have been false conflicts. See In re
Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115, 120 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 851 (1986), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1596 (1987); Reyno v. Piper Air-
craft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 170-71 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 235 (1981);
Moser v. Bostitch Division of Textron, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 917, 920 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
538. See Danz v. Danz, 444 Pa. 411, 414, 283 A.2d 282, 284 (1971).
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and the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. ' '5 39
So matters stood until the 1984 case of Myers v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co. 540 In Myers, an Illinois resident was seriously injured in a
car accident in Pennsylvania while acting on behalf of his Illinois em-
ployer. During the time that his workers' compensation claim was pend-
ing, the injured employee received an award of $324,000 from the other
driver's no-fault automobile insurer. The employee's eligibility for work-
ers' compensation was then established and he received another award
under the Illinois worker's compensation statute. At that point, the no-
fault insurer sued the employers' insurer for contribution of amounts ear-
lier paid by it to the employee. Pennsylvania law allowed contribution
on these facts, but Illinois law did not. The court held Pennsylvania law
applicable since any other course might have seriously jeopardized the
efficacy of the Pennsylvania insurance system.5 41 Griffith, McSwain, and
Cipolla were all cited as controlling. 542 The court distinguished a related
claim by the employer's insurer, an Illinois company, against the em-
ployee since there both the claimant and the defendant were Illinois citi-
zens.543 The court made no mention of the place of making rule and did
not assign overwhelming importance to any single contact. There was no
reference to the Second Restatement; the court instead relied on a combi-
nation contacts and interest-analysis approach. 544
While Myers does not definitively establish any particular choice of
law method for contract cases, it clearly represents a rejection of the
place of making rule. Even before Myers, the lower courts had begun the
search for a more flexible theory. As early as 1966, the superior court
had applied a variant of the Griffith interest-analysis approach in a con-
tract case, though only as an alternative holding since the place of mak-
ing rule produced the same result.5 45 The real thunderbolt, struck in
1975, when the superior court, in Gillan v. Gillan,546 held that Grffith
had adopted the Second Restatement approach for choice of law cases
generally, and that section 188 would be applied to determine the law
applicable to a separation agreement.5 47
539. Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 54-55 n.5, 459 A.2d 744, 748 n.5 (1983).
540. 506 Pa. 492, 485 A.2d 1113 (1984).
541. Id. at 498-99, 485 A.2d at 1117.
542. Id. at 496, 485 A.2d at 1115-16.
543. Id. at 496-97, 485 A.2d at 1116.
544. Id. at 496-99, 485 A.2d at 1116-17.
545. See Crawford v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 208 Pa. Super. 150, 156-57, 221 A.2d 877,
881-82 (1966).
546. 236 Pa. Super. 147, 345 A.2d 742 (1975).
547. Id. at 150-53, 345 A.2d at 744-45.
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Recent lower court cases indicate that Pennsylvania no longer fol-
lows the place of making rule, but the courts have divided over what the
proper approach should be in contract actions. Only one case following
Gillan has held that Griffith requires application of the Second Restate-
ment, although the court in that case in fact did nothing more than count
contacts.5 48 In three other cases, the superior court has applied a most
significant contacts or flexible contacts approach without reference to the
Second Restatement.5 49 This latter approach has also been used to deter-
mine the applicable law in a case concerning the validity of an attempted
revocation of a testamentary trust.55 0
The cases are not entirely reconcilable, but Myers and the recent
superior court cases indicate that a center of gravity approach is the
method most often applied in Pennsylvania contract cases. The policy-
sensitive interest-analysis approach of the early supreme court tort cases
has so far not been extended to contract cases, although the supreme
court has not had a real opportunity to pass upon the issue. There is
little support for the Second Restatement.
In the leading Third Circuit case, Melville v. American Home Assur-
ance Co.,551 the court of appeals held that Delaware law was applicable
in determining the burden of proof for suicide under an accidental death
insurance policy. The insured was a Delaware resident, the beneficiary
was a Pennsylvania resident, and the insurance company was located in
New York. The court held that Griffith had adopted a combination of
interest analysis and the Second Restatement. The court applied each of
these approaches in turn and found Delaware law applicable each
time.552 Since Melville, there have been a large number of federal court
decisions involving choice of law in contract. Most have applied a center
of gravity approach as the Pennsylvania superior court has generally
done.553 Others have relied more heavily upon the Second Re-
548. See Knauer v. Knauer, 323 Pa. Super. 206, 470 A.2d 553 (1983).
549. See McCabe v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 356 Pa. Super. 223, 514
A.2d 582, 585-86 (1986); Caputo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 344 Pa. Super. 1, 7, 495 A.2d 959, 962
(1985); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walter, 290 Pa. Super. 129, 137-38, 434 A.2d 164, 167-68
(1981).
550. See In re Estate of Agostini, 311 Pa. Super. 233, 252-54, 457 A.2d 861, 871-72 (1983).
551. 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978).
552. Id. at 1313-15.
553. See In re Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 882 (3d Cir. 1984); McFad-
den v. Burton, 645 F. Supp. 457, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Rupinsky v. Miller Brewing Co., 627
F. Supp. 1181, 1183-84 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Home for Crippled Children v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 590 F. Supp. 1490, 1500-01 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Polt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 585 F.
Supp. 796, 798 (M.D. Pa. 1984); Hanmermill Paper Co. v. Pipe Sys., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1189,
1194 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 n.1
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Exportadora Salcedo de Elaboradoros de Cacao
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statement.5 54
Rhode Island
Rhode Island was an early follower of Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations. However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's recent con-
flict of law cases involving torts have been somewhat inconsistent. Fur-
thermore, the court has never applied Leflar in a contract case.
The premier choice of law case in Rhode Island was Woodward v.
Stewart,55 5 an action between Rhode Island residents involving a car ac-
cident that occurred in Massachusetts. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's wrongful death action, reasoning that the applicable law was
the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act, 556 and that the Act was unen-
forceable in Rhode Island due to its "penal" nature.5 57 The supreme
court reversed, allowing the action to proceed under Rhode Island law.
Although the court expressly adopted Leflar's five-factor approach, it did
not in fact apply it. Instead, the court merely sized up the contacts and
found Rhode Island's contacts to be greater.55 8
The supreme court again applied Leflar's five factor approach one
year later in Brown v. Church of Holy Name of Jesus,559 another case
involving application of the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act. In
Brown, a Rhode Island child drowned in Massachusetts during a recrea-
S.A., 549 F. Supp. 383, 386-87 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Henning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp.
442, 445-48 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Argo Welded Prod. v. J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, 528 F. Supp.
583, 586-88 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Mashuda v. Western Beef, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 887, 891 (W.D. Pa.
1981); Graves v. Republic Ins. Co., 516 F. Supp. 424, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kawecki Berylco
Indus., Inc. v. Fansteel, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 984, 986-87 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 686 (3d
Cir. 1982); Jewelcor Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 499 F. Supp. 39, 41-43 (M.D.
Pa. 1981).
554. See CBS, Inc. v. Film Corp. of Am., 545 F. Supp. 1382, 1385-87 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 483 F. Supp. 1185, 1194-95 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 637 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1980).
555. 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968).
556. See id. at 293, 243 A.2d at 919 (applying MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2).
557. Id. at 300, 243 A.2d at 923. See McGrath v. Tobin, 81 R.I. 415, 425, 103 A.2d 795,
798 (1954), in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts Wrongful
Death Act was "penal in the international sense" and that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not require Rhode Island courts to hear actions arising thereunder. See also Huntington v.
Atrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (defining "penal").
558. All the interest factors, other than the fortuitous locus of the accident, point to
the application of Rhode Island law. All the parties involved were Rhode Island
residents, their trip started in Rhode Island and was to end in Rhode Island, the
guest-host relationship arose in Rhode Island and suit was commenced in Rhode
Island.
Woodward, 104 R.I. at 300, 243 A.2d at 923.
559. 105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969).
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tional outing sponsored by defendant Rhode Island church. The court
followed Woodward, holding the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act in-
applicable, thus avoiding once again the proscription on applying a for-
eign penal law.5 60 The court then addressed whether the Massachusetts
rule of charitable immunity barred recovery from the Rhode Island
church. The court applied the Leflar test and held the Massachusetts
rule not applicable. The first three Leflar factors were said to be unim-
portant, but the fourth and fifth factors pointed toward Rhode Island
law.5 61 The court also cited section 145 of the Second Restatement,
though only as an indication of significant contacts to consider and not as
a choice of law method.5 62
In Busby v. Perini Corp.,563 the supreme court utilized sections 145
and 184 of the Second Restatement to find Massachusetts law applicable
in a suit by a Massachusetts worker against a Massachusetts general con-
tractor for an injury occurring in Rhode Island. Massachusetts law
barred the suit because the employee had already recovered workers'
compensation benefits from his employer, a Massachusetts subcontrac-
tor. Predictably, the court held that Massachusetts law governed. The
decision rested less on general choice of law grounds than on a healthy
respect for the compensatory equilibrium struck by the sister state's
workers' compensation laws. 564 The employee received his benefits
under Massachusetts' workers' compensation laws, and that scheme was
correctly held to apply to all claims arising from the employee's work-
related injuries. Although the Second Restatement was used to support
that result, the court, in dictum, indicated that it was not abandoning the
Leflar approach to choice of law generally.5 65
In 1973, however, the supreme court totally ignored the Leflar fac-
560. Id. at 325, 252 A.2d at 178.
561. The court explained:
The advancement of the forum's governmental interest is of significant weight in this
case. Rhode Island has a natural interest in regulating the relationship among its
domiciliaries. The instant relationship was apparently created in Rhode Island; the
plaintiff and all defendants are residents of Rhode Island. Hence, only Rhode Island
is concerned with the ultimate result....
Finally, we feel our policy to be the better rule. Although in most conflict circum-
stances it is difficult to say which is truly the better rule as between two conflicting
policies, in the present situation, even the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
recognized the disfavor in which the charitable immunity doctrine is held.
Id. at 330, 252 A.2d at 181.
562. See id. at 326-27, 252 A.2d at 179.
563. 110 R.I. 49, 290 A.2d 210 (1972).
564. Id. at 53-54, 290 A.2d at 212-13.
565. See id. at 52, 290 A.2d at 212.
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tors and applied a straight interest-analysis in Labree v. Major,566 a guest
statute case. The case involved a car accident in Massachusetts which
injured a Massachusetts passenger. The defendant driver was a Rhode
Island resident. Massachusetts had a guest statute, but Rhode Island did
not.5 67 Surprisingly, the court applied Rhode Island law. Even more
surprisingly, it did so without reference to Leflar's better rule of law ap-
proach, the court's previous benchmark for choice of law cases and the
method which, more than any other, would have supported the result
reached.
Analyzing the respective state interests, the Labree court found that
Massachusetts had no interest in shielding an out-of-state driver from
liability. Moreover, the Massachusetts courts had strived in recent years
to avoid application of the guest statute, and the Massachusetts legisla-
ture had in fact repealed the statute two years before the supreme court
decision; these factors were "indicative of the lack of importance of the
host-guest gross-negligence rule in Massachusetts." 568 Conversely,
Rhode Island's interest in compensating injured passengers transcended
jurisdictional boundaries. 569 An apparent unprovided-for case was
thereby transformed into a false conflict, and the law of the only inter-
ested state, Rhode Island, was applied. The suit was allowed to proceed.
The Leflar factors returned in Pardey v. Boulevard Billiard Club,57 0
a 1986 dram shop case. The plaintiff in Pardey was a Massachusetts wo-
man who was injured in a car accident caused by an intoxicated minor
from Massachusetts who had been served alcohol by the defendant
Rhode Island tavern. The accident took place in Massachusetts. Both
Rhode Island and Massachusetts had dram shop acts but the Massachu-
setts act applied only to Massachusetts vendors. The court, specifically
citing the Leflar factors held the Rhode Island act applied.5 71 Pardey
indicates a likelihood that the Leflar test will continue to govern Rhode
566. 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973).
567. As the court itself recognized, id. at 667 n.2, 306 A.2d at 815 n.2, the fact pattern
presented was the same as that in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), another rare guest statute case in which driver and passenger hailed from
different jurisdictions. The court specifically declined, however, to follow Judge Fuld's third
rule in this case. 111 R.I. at 672-73, 306 A.2d at 817-18.
568. Id. at 669-70, 306 A.2d at 816.
569. "Rhode Island's policy of allowing recovery by passengers for the ordinary negli-
gence of their hosts is not limited to the protection of Rhode Island guests. The state has an
interest in enforcing the standard of care of an automobile operator no matter where his guest
resides." Id. at 671, 306 A.2d at 816.
570. 518 A.2d 1349 (R.I 1986).
571. Id. at 1351-52.
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Island conflict of law cases involving torts.572
The federal courts in Rhode Island have consistently applied the
Leflar factors in tort. The leading case is Roy v. Star Chopper Co.573
This case was similar to Labree in that the court managed to transform
an apparent unprovided-for case into a false conflict favoring application
of Rhode Island law. It did so, however, in the context of the five Leflar
factors. Thus, where a Massachusetts plaintiff was injured in Massachu-
setts as a result of a defective product produced in Rhode Island, the
Rhode Island rule of strict liability applied. Four of the five Leflar fac-
tors were said to support this result; a fifth factor was neutral. 574
One earlier First Circuit case and two federal district court cases
also applied a factor-by-factor analysis under the Leflar method.575 A
slightly different approach, adopted in an early federal district court case
following the supreme court's decision in Brown, applied both the Leflar
factors and section 145 of the Second Restatement.5 76 Relying primarily
upon the latter approach, the court again addressed an issue which had
arisen in Woodward and Brown, the applicability of the Massachusetts
Wrongful Death Act. A more recent case also adopted this parallel ap-
proach, but the court found the Massachusetts statute of limitations ap-
plicable on the strength of greater contacts.577
These cases indicate that the five-factor Leflar approach is still ac-
tive in Rhode Island tort cases. Variations on this method have ap-
peared, but the basic inquiry is the same. Among difficult cases, only
Labree, the straight interest-analysis case, utilized a different
methodology.
So far, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has not changed the
traditional rule that a contract is to be interpreted according to the law of
the place of making. Although the governing case law is ancient,5 78 sev-
572. But see Blais v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 526 A.2d 854 (R.I. 1987) (Connecticut
plaintiffs prohibited from recovering pain and suffering damages by law of Massachusetts since
both wrongful conduct and injury occurred there).
573. 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
574. The court stated that only "simplification of the judicial task" was irrelevant. Id. at
1129. Indeed, it is an extremely rare case where applying the law of another state imposes any
significant hardship on the forum.
575. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 177-80 (1st Cir. 1974); Gravina v.
Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1, 4-6 (D.R.I. 1972); Tiernan v. Westext Trans., Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 1256, 1263-64 (D.R.I. 1969).
576. See Thayer v. Perini Corp., 303 F. Supp. 683, 686-88 (D.R.I. 1969).
577. See Montaup Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Corp., 561 F. Supp. 740, 744-45 (D.R.I. 1983);
see also Hart Eng'g Co. v. FMC Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1471, 1481 (D.R.I. 1984) (also espousing
the two-track, combination Second Restatement and Leflar approach, but finding that the sub-
stantive laws of all three interested states were not in conflict).
578. See Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 171, 192 A. 158, 163
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eral recent federal cases have applied the place of making rule in reliance
on the authority of the early supreme court decisions.5 79 In the 1972 case
of A. C. Beals Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital,580 the supreme court held
that Rhode Island law governed the enforceability of an arbitration
clause in an interstate contract, since the "last act" necessary to make the
contract binding occurred in Rhode Island.581 The court also noted that
Rhode Island had the most significant interests in the litigation, but it
specifically declined to decide whether to extend the Woodward ap-
proach to contracts.58 2 The place of making rule remains the governing
law in Rhode Island until its supreme court states otherwise.
South Carolina
The South Carolina Supreme Court remains firmly committed to
the rule of lex loci delicti. Two spousal immunity cases, mirror images of
one another, illustrate this position. In Oshiek v. Oshiek,583 a South Car-
olina woman sued her spouse for injuries resulting from a car accident in
Georgia. South Carolina had abandoned the common law rule of
spousal immunity but Georgia had not. The South Carolina Supreme
Court treated the case as simply one of applying settled precedent. The
law of the place of injury, Georgia, governed.5 84 The converse situation
occurred in Algie v. Algie,585 where a Florida woman sued her spouse for
injuries suffered during a crash landing of a small plane at the Charles-
(1937) ("[O]rdinarily the validity of a contract depends upon the law of the place where it is
made."); see also Coderre v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 48 R.I. 152, 155, 136 A. 305, 306 (1927) ("In
the absence of a special provision in the contract to the contrary, a contract is to be construed
in accordance with the law of the state where it is made.").
579. See Soar v. National Football League Players' Ass'n., 550 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 n.5 (1st
Cir. 1977); Anderson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1222, 1223 n.1 (D.
R.I. 1983); Bartholomew v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 502 F. Supp. 246, 250 (D.R.I. 1980),
aff'd, 655 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1981). But see Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 1197, 1203-04 (D.R.I. 1985) (applying a harried combination
of Leflar and signifcant contacts analysis to determine the assignability of certain ambiguous
bonds). rev'd on other grounds, 789 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1986).
580. 110 R.I. 275, 292 A.2d 865 (1972).
581. Id. at 285-86, 292 A.2d at 870-71.
582. "On this record we need not, and do not, decide whether the doctrine enunciated in
Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), applies to contract cases." Id. at 287
n.5, 292 A.2d at 871 n.5.
583. 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
584. We conclude, as did the Circuit Judge, that the situs of the tort is controlling on
the issue of the existence of a cause of action for personal injury by one spouse
against the other. Since, under the law of the State of Georgia, the wife had no right
of action against her husband for a personal tort, she has no right of action which can
be enforced here.
Id. at 255, 136 S.E.2d at 306.
585. 261 S.C. 103, 198 S.E.2d 529 (1973).
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ton, South Carolina airport. The court declined to overrule Oshiek, and
instead applied the law of the place of injury, South Carolina, this time
allowing the suit.586 All of the other tort cases have been decided in the
federal courts, and these courts, without exception, have applied lex loci
delicti.5 87
There have been no modem South Carolina Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding choice of law in contract, though there is little doubt that
the traditional rules still apply here as well. A series of cases in the 1940s
established the place of making and place of performance rules in South
Carolina.5 8  Although a federal district court has enforced a contractual
choice of law clause, the court there noted the general applicability of the
place of making and place of performance rules.589 In a hybrid situation
involving the interstate sale of certain automobiles, a Fourth Circuit
panel applied the traditional rule that the law of the state where the chat-
tels are located at the time of the transaction governs.5 90
South Dakota
The supreme court of South Dakota remains committed to the place
of injury rule in tort. The leading case, Heidemann v. Rohl,5 91 arose
from an airplane crash in Nebraska which killed six members of a South
Dakota college debating team. One of the victims' parents brought a
wrongful death action against the South Dakota lessor of the airplane.
586. The court stated: "We are now urged to overrule Oshiek and formulate a rule which
will bar this plaintiff's right to sue, although her injuries occurred, and right of action arose, in
this non-immunity jurisdiction. We are not persuaded that this result would be in furtherance
of justice." Id. at 106, 198 S.E.2d at 530.
587. See Glaesner v. Beck/Arnley Corp., 790 F.2d 384, 386 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986); Mizell v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 592 n.2 (D.S.C. 1981); Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33, 35
(D. S.C. 1976); Hester v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 287 F. Supp. 957, 972 (D.S.C. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1969); Wright v. Am. Flyers Airline Corp., 263
F. Supp. 865, 868-69 (D.S.C. 1967); Locklair v. Locklair, 256 F. Supp. 530, 532 (D.S.C. 1966).
588. See Murphy v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 197 S.C. 393, 407, 15 S.E.2d
646, 651 (1941) ("Our Courts hold that a contract is controlled by the law of the State in
which it is made and is to be performed."); Knight v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 184 S.C. 362,
376, 192 S.E. 558, 564 (1937) ("It is familiar law that a contract is governed by the laws of the
state in which it is made and to be performed."); Livingston v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co., 176 S.C. 385, 391, 180 S.E. 343, 345 (1935), stating that:
It is fundamental that unless there be something intrinsic in, or extrinsic of, the con-
tract that another place of enforcement was intended, the lex loci contractu governs.
If the contract be silent thereabout, the presumption is that the law governing the
enforcement is the law of the place where the contract is made.
589. See Associated Spring Corp. v. Roy F. Wilson & Avnet, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 967, 975
(D.S.C. 1976).
590. See Rawl's Auto Auction Sales v. Dick Herriman Ford, 690 F.2d 422, 426 (4th Cir.
1982).
591. 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972).
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The parent had earlier signed a release exculpating the college from lia-
bility. Two conflict of law problems were thus presented. First, Ne-
braska law allowed an airplane pilot's negligence to be imputed to the
owner of the airplane, but South Dakota law did not. Second, Nebraska
law provided that a release from liability of less than all joint tortfeasors
did not operate as a release of those parties not named in the agreement,
but South Dakota law, favoring a right of contribution among
tortfeasors, provided otherwise. The court held Nebraska law applicable
on each count. While acknowledging the trend toward adoption of mod-
em choice of law analyses, the court bemoaned the inconsistencies of the
new theories.5 92 The court retained the old place of injury rule.593 A
1986 case once again involving a challenge to the validity of a release was
decided under the law of the place where the underlying automobile acci-
dent occurred.5 94 The court cited Heidemann and reaffirmed the place of
injury rule.595
The South Dakota Supreme Court has not been called upon to de-
cide any conflicts cases involving contracts in recent years. Probably it
would continue to apply the place of making and place of performance
rules. There have been no federal cases either.
Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court flatly rejected an opportunity to
adopt a modem choice of law theory in Winters v. Maxey,596 a guest
statute case. In Winters, the plaintiff and the defendant, both Tennessee
residents shared an automobile ride to Florida. The car crashed in Ala-
bama, injuring the plaintiff passenger. The Alabama guest statute al-
lowed recovery only upon a showing of gross negligence by the driver, a
showing plaintiff could not make. Tennessee, however, had no guest stat-
ute. After discussing the leading choice of law cases in New York and
Wisconsin and noting their inconsistency both intemally and with one
592. Although there is dissatisfaction with the lex loci delicti rule there is also a
reluctance on the part of many courts to adopt the modem fragmented approach to
the settlement of multi-state conflict of laws problems because of the lack of discerni-
ble and suitable guidelines. For the most part the variants of the modem approach
set forth theory and concepts rather than followable rules. As a result there is con-
siderable confusion and inconsistency in its application.
Id. at 259, 194 N.W.2d at 169.
593. Id.
594. See Schick v. Rodenburg, 397 N.W.2d 464 (S.D. 1986).
595. "The 'place of the wrong' rule governs the substantive rights of parties to a multistate
tort action." Id. at 466.
596. 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972).
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another,597 the court retained the old rule. The court of appeals acqui-
esced in this decision.5 98 In addition, there have been a large number of
federal court decisions, all of which have applied the rule of lex loci
delicti.5 99
In contract, as in tort, Tennessee adheres to the traditional rule that
a contract will be interpreted according to the law of the state where it is
made. The latest statement of the rule occurred in 1975, in Great Ameri-
can Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 6m In that case,
a negligent driver operating his sister's car was involved in an accident.
After the owner's insurer settled claims held by other persons involved in
the accident, it sought contribution from the driver's insurer. The
driver's policy was issued in New York, the law of which required that
the owner's insurance coverage be exhausted before contribution from
the driver's insurance coverage. Thus, the owner's insurer would be de-
nied contribution. Tennessee law, however, provided for proration of lia-
bility between insurers. The Tennessee Supreme Court held the New
York law applicable and dismissed the suit. In retaining the rule of lex
loci contractus, the court reasoned that "the dominant contacts rule has
made no significant progress toward uniformity since Winters."6 1 Its
decision was aided by the fact that the Tennessee legislature had, subse-
quent to the issuance of the policy involved in this case, changed its law
597. The court stated:
In our examination of cases using the "dominant contacts" rule, we have not been
able to discern they provide any "uniform common law of conflicts" to take the place
of the uniform rule of lex loci delicti. As an example, in the cases we have used in
this opinion under the method of analysis used in New York in a given factual situa-
tion, one result could be reached, while under the method of analysis used by Wis-
consin a different result would be reached.
Id. at 758 (comparing Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 635, 133 N.W.2d 408, 417 (1965),
with Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)).
598. See Elias v. A & C Distributing Co., 588 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1075 (1980).
599. See Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 684 F.2d 386, 393 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982); Modin v. New
York Cent. Co., 650 F.2d 829, 836 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 967 (1981); Telecommuni-
cations, Eng'g Sales & Service Co. v. Southern Telephone Supply Co., 518 F.2d 392, 394 (6th
Cir. 1975); Trahan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 505, 507 (M.D. Tenn. 1983);
Mayes v. Gordon, 536 F. Supp. 2, 5 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Sherrod v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,
516 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 871 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980); Miller v. B-B Distrib. Co, 79 F.R.D. 219, 221 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Mosley v. U.S.,
456 F. Supp. 671, 673 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Babcock v. Maple Leaf, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 428, 432
(E.D. Tenn. 1976); see also In re City & County Ins. Agency, Inc., 46 Bankr. 588, 591 (E.D.
Tenn. 1985); Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chemicals, 518 F. Supp. 375, 379 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
In each case the court expressed doubt as to proper characterization of disputed issues, but
held that lex loci delicti and lex loci contractus produced same result.
600. 519 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. 1975).
601. Id. at 580.
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to conform to the New York law in question.60 2 Prior supreme court
decisions also followed the traditional rule.60 3 Recent appellate decisions
have done likewise. 604 In the federal courts, too, application of the rule
of lex loci contractus has been frequent and unerring.60 5 Indeed, Tennes-
see's adherence to the traditional rules in conflict of laws generally is so
firm that there does not appear to have been any Tennessee conflicts case
in which a different rule has been espoused, even in dissent.
Texas
Texas courts apply the Second Restatement approach in both tort
and contract cases. The big break with the past came with the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Gutierrez v. Collins, 60 6 which involved a car
accident between two Texas residents in Chihuahua, Mexico. The laws
of Texas and Mexico differed substantially with regard to damages.60 7 In
602. Accordingly, "It]he conflict between the Tennessee rule and the New York rule in-
volves no consideration prejudicial to the general interest of the citizens of Tennessee .
Id.
603. See Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 493 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tenn.
1973) ("It is a familiar rule in Tennessee that the construction and validity of a contract are
governed by the law of the place where the contract is made."); see also Sloan v. Jones, 192
Tenn. 400, 407, 241 S.W.2d 506, 509 (1951) ("It is a familiar rule that the construction and
validity of a contract are governed by the law of the place where the contract is made.").
604. See Hutchison v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 652 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1983) ("Plaintiff concedes lex loci contractus becomes as much a part of a contract as if
specifically incorporated therein and, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, the
laws of the state where the policy was issued and delivered are applicable to the terms of the
agreement."); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 699 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1983) ("Since the policy at issue was issued in Virginia, the substantive law of Vir-
ginia governs.").
605. See United States v. Republic Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir. 1985); Boatland,
Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818, 821 (6th Cir. 1977); Agricultural Serv. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1977); MacPherson v. MacPherson, 496
F.2d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 1974); In re Fickey, 23 Bankr. 586, 588 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); American
Training Serv., Inc. v. Commerce Union Bank, 415 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 n.3 (M.D. Tenn 1976),
aff'd, 612 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1979); Perry v. Lockert, 414 F. Supp. 169, 170 (M.D. Tenn.
1976).
606. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
607. The supreme court explained the Mexican law as follows:
First, there are the limitation-of-damages statutes which index a plaintiff's recovery
to the prevailing wage rates set by Mexican labor law. These provisions have the
effect of substantially reducing a plaintiff's recovery compared to that which he
might expect to receive in a United States court. Secondly, Mexican law does not
recognize pain and suffering as an element of damages, contrary to the laws of Texas
and other jurisdictions in this country. Thirdly, Mexican law authorizes recovery for
moral reparations which include injuries to a plaintiff's reputation, dignity, or honor.
The award is within the discretion of the judge and may not exceed one third of the
other damages awarded.
Id. at 321.
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a well-written opinion, Justice Johnson brushed aside the tired argu-
ments for retention of the lex loci delicti rule, and instead announced
that the Texas courts would abandon that approach and adopt sections 6
and 145 of the Second Restatement for resolution of conflicts in tort
cases.608 Although it seemed certain that Texas law would apply, the
court left to the lower court the task of applying its newly-adopted choice
of law methodology.
One year later, in Robertson v. McKnight,6°9 the court again fol-
lowed the Second Restatement approach. In that case, a New Mexico
couple was killed in an airplane crash in Texas. The wife's estate brought
a wrongful death action against the husband's estate, alleging that the
husband had been negligent in piloting the airplane. New Mexico had no
proscription on interspousal suits, but Texas did. The supreme court,
citing section 169 of the Second Restatement, 610 held that New Mexico,
the spousal domicile, had the most significant relationship to the case,
and its law would be applied.611
The court's most recent foray into choice of law came in Total
Oifield Services, Inc. v. Garcia.612 There the court affirmed a court of
appeals' ruling that the Texas wrongful death statute applied to an action
brought by survivors of a Texas oil worker against a Texas corporation
for the workers' employment-related death in Oklahoma. The court spe-
cifically reaffirmed its adherence to section 145 of the Second
Restatement. 613
In recent years, there have been a plethora of conflict of laws deci-
sions in the Texas federal courts, all of which cited Gutierrez or the Sec-
ond Restatement. 614 Unfortunately, these cases have generally been
608. Id. at 318. The court stated:
Having considered all of the theories, it is the holding of this court that in the future
all conflicts cases sounding in tort will be governed by the "most significant relation-
ship" test as enunciated in Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flicts. This methodology offers a rational yet flexible approach to conflicts problems.
It offers the courts some guidelines without being too vague or too restrictive. It
represents a collection of the best thinking on this subject and does indeed include
"most of the substance" of all the modern theories.
Id.
609. 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980).
610. The Second Restatement provides: "(1) The law selected by application of the rule
of § 145 determines whether one member of a family is immune from tort liability to another
member of the family. (2) The applicable law will usually be the local law of the state of the
parties' domicile." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 169 (1969).
611. Robertson, 609 S.W.2d at 537.
612. 711 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1986).
613. Id. at 239.
614. See Johansen v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 1381 n.5 (5th Cir.
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lacking in true analysis. It appears from these decisions that the federal
courts are merely adding up contacts. Similarly, a Texas appellate court,
paying lip service to the Second Restatement, applied Texas law to a
medical malpractice suit on the strength of factual contacts alone. 615
The Texas Supreme Court expressly extended the Second Restate-
ment approach to contract cases in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.61 6 In-
terestingly, however, the court there applied false-conflict analysis to find
Texas law applicable to a release from liability signed by the wife of a
Texan killed in an airplane crash in New Mexico. At the time the dece-
dent was employed in New Mexico. The release was given to the air-
plane owner but purported to release from liability "any other
corporations or persons whomsoever responsible therefore" as well.6 1 7
Under the New Mexico law this language discharged any tortfeasor
within the named class, including the defendant manufacturer. In
Texas, however, as the court explained, the rule is different: "A
tortfeasor can claim the protection of a release only if the release refers to
him by name or with such descriptive particularity that his identity or his
connection with the tortious event is not in doubt. '61 8 The court based
its application of the Texas rule on an analysis of the relevant govern-
mental interests. New Mexico had no interest at all, since neither party
resided in that state; Texas, on the other hand, was critically interested in
the full compensation of its resident plaintiff. Also, the fact that the re-
lease was executed in Texas was indicative that the parties expected
Texas law to govern. Consequently, the release did not release the de-
fendant from liability.
1987); Lee v. Miller County, Ark., 800 F.2d 1372, 1374-75 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1986); Rosenberg v.
Celotex Corp., 767 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1985); Webb v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 750 F.2d
368, 374 (5th Cir. 1985); Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc., 738 F.2d 660, 667 (5th Cir. 1984),
reh'g denied, 753 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1985); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084,
1087 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 744 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985);
Brown v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 733 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir.), rehg denied, 739 F.2d 633 (5th
Cir. 1984); Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1187 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984); Hines
v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 728 F.2d 729, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1984); Kneeland v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n, 650 F. Supp. 1047, 1058-59 (W.D. Tex. 1986); Moorhead v. Mitsubishi
Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 385, 390 (E.D. Tex. 1986); Tidelands Royalty "B" Corp. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 611 F. Supp. 795, 800-01 (N.D. Tex. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d
1344 (5th Cir. 1986); Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (N.D. Tex.
1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 802 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1295 (1987).
615. See Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727, 733-34 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
616. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
617. Id. at 418.
618. Id. at 419-20.
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The court of appeals followed Duncan in Ossorio v. Leon,619 which
involved the enforceability of a survivorship clause in certain certificates
of deposit executed by a Mexican citizen at a Texas bank. All parties
claiming an interest in the deposit account were residents of Mexico.
The court, citing Duncan and section 6 of the Second Restatement, ap-
plied Mexican law, notwithstanding that the certificates were "made" in
Texas.
The Fifth Circuit has noted three times Duncan's extension of the
Second Restatement to contract.620 In a Texas appellate case, the court
used section 6 to void an Islamic divorce rendered through a summary,
ex parte proceeding in Kuwait.621
The supreme court has clearly adopted the Second Restatement in
tort cases and it has announced that it will employ the same approach in
contract cases as well. On this record, Texas can properly be classified as
a Second Restatement state for all choice of law issues.
Utah
Utah follows the traditional rules of the First Restatement in both
tort and contract and there is no sign of impending change.
The only recent tort case is Rhoades v. Wright,622 a wrongful death
action brought by the wife of a Utah farmer who was shot and killed by
the defendant, a Colorado farmer, during a visit to the defendant's farm.
The plaintiff brought suit individually and as administrator of her hus-
band's estate in federal district court in Utah. The court dismissed the
case without prejudice for lack of in personam jurisdiction over the Colo-
rado defendant. Within one year after the dismissal, the plaintiff filed
simultaneous claims in the state courts of Utah and Colorado. The Colo-
rado court dismissed due to the running of the state's statute of limita-
tions. The Utah court dismissed for lack of in personam jurisdiction, but
the supreme court of Utah reversed, holding that attachment jurisdiction
existed since defendant owned certain property in Utah.623 On remand,
the trial court again dismissed, this time reasoning that Colorado law
applied and that that state's statute of limitations had expired. Again the
case reached the supreme court, and again that court reversed.
619. 705 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
620. See Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 799 F.2d 1000, 1003 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
802 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1295 (1987); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Truck Ins. Exch., 797 F.2d 1288, 1291 (5th Cir. 1986); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185,
1195 (5th Cir. 1985).
621. See Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
622. 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
623. Rhoades v. Wright, 552 P.2d 131, 131-35 (Utah 1976) (Rhoades I).
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For the second time, the supreme court held that the courts of Utah
could exercise attachment jurisdiction over the Colorado defendant's
Utah property. 624 It then tackled the choice of law issue regarding the
statute of limitations. The Utah Supreme Court agrees with the Colo-
rado trial court that under the law of Colorado, plaintiff's suit was
barred. Under the law of Utah, however, the suit was not barred. The
Utah renewal statute provided that one who had earlier filed a timely
claim and had it dismissed "otherwise than upon the merits" could bring
a new action within one year after the dismissal. 625 Because the plain-
tiff's original action in federal district court had been timely ified and her
present action had been brought within one year of the federal court dis-
missal, the statute preserved the plaintiff's action.626 The court held that
the statute of limitations issue was "procedural," and that Utah's statute
would apply notwithstanding the fact that the shooting occurred in
Colorado.627
Finally, the court had to decide whether to enforce a Colorado stat-
ute which limited the allowable recovery for wrongful death. Here, the
court invoked the Utah public policy in favor of full compensation, and
refused to apply the Colorado law. 628 Thus, the supreme court utilized
two escape devices in one case: the dichotomy between procedure and
substance and the forum's public policy. Aided by its handy escape de-
vices, the court found the adoption of the governmental interest analysis
unnecessary. 629
The latest contract case is Jacobsen v. Bunker,630 another statute of
limitations dispute. In that case, two sisters while living in California,
signed promissory notes in favor of their father. The family apparently
moved to Utah before the father died. When he died, each sister and a
624. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980) (Rhoades II), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
897 (1981). In the interim between Rhoades I and Rhoades II, the United States Supreme
Court decided, in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), that the "minimum contacts" re-
quirement of in personam jurisdiction announced in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), also applied to in rem cases. Defendant argued that jurisdiction was
lacking under this standard. The Utah Supreme Court did not agree. Rhoades, II, 622 P.2d at
345.
625. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-40 (1977).
626. Rhoades, 11, 622 P.2d at 350 n.34. Colorado also had a renewal statute, but it had
been interpreted by the Colorado trial court as not applicable to wrongful death actions.
627. Id. at 349.
628. "Again, our statutory approach to the problem evidences a strong public policy
against limitations being placed on damages. Since application of a foreign state's law limiting
such damages would do violence to this policy, we are constrained to apply our own law
concerning this matter." Id. at 351.
629. Id. at 351.
630. 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985).
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brother became entitled to a one-third share of the amount which re-
mained due on each promissory note. The first sister sued the second for
the amount the second had not yet paid on her note. The second sister
counterclaimed for the amount which the first sister had not yet paid on
her note. The first sister contended that the counterclaim was barred by
the California statute of limitations and that California law did not allow
a set-off under these circumstances. Under Utah law, although the stat-
ute of limitations on the counterclaim had expired, set-off was still
available.
The court held that the rule of lex loci contractus required applica-
tion of California law.631 Unfortunately, the plaintiff had failed to supply
the court with the relevant California law. The court therefore assumed
that law to be the same as Utah's, and the set-off was allowed. 632
Four years earlier, in Morris v. Sykes,633 a similar situation had
arisen. The plaintiff and the defendant had entered into a contract in
Alaska for the sale of certain undeveloped Alaska real estate, the
supreme court held that it was bound by the lex loci contractus rule to
apply Alaska law.634 However, the defendant in that case failed to make
any showing of a "significant difference between the law of Alaska and
[Utah] in regard to the enforceability of such a contract and the forfei-
ture clause therein. ' 635 Utah law was therefore applied.
In conclusion, Utah courts have continued to follow the traditional
rules of the First Restatement in tort and contract. The courts have
shown no signs of changing in the near future.
Vermont
The Vermont Supreme Court has been slow to adopt a modern
choice of law theory. Although the cases are old, they indicate a contin-
uing adherence to lex loci delicti in tort, and some confusion in contract.
631. "The law of California governs the outcome of this case. Both litigants' notes were
executed and payable in California." Id. at 1209. Again, after citing the place of making rule,
the court said, "the rule is the same for promissory notes. Their legal effect is governed by the
law of the jurisdiction where they are executed and delivered." Id.
632. Id. at 1210.
633. 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981).
634. We have no disagreement with the proposition that when a contract is entered
into and is to be performed in a foreign jurisdiction the law of that jurisdiction should
be applied; and this is particularly so when the contract deals with land in that juris-
diction. Therefore, it is our duty to apply the substantive law of Alaska to this
controversy.
Id. at 683-84 (footnotes omitted).
635. Id. at 684.
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The latest tort case in the supreme court is Goldman v. Beaudry,636 a
case which provides an example of the reflexive way in which pre-Bab-
cock courts invoked the place of injury rule. In Goldman, the plaintiff
and the defendant, apparently both Vermont residents, were involved in
an auto accident in Quebec. The defendant pleaded Vermont's contribu-
tory negligence law as a complete defense, but the plaintiff argued for
application of Quebec's rule of comparative negligence instead. The
court applied Quebec law reasoning that the First Restatement mandated
the result.637
In a 1956 dictum, the Vermont Supreme Court indicated approval
of the center of gravity approach to choice of law in contract. 638
Although the court ultimately held that the disputed issue was one of
property and not one of contract, its more liberal approach to contract
cases continued in later cases. The supreme court in fact went so far as
to quote section 188 of the Second Restatement in the 1968 usury case of
Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden.639 However, the court in that case held
only that a promissory note naming a Vermont borrower and a Massa-
chusetts lender would be evaluated according to the laws of Massachu-
setts, where the note was executed. 640
636. 122 Vt. 299, 170 A.2d 636 (1961).
637. The plaintiff's claim of error is well-founded. The rights and liabilities of the
parties to an action arising from a motor vehicle accident are determined by the laws
of the state where the accident happened. Whether contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff precludes recovery in whole or in part is to be settled by the law
where the claimed injury was inflicted. If the law of the foreign country applies the
doctrine of comparative negligence in fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties,
we must administer that law accordingly.
Id. at 301, 170 A.2d at 638 (citations omitted).
638. Even between the parties, in making a choice of law, the doctrine that the place of the
contract shall govern has been modified. In cases presenting a choice of law of a particular
jurisdiction, where the contract contains no explicit provision that it is to be governed by some
particular law the courts
examine all the points of contact which the transaction has with the two or more
jurisdictions involved, with the view to determine the 'center of gravity' of the con-
tract, or of that aspect of the contract immediately before the court; and when they
have identified the jurisdiction with which the matter at hand is predominantly or
most intimately concerned, they conclude that this is the proper law of the contract
which the parties presumably had in view at the time of contracting.
Boston Law Book Co. v. Hathorn, 119 Vt. 416, 423, 127 A.2d 120, 125 (1956) (quoting Jan-
sson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212, 218-19 (1st Cir. 1950)).
639. 127 Vt. 229, 233, 245 A.2d 891, 894 (1968).
640. Id. at 233-34, 245 A.2d at 894. In fact, the court ultimately was forced to apply
Vermont law because the parties failed in their obligation to establish proof of the relevant
Massachusetts law. See also Crocker v. Brandt, 130 Vt. 349, 293 A.2d 541 (1972); General
Acceptance Corp. v. Lyons, 125 Vt. 332, 215 A.2d 513 (1965) (both applying Vermont law
where parties failed to plead or prove Georgia law).
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Two federal courts sitting in diversity were less hesitant to abandon
the old rules. In the 1972 case of LeBlanc v. Stuart,641 federal district
court Judge Holden, a former member of the Vermont Supreme Court
and author of the Goldman opinion, predicted that the Vermont courts
would overrule Goldman and extend the center of gravity approach, pur-
portedly adopted in Pioneer Credit Corp., to tort cases.642 LeBlanc itself
was a spousal immunity case in which a Rhode Island couple had been
involved in a car accident in Vermont. The court held that Rhode Is-
land's rule of spousal immunity applied.6 43 Although the court stated
that section 145 of the Second Restatement governed, it relied principally
upon a California case, Emery v. Emery,6 4 which held that the law of the
common domicile should govern questions of intra family immunity.
Later, in a 1975 choice of law tour de force, the federal district court in
Massachusetts, relying upon Pioneer Credit Corp. and LeBlanc, found
that the Vermont Supreme Court, if faced with the question, would no
longer follow Goldman but would adopt the Second Restatement.6 45
That decision rested on a very liberal reading of Pioneer Credit Corp.
The Second Circuit, in 1971, expressed its opinion that the Vermont
courts would continue to apply lex loci delicti.646 The case involved
alienation of affections, an intentional tort. The lower court applied a
two-track choice of law approach, relying on the traditional Goldman
rule and, in the alternative, on the Second Restatement.6 47 Although the
court of appeals agreed with the district court's determination that Ver-
mont law applied, it relied exclusively on the traditional rule in inten-
tional tort cases that the applicable law is the law of the place of
defendant's conduct. 648
The division among the federal courts as to the current state of
641. 342 F. Supp. 773 (D. Vt. 1972).
642. Id. at 774-75.
643. Id.
644. 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
645. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp.
1106, 1109-11 (D. Mass. 1975).
646. See Marra v. Bushee, 447 F.2d 1282, 1283-84 (2d Cir. 1971).
647. See Marra v. Bushee, 317 F. Supp. 972, 973-78 (D. Vt. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
447 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir. 1971).
648. Although no Vermont decision has considered the choice-of-law rule applicable
in an alienation of affection dispute involving multi-state conduct, the district court
properly determined that Vermont would, in this instance, employ the law of the
state in which the defendant's conduct primarily occurred. The traditional approach
to the choice of law determined the applicable law by locating territorially the "place
of the wrong," defined in the context of negligent torts as the place of the injury, and
in the context of intentional torts as the place of the wrongful conduct.
Marra, 447 F.2d at 1283 (citations omitted).
August 1987] CHOICE OF LAW
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
choice of law in Vermont is directly attributable to the confusing Pioneer
Credit Corp. decision. Probably the federal courts have read too much
into the supreme court's citation in that case to the Second Restatement.
A fair reading of that opinion in fact leaves lex loci contractus intact.
Certainly, that case is not authority, as suggested in the two district court
cases, for abandoning lex loci delicti in tort. With only these few cases, it
is too early to remove Vermont from the list of states still adhering to the
rules of the First Restatement.
Virginia
There have been only two modem conflicts decisions made by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, one in tort and one in contract. These two
cases established the continued vitality of the traditional rules of the First
Restatement in that state.
The tort case is McMillan v. McMillan,69 a spousal immunity case
which comes about as close as any modem decision to a ringing endorse-
ment of the rule of lex loci delicti. The supreme court dispensed with the
drama and gave away its holding in the first paragraph of the opinion:
Lex loci delicti would be applied to bar suit between Virginia spouses for
an accident occurring in the immunity state of Tennessee, even though
Virginia had no immunity rule.650 The court used the usual arguments
of inconsistency and unpredictability to support the rejection of modem
conflicts theory. 651
The contract case is Woodson v. Celina Mutual Insurance Co. 652 In
that case, Mr. Delawder purchased a used automobile from Mr. Hinkle
during a brief visit by Delawder to West Virginia. Two days later, when
Delawder had returned to his home in Virginia, he was involved in a
two-car accident which took his life and that of Mrs. Woodson, a passen-
ger in the other vehicle. Mr. Woodson brought a wrongful death action
against Delawder and Hinkle. Hinlde's insurer sought a declaratory
649. 219 Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979).
650. In resolving conflicts of laws, the settled rule in Virginia is that the substantive
rights of the parties in a multistate tort action are governed by the law of the place of
the wrong. Maryland v. Coard, 175 Va. 571, 580-81, 9 S.E.2d 454, 458 (1940). To-
day in an intra-family suit, we are invited to reject that lex loci delicti principle and
to follow the so-called "modern trend" by applying the law of the domicile of the
parties. We decline the invitation and reaffirm "the place of the wrong" rule.
Id. at 1128, 253 S.E.2d at 663.
651. "Thus, we do not think that the uniformity, predictability, and ease of application of
the Virginia rule should be abandoned in exchange for a concept which is so susceptible to
inconstancy, particularly when, as here, the issue involves the substantive existence of a cause
of action in tort." Id. at 1131, 253 S.E.2d at 664.
652. 211 Va. 423, 177 S.E.2d 610 (1970).
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judgment that its insured was not the owner of the automobile on the day
of the accident and that, therefore, it was not liable to Mr. Woodson.
The attempted transfer of ownership from Hinlde to Delawder might not
have been effective under Virginia law since there was no conclusive evi-
dence of transfer of the certificate of title. The transfer of title, however,
was valid under the law of West Virginia, where the sale was made, be-
cause that law made possession of the certificate of title only evidence of
ownership, and not conclusive evidence. The court held West Virginia
law applicable on the basis that the sale took place in that state. 653 Since
the transfer from Hinkle to Delawder was valid, Hinkle's insurer was
released from liability. The court based its choice of law decision on a
Virginia precedent established in 1938.654
The rest of the cases in Virginia have been in the federal courts. In a
series of decisions handed down since McMillan and Woodson, the fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity have reaffrmed Virginia's commitment to
the traditional rules in both tort and contract cases.6 55
Washington
The State of Washington follows the Second Restatement approach
to choice of law problems. The supreme court first adopted this ap-
proach in a 1967 contract case, Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor
Inn, Inc. 656 In that case, a husband and wife, owners of a Washington
653. In our consideration of this case, we are controlled by the law of the State of
West Virginia. The transaction which involved the purchase of the Pontiac vehicle
and the transfer of its title occurred in that state. Likewise the transaction which
involved the issuance of a policy of automobile liability insurance to Hinlde by Celina
occurred in that jurisdiction.
Id. at 426, 177 S.E.2d at 613.
654. "The nature, validity and interpretation of contracts are governed by the law of the
place where made, unless the contrary appears to be the express intention of the parties." Id.
(quoting C.I.T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 22, 195 S.E. 659, 661 (1938)).
655. For tort cases, see Quillen v. International Playtex, Inc., 789 F.2d 1041, 1044 (4th
Cir. 1986); Morrissey v. William Morrow & Co., 739 F.2d 962, 968 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1216 (1985); Insurance Co. of N. America v. United States Gypsum Co., 639
F. Supp. 1246, 1248-49 (W.D. Va. 1986); Lintz v. Carey Manor Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 543, 547
(W.D. Va. 1985); and Bays v. Jenks, 573 F. Supp. 306, 307 (W.D. Va. 1983). In contract, see
Crosson v. Conlee, 745 F.2d 896, 902 (4th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985);
Insurance Co. of N. America v. United States Gypsum Co., 639 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (W.D.
Va. 1986); Madaus v. November Hill Farm Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1246, 1248-49 (V.D. Va. 1986);
Witter v. Torbett, 604 F. Supp. 298, 302 (W.D. Va. 1984); United Coal Co. v. Land Use Corp.,
575 F. Supp. 1148, 1161-62 (W.D. Va. 1983); Occidental Fire and Casualty Co. v. Bankers and
Shippers Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 1501, 1503 (W.D. Va. 1983); National Indep. Coal Operators
Assoc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 544 F. Supp. 520, 525 (W.D. Va. 1982); Metcalfe Brothers v.
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 826, 829 (W.D. Va. 1980); and Wellmore Coal
Corp. v. Gates Learet Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140, 1143 (W.D. Va. 1979).
656. 70 Wash. 2d 893, 425 P.2d 623 (1967).
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motel, contracted to rent television sets from a Delaware corporation.
The contract was consummated in New York when the lessor's vice pres-
ident signed the contract. The lessor then assigned the contract to the
plaintiff, also a Delaware corporation. The owners of the motel later di-
vorced. The trial court awarded the plaintiff a judgment against the
motel for delinquent rentals, but held that the plaintiff could not satisfy
any part of that judgment out of the wife's property, since the law of
New York, where the contract was made, did not recognize community
property liability. Instead, only the actual signer of the contract, the hus-
band, was liable thereon.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that Washington
community property law applied, and that the portion of the wife's cur-
rent property holdings that were acquired during of her former marriage
remained subject to the execution of the plaintiff creditor's judgment. In
order to reach this result, the court expressly abandoned the old place of
making rule and adopted in its place what is now section 188 of the Sec-
ond Restatement.657 The court applied the same rule in a second con-
tract case decided the same day. 658
The court applied the Second Restatement again in 1969, in Potlatch
No. 1 Federal Credit Union v. Kennedy,6 59 but this time the analysis fo-
cused on governmental interests and party expectations. The plaintiff,
Idaho credit union, was the named payee on a note made by Roy Ken-
nedy and signed by his brother, both Washington residents. The brother
signed only as an accommodation, and received no benefit from the
plaintiff's loan to Roy Kennedy. When the maker defaulted on the note,
the plaintiff sued the marital communities of Roy Kennedy and his wife,
and the co-signer and his wife. Under Washington surety law, the mar-
657. We have determined that we should no longer adhere to the rule of lex loci
contractus. We therefore adopt what we consider to be the better rule, viz., that the
law of the state with which the contract has the most significant relationship, except
perhaps in the unusual case of usury, will govern the validity and effect of a contract.
In so doing, we follow the lead of various other states which have adopted a similar
rule as an escape from the rigidity of lex loci contractus. The rule we adopt is more
flexible and thus better adapted to deal with the contracts with multistate aspects
which are becoming the rule today and making commonplace choice of law problems
such as this one. The rule we approve here also gives much more emphasis to the
desires and expectations of the parties, as the state with the most significant relation-
ship is the state chosen by the parties, if an actual, valid choice is made.' Where no
choice is made, it is most likely that the parties would expect the law of the state with
the most significant contacts to be applied.
Id. at 899-900, 425 P.2d at 627 (citations omitted).
658. See Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble, 70 Wash. 2d 907, 909, 425 P.2d 631, 632
(1967).
659. 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969).
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tal community of the co-signer and his wife was not liable for repayment
of the note since neither spouse received any benefit from the loan.
Under Idaho surety law, however, the community was liable. The court
noted that a true conflict was presented because the purpose of each
state's law would be served by its application. 660 Relying heavily on a
comment to section 188 of the Second Restatement, the court resolved
the conflict by applying the law that most nearly conformed to the expec-
tations of the parties, the law of Washington.661 The judgment in favor
of the cosigner and wife was affirmed.
The Washington Supreme Court's emphasis upon the interest-analy-
sis aspect of section 188 was evidenced again in a 1974 case in which
three states were implicated, and the court again found Washington law
applicable.662 The choice of law discussion was dicta, however, since the
parties failed to prove any foreign law, thus making forum law applicable
anyway.
The supreme court has twice dealt with contractual choice of law
provisions. In one case, the court applied section 187(2) but also empha-
sized the significant contacts of the state whose law was selected. 663 In
the other case, however, it again applied section 187(2) and decided not
to uphold a choice of law clause which would have resulted in usurious
interest charges of twenty-five percent. 64 The Washington legislature
660. The legislatures and courts of the two states have made conflicting policy deci-
sions with respect to this question. Idaho has chosen to recognize the interests of
creditors over the interests of marital property in these situations. Washington has
taken the opposite view. These two policy decisions come into direct conflict where,
as here, the controversy involves an Idaho creditor and a Washington marital com-
munity. This, then, is not a "false conflict."
Id. at 809-09, 459 P.2d at 34.
661. Id. at 810-11, 459 P.2d at 36 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 188 comment c (1969)). Comment c to § 188 provides:
Whether an invalidating rule should be applied will depend, among other things,
upon whether the interest of the state in having its rule applied to strike down the
contract outweighs in the particular case the value of protecting the justified expecta-
tions of the parties and upon whether some other state has a greater interest in the
application of its own rule.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 comment c (1969)). It is fair to say
that the court relied more upon this comment than on § 188 generally in its choice of law
analysis.
662. See Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Hutton, 84 Wash. 2d 320, 525 P.2d 223 (1974).
663. See Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 96 Wash. 2d 416, 421-24, 635 P.2d 708, 711-
13 (1981).
664. See O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 586 P.2d 830 (1978).
The O'Brien court's analysis was really quite sophisticated. Applying § 187(2), it first quoted a
clear legislative statement showing that the Washington usury law expressed a "fundamental
policy" of the State of Washington. The court further determined that Washington had a
materially greater interest in the resolution of the usury issue than did New York, which,
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later codified this result by enacting a choice of law statute requiring
application of the Washington usury laws in all cases involving Washing-
ton borrowers regardless of the situs of the loan. 665
In Whitaker v. Spiegel Inc.,666 the supreme court held that this stat-
ute removed from the Washington courts the discretion to select the ap-
plicable law in usury cases. Thus, the Second Restatement will no longer
be applied in contract cases where the disputed issue involves the legality
of an interest rate charged to a Washington borrower. In all other con-
tract cases, the most significant relationship test will govern. A 1985
court of appeals decision confirms this analysis. 667
Tort cases have followed a similar approach. In Werner v. Wer-
ner,668 the court for the first time announced that the Second Restate-
ment applied in tort as well as contract.669 The court there held that
California had the greatest contacts with a negligence action brought
against California notaries who affixed a jurat to a forged document con-
veying certain Washington real property. However, the court did not ac-
tually refer to the Restatement factors when making its choice of law.
A clearer case was Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp.,670 a wrongful
death action. In that case, a Kansas resident died when he fell from a
scaffolding which had been manufactured and sold by the defendant, a
Washington corporation. The accident occurred in Kansas, a state
which imposed a $50,000 limit on recovery for wrongful death. Wash-
ington law imposed no such limits. The court, applying section 145 of
the Second Restatement, found the contacts to be "evenly balanced." 671
The court then engaged in a detailed analysis of the governmental inter-
besides being the state named in the choice of law clause, had no significant connection with
the loan. Finally, it held that Washington would have been the state of the applicable law
under § 188 had the parties not selected the law of another jurisdiction. Under these circum-
stances, the court noted that § 203, validating "a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to
which the contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permit-
ted by the general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of
§ 188," was inapposite; even if New York did bear a "substantial relationship" to the loan, the
25% interest rate called for in the contract was clearly "greatly in excess" of the 12% top rate
permitted under Washington law. 90 Wash. 2d at 685-87, 586 P.2d at 833-34.
665. See WASH. REV. CODE- ANN. § 19.52.034 (1978).
666. 95 Wash. 2d 661, 623 P.2d 1147, modified, 95 Wash. 2d 661, 637 P.2d 235, appeal
dismissed, 454 U.S. 958 (1981).
667. See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 26, 30-31,
701 P.2d 806, 808-809 (1985).
668. 84 Wash. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974).
669. "The proper choice of law in this case is a rather clear-cut matter. This court has
adopted the 'most significant contacts' approach of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of
Laws." Id. at 368, 526 P.2d at 376.
670. 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976).
671. Id. at 582, 555 P.2d at 1001.
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ests at stake, holding that Kansas had no interest in applying its limita-
tion of damages statute where the defendant was a Washington
corporation. Although Washington's interest in full compensation for
survivors in wrongful death cases was not implicated where the decedent
and his family were not Washington residents, the forum state had a
further interest in allowing unlimited damages as a means of deterring
tortious activity by defendants residing within the state. The deterrence
rationale pertains regardless of where the plaintiff lives. Thus, the case
presented a false conflict. Washington law was applied.672
In Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank of Tampa, Florida,673 a case in-
volving the conversion of a Washington resident's car by a Florida bank
acting through its Nevada agent, the court applied Washington law, for-
bidding punitive damages, rather than Florida law, allowing such dam-
ages. Again, the court primarily analyzed the relative purposes behind
the two states' rules. Traditional interest analysis probably would have
called for application of Florida law here since defendant was a Florida
bank and, presumably, the purpose behind Florida's punitive damages
law was to punish and deter wrongdoers. Instead of analyzing the case
this way, however, the court emphasized the overriding importance of
Washington's policy of not allowing punitive damages.674
The most recent supreme court case is a 1984 wrongful death action,
Southwell v. Widing Transportation, Inc. 675 In Southwell, a British Co-
lumbia motorcyclist was killed in British Columbia when he was hit by a
steel casting which dislodged from a flatbed truck. The truck belonged to
an Oregon corporation and was operated by one of its employees, a
Washington resident. The administrator of decedent's estate filed a
wrongful death complaint against the truck's owner and the driver. The
defendants answered contending that British Columbia law, which did
not allow recovery of lost future earnings, governed. Plaintiff moved to
strike the affirmative defense but the trial court denied the motion. The
supreme court held that it had an insufficient factual basis upon which to
make a choice of law decision. Nevertheless, in the course of its opinion,
the court made clear its commitment to the Johnson "2-step analysis,"
672. Id. at 584, 555 P.2d at 1002. The court relied heavily on the decision of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in a similar limitation of damages case, Hurtado v. Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d 74,
522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). There, as here, the deterrence rationale was utilized
to create a false conflict out of an apparent, unprovided-for case.
673. 96 Wash. 2d 692, 635 P.2d 441 (1981).
674. Id. at 700, 635 P.2d at 445.
675. 101 Wash. 2d 200, 676 P.2d 477 (1984).
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involving section 145 and interest analysis. 676
The Washington Court of Appeals, in Mentry v. Smith, 677 applied
an interest analysis to find an Oregon guest statute inapplicable in a suit
between Washington residents arising from an auto accident in Oregon.
The court used a contact-counting approach rather than an interest anal-
ysis in two other cases.678
The Washington Supreme Court cases are not easily categorized. In
Johnson, the court came to consider the relative governmental interests
only after first deciding that the contacts listed at section 145 were incon-
clusive. Similarly, the most recent case, Southwell, appears to advocate a
twin-track approach in which section 145 and governmental interest
analysis are equally considered. Washington is best described, therefore,
as a Second Restatement jurisdiction. However, its emphasis upon dis-
covering and effectuating the purposes and policies supporting the rele-
vant laws is greater than in most other Second Restatement states.
West Virginia
West Virginia courts follow the lex loci delicti rule in tort and the
lex loci contractus rule in contract. There have been several modem reaf-
firmations of each rule. Indeed, in none of these cases did the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals even consider adopting a modem choice
of law theory. The continued vitality of the traditional rules in West
Virginia is simply undeniable.
The leading case in tort is Hopkins v. Grubb.679 In Hopkins, two
West Virginians were involved in an accident in Virginia, a guest statute
state. The court applied the Virginia guest statute under the rule of lex
676. Johnson established a 2-step analysis applicable to such cases. The first step
involves an evaluation of the contacts with each interested jurisdiction. See Restate-
ment § 145. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative impor-
tance with respect to the particular issue. The approach is not merely to count
contacts, but rather to consider which contacts are most significant and to determine
where these contacts are found. Johnson, 87 Wash. 2d at 581, 555 P.2d at 997. The
second step involves an evaluation of the interests and public policies of potentially
concerned jurisdictions. The extent of the interest of each potentially interested state
should be determined on the basis, among other things, of the purpose sought to be
achieved by their relevant local law rules and the particular issue involved.
Id. at 204, 676 P.2d at 480.
677. 18 Wash. App. 668, 571 P.2d 589 (1977).
678. See Hepler v. CBS, 39 Wash. App. 838, 847-48, 696 P.2d 596, 602, cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 343 (1985); Colorado Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash. App. 610, 620-21, 668
P.2d 1304, 1310-11 (1983).
679. 160 W. Va. 71, 230 S.E.2d 470 (1977).
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loci delicti.680 The Hopkins court reaffirmed a Babcock-era decision in
which the Ohio guest statute was applied in a suit between West Virginia
residents over an accident occurring in Ohio.681 Indeed, in an even ear-
lier case, the court held, on facts precisely the same as in Hopkins, that
Virginia's guest statute governed. 682 The court's reflexive, almost mat-
ter-of-fact, application of lex loci delicti has not been confined to guest
statute cases. In a series of recent cases, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, 683 as well as federal courts, 68 4 have held the place of
injury rule applicable to other tort issues as well.
The court's application of lex loci contractus in contract is without
exception. The case most often cited is Michigan National Bank v. Mat-
tingly,685 which involved a retail installment contract with a rate of inter-
est usurious under the law of West Virginia but legal in Ohio. The
borrowers in that case were West Virginia residents. The retail install-
ment contract covered a trailer home purchased in Ohio. There was a
factual dispute as to where the contract was signed, but there was no
dispute as to the applicable choice of law rule.686 The jury found that the
contract had been signed at the borrower's home in West Union, West
Virginia. On this basis, the supreme court of appeals applied West Vir-
ginia law.
680. "This unfortunate incident, having occurred in the State of Virginia, the substantive
law of that state will be applied." Id. at 73, 230 S.E.2d at 472.
681. "Inasmuch as the automobile accident occurred in Ohio, the right to recover must be
measured and determined in accordance with the laws of that state." Thornsbury v. Thorn-
sbury, 147 W. Va. 771, 773, 131 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1963).
682. See Dodrill v. Young, 143 W. Va. 429, 102 S.E.2d 724 (1958). "As the collision in
which the plaintiff sustained the injuries of which she complains occurred in the Common-
wealth of Virginia the right of the plaintiff to recover damages for such injuries must be deter-
mined by the laws of that state as applied by its courts." Id. at 431, 102 S.E.2d at 726.
683. See Paul v. International Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 555-56 (W. Va. 1986); Perkins v. Doe,
350 S.E.2d 711, 713 (W. Va. 1986); Ireland v. Britton, 157 W. Va. 327, 331, 201 S.E.2d 109,
112 (1973); Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 156 W. Va. 444, 448, 195 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1973);
Lambert v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 155 W. Va. 397, 403-04, 184 S.E.2d 118, 122 (1971);
Edwards v. Lynch, 154 W. Va. 388, 390, 175 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1970).
684. See O'Brien v. Tri-State Oil Tool Indust., 566 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (S.D. W. Va.
1983), stating:
These cases reflect a consistent and unswerving application of lex loci delicti by West
Virginia courts. The opinions in the above cited cases do not even contain a sugges-
tion of dissatisfaction with or criticism of this venerable conflicts rule. These cases
commend but one conclusion-lex loci delicti has been, and continues to be, the
controlling conflicts of law doctrine in West Virginia.
See also In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litig., 381 F. Supp. 931, 946 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
685. 158 W. Va. 621, 212 S.E.2d 754 (1975).
686. "The applicable rule is clear. The law of the state in which it was made and to be
performed governs a contract's construction when it is involved in litigation in the courts of
this State." Id. at 624, 212 S.E.2d at 756.
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The court recently reaffirmed the principle of lex loci contractus on
several occasions.6 87 On one such occasion, in General Electric Co. v.
Keyser, 688 the court actually utilized parts of the Second Restatement,
but it ultimately rested its decision on the place of making rule. In Gen-
eral Electric, a West Virginia resident signed a guaranty on three promis-
sory notes, agreeing to assume secondary liability for the repayment of
certain debts owed by a California corporation to a New York corpora-
tion. When the borrower defaulted and filed for bankruptcy, the lender
sued the West Virginia guarantor for the balance due. The guarantor
defended on the ground that the interest rate was usurious. The guaran-
tor counterclaimed under a West Virginia usury statute, which provided
the debtor of a usurious loan with a cause of action for damages against
the lender in the amount of four times the interest agreed to be paid.689
The supreme court of appeals held that California law, the place of the
making, governed the question of whether the interest rate was usuri-
ous. 690 Under California law, the interest rate was indeed usurious. The
court then held that a separate question was presented as to the issue of
what state's remedial laws would be applied. In the guaranty agreement,
the parties provided that New York law would govern. The court, how-
ever, relying on section 187(2) of the Second Restatement, held this
clause ineffective both because New York had no substantial relationship
to the parties or the transaction and because that state's law, which ap-
parently would have precluded the defense of usury altogether, was con-
trary to the fundamental public policy against usury in West Virginia. 691
The court then relied on the place of making rule again in determining
that California law would provide the appropriate remedy.692 The coun-
terclaim based on the West Virginia statute was therefore dismissed. The
court noted, however, that the result reached was also consistent with
section 194 of the Second Restatement, which it praised but did not
adopt.693
687. See First Nat'l Bank of Grayson v. Whaley, 168 W. Va. 327, 284 S.E.2d 618, 619
(1981); see also General Elec. Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289, 292 (W. Va. 1981); Pemco Corp.
v. Rose, 163 W. Va. 420, 424, 257 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1979).
688. 275 S.E.2d 289 (W. Va. 1981).
689. See W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1986).
690. General Electric, 275 S.E.2d at 292.
691. Id. at 293-95.
692. Id. at 295.
693. We need not today adopt the Restatement view, however, because West Virginia
law supports the application of California law. West Virginia traditional conflicts of
law rule for contracts is set out in Michigan National Bank v. Mattingly... where we
said that a contract will be construed under the laws of the state in which it was
made and to be performed when it is involved in litigation in the courts of this state.
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Whether General Electric signals a trend toward eventual adoption
of the Second Restatement in West Virginia is uncertain. For now, how-
ever, West Virginia remains a First Restatement state in both contract
and tort.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin was one of the first states to depart from the traditional
rules of the First Restatement. In time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted Professor Leflar's five choice-influencing considerations. That
approach remains extant today.
Quite early, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed its dissatisfac-
tion with the place of injury rule in tort. In the pre-Babcock case of
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co.,694 the court held that Wiscon-
sin law governed spousal immunity in a direct action suit brought by a
Wisconsin woman against her husband's insurer for an accident occur-
ring in California, which at that time was an immunity state. Then, in
Wilcox v. Wilcox,695 the court abandoned lex loci delicti entirely. This
time the court used an interest analysis approach in holding that the Ne-
braska guest statute did not bar a suit between Wisconsin spouses over an
automobile accident occurring in Nebraska. Wisconsin had a vital inter-
est in apportioning liability between two of its citizens, but Nebraska had
no interest in protecting a Wisconsin host from ingratitude or a Wiscon-
sin insurer from the risk of fraud. The court cited what is now section
145 of the Second Restatement, but it declined to make that rule its
own.
69 6
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first adopted the Leflar factors in
1967 in Heath v. Zellmer.697 The case was the mirror image of Wilcox:
two Indiana residents, a state with a guest statute, were involved in an
accident in Wisconsin. The court held that this fact pattern presented a
Id. In addition, see New v. Tac & C. Energy, Inc. 355 S.E.2d 629, 630-31 (W. Va. 1987),
where the supreme court held that the Second Restatement would be applied in cases where
application of the place of making and place of performance rules yield different results.
694. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 138, 95 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1959).
695. 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
696. The concern, therefore, of the courts must not be merely with the contacts
quantatively, but with them qualitatively in light of policy considerations. We there-
fore conclude that we cannot accept invariably the order of importance that the Ten-
tative Draft No. 9 of the Restatement of Conflicts has assigned to various contacts,
although in general we agree with the order of importance assigned. However, the
weight depends on their relevancy to the policies of the place of the wrong and the
forum.
Id. at 634, 133 N.W.2d at 417.
697. 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
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true conflict between the foreign states' desire to protect gracious hosts
and Wisconsin's need to deter negligent driving on its roads. The court
resolved this true conflict by applying Leflar's five choice-influencing
considerations. In applying these factors, the court held that factors four
and five required application of Wisconsin law: the Indiana guest statute
would frustrate the forum's twin governmental interests of compensating
injured plaintiffs and deterring negligent driving in Wisconsin; Wiscon-
sin's rule of common law liability was the better rule of law. 698
In a pair of cases decided the following year, the supreme court
again applied the fourth and fifth Leflar factors, and again found Wiscon-
sin law applicable. In Zelinger v. State Sand and Gravel Co.,699 an Illi-
nois mother and her daughter were injured when their automobile
collided with a truck owned by the defendant Wisconsin corporation.
The accident occurred in Wisconsin. Mother and daughter brought an
action for damages, and Bernard Zelinger sought recovery for emotional
damages caused by the injuries to his wife and daughter. The defendant
sought contribution from the mother for payments made by the defend-
ant on account of Bernard Zelinger's claim of emotional distress and his
daughter's injury claim. The counterclaim pitted the mother against her
husband and daughter. The counterclaim was therefore impermissible
under the law of Illinois, both because Illinois retained the concepts of
spousal and parental immunity and because the Illinois guest statute pre-
cluded a suit by a guest passenger against a host driver. However, the
court held each of these Illinois laws inapplicable, and allowed the coun-
terclaim. This time, the court relied exclusively on the better rule of law
inquiry, having found neither state's governmental interest
predominant. 7°°
698. Id. at 600-04, 151 N.W.2d at 674-76. As to the better rule of law inquiry, the court
said that "the application of the rule of ordinary negligence, rather than gross negligence or
'wanton or willful' conduct, makes better socioeconomic sense in modem America. It is the
sounder law. The Indiana law is an anachronism." Id. at 602, 151 N.W.2d at 675. The first
three Leflar factors were, as usual, held to be irrelevant in the case of unintentional torts.
699. 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968).
700. In Heath, we detailed our judgment of a host-guest statute characterizing such
law as archaic and not justified in the law of torts in this modem day. Likewise, the
interspousal immunity has little justification. It was based upon the common-law
theory of unity of person and that person was the husband. The status of women in
our society with rights as well as immunities and duties is now recognized and the
wife as a legal person is equal to her husband. Likewise, this state sees no social need
for the existence of the doctrine of parental immunity but rather its existence works
an injustice to the child .... In our view the existence of parental immunity in torts
is not the better law.
Id. at 112-13, 156 N.W.2d at 472-73.
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In Conklin v. Homer,701 the court was again faced with an apparent
false conflict calling for application of a foreign guest statute. As it did in
Heath, however, the court applied Wisconsin common law by using of a
two-step approach, combining interest analysis and the Leflar factors.
Wisconsin had a substantial interest in this suit between two Illinois resi-
dents over a car accident in Wisconsin, because it was the forum and
because the Wisconsin legislature's refusal to enact a guest statute ex-
pressed a policy in favor of deterring negligent driving on Wisconsin
roads. Thus, a true conflict was presented, and the court evaluated the
choice-influencing considerations. This analysis was precisely the same
as it had been in Heath: the first three factors were irrelevant; factors
four and five pointed toward the application of Wisconsin law.
Up to this point, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had espoused a two-
step approach to conflicts questions. In Hunter v. Royal Indemnity
Co.,702 however, the court abandoned the interest-analysis component
and moved directly to a consideration of the Leflar factors. No longer
would the court first determine whether a "true" or "false" conflict ex-
isted. The two-step technique of Heath was now only one step.703 The
court also announced a presumption that forum law would apply when-
ever application of the five Leflar factors produced an inconclusive re-
sult.704 Nevertheless, the court applied Ohio law to prohibit a suit by an
injured worker against a co-employee where the injured party had al-
701. 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
702. 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
703. We deem this method of analysis a redundancy. No useful purpose is served by
a preliminary analysis that only tells us our problem is difficult. Moreover, the same
considerations are in part likely to be tediously reiterated in each of the two steps.
More importantly, by using the two-step analysis, what appears to be an easy choice
is likely to be resolved at the first stage without a proper evaluation of the five choice-
influencing considerations we adopted in Heath.
While the Wilcox analysis well served its purpose where once made the choice of
law was apparent, we deem it more appropriate merely to determine whether there is
a conflict, le., will the choice of one law as compared to another determine the out-
come. Once that is decided and the facts on their face reveal that to apply any of
multiple choices of law would not constitute mere officious intermeddling, in the
constitutional sense, the analysis should proceed with the law-selecting process based
on the five factors approved in Heath.
Id. at 598, 204 N.W.2d at 902.
704. When a conflict exists that may constitutionally be determined by the choice of
the law other than the forum, we are obliged to make the choice in light of the
choice-influencing considerations. While it may be difficult to dispel innate parochial
preference, the resolution of a conflict ought not be skewed by a forum preference.
Nevertheless, if the choice-influencing considerations do not indicate that the foreign
law is appropriate, the conflict should be resolved by the application of forum law.
Id. at 600, 204 N.W.2d at 903.
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ready received workers' compensation benefits and Wisconsin's only con-
nection with the case was as site of the accident. The court found that
applying Ohio law served the consideration of predictability of results,
and that the Wisconsin law favoring compensation was not demonstrably
better than the Ohio law barring recovery.705
The last case decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was Lichter
v. Fritsch.70 6 In Lichter, an Illinois resident negligently left his car un-
locked, with the keys in the ignition, in the parking lot of an Illinois
mental hospital. A patient at the hospital drove off in the car, eventually
traveled into Wisconsin, and caused an accident, which injured the plain-
tiff, a Wisconsin resident. Under Illinois law the owner of the car was
liable to the plaintiff, but under Wisconsin law he was not. The supreme
court applied the Illinois law. This time, three of the five considerations
were served by applying the foreign law: predictability of results, mainte-
nance of interstate order and, oddly, the governmental interests of the
forum.70 7 Additionally, this case is notable for the fact that the court
found Wisconsin law to be the better law, and yet declined to apply it.7o8
In the context of tort cases, the Leflar theory has become the bench-
mark in Wisconsin.70 9 Leflar's test has also been applied twice to find
Wisconsin's statute of limitations applicable.710
705. As to the better rule of law analysis, see Hunter, 57 Wis. 2d at 610, 204 N.W.2d at
908, which stated:
The bar of co-employees' actions does not represent merely past thinking. The trend,
to the extent that it is discernible, appears to be toward barring these actions rather
than permitting them. We cannot conclude, as we did in Heath, Zelinger, and Conk-
lin, that Wisconsin's rule of liability unmistakably represents the better law.
706. 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252 N.W.2d 360 (1977).
707. Id. at 186, 252 N.W.2d at 363-64. Rather than relying on the specific Wisconsin law
implicated by the facts of this case, a non-compensatory law, the court generalized and found
that Wisconsin had a broader interest in compensating injured plaintiffs. The plaintiff here
was from Wisconsin.
708. The result in this case is astounding from a conflicts point of view. Lichter is proba-
bly the only case ever decided under the Leflar regime in which the forum found its own law to
be better but nevertheless applied foreign law. This is truly unusual when one considers that
the choice of law in tort cases ordinarily comes down to the last two factors and one of these is
exclusively concerned with serving the interests of the forum. Moreover, even the better law
inquiry is heavily forum-favoring since most judges feel their own law, particularly the com-
mon law which they helped forge, is the better law.
709. See American Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d 258, 263, 369 N.W.2d 168,
171-72 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (Leflar factors mandate application of Wisconsin "collateral
source" rule in lieu of Minnesota no-fault automobile insurance act); see also Tillett v. J. I.
Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1985); Grabski v. Finn, 630 F. Supp. 1037, 1043
(E.D. Wis. 1986) (recent federal cases also applying the Leflar factors in tort).
710. See Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. H.O. Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 54, 64-67, 216 N.W.2d 239, 244-45
(1974); Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 201-04, 206
N.W.2d 414, 418-19 (1973).
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The applicability of Leflar's factors in contract, however, is a bit
unsettled. In the first case to reject lex loci contractus, Urhammer v.
Olson,711 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a center of gravity ap-
proach rather than the Leflar factors.712 Urhammer was an easy case for
applying Minnesota law to an insurance contract since all contacts ex-
cept the insurer's place of business were in that state.
It was in its second contracts case, however, that the supreme court
adopted its current approach. Haines v. Mid-Century Insurance Co.71 3
involved a direct action suit by a Minnesota resident against her hus-
band's Minnesota insurer for injuries suffered as a result of her husband's
negligent driving in Wisconsin. The husband's insurance policy con-
tained a family-exclusion clause, under which the insurer was not to be
held liable for bodily injuries suffered by members of the insured's house-
hold. Family-exclusion clauses had been declared unenforceable by the
Wisconsin legislature. The court noted its adoption of the center of grav-
ity approach in Urhammer, and stated that section 188 of the Second
Restatement was "the embodiment of this approach. ' 714 At one point in
the opinion, the court went so far as to say that section 188 provided the
rule of decision. 715 Unfortunately, the court found its cursory review of
the section 188 contact points to be inconclusive, and it proceeded to
analyze the case under the Leflar factors. It found Wisconsin law appli-
cable, even though all parties were Minnesota residents: the only rele-
vant factor here was the application of the better rule of law; Wisconsin's
rule precluding enforcement of the exclusionary clause was held to be the
better rule of law.716
In 1977, the supreme court again cited section 188. The court of-
fered no analysis, instead merely summarily affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing that Iowa law governed an insurance contract since it was the site of
the insured.717 In the most recent supreme court case to engage in choice
711. 39 Wis. 2d 447, 159 N.W.2d 688 (1968).
712. See id. at 450, 159 N.W.2d at 689: "We now adopt the grouping-of-contacts ap-
proach for the resolution of conflicts questions pertaining to the validity and rights created by
the provisions of a disputed contract."
713. 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
714. Id. at 446, 177 N.W.2d at 330.
715. "The particular issue here is as to the validity of the family-exclusion provision and
we are governed in the selection of the law to apply to that issue by the method of analysis
embodied in the grouping of contacts approach of sec. 188, Restatement." Id. at 449, 177
N.W.2d at 332.
716. Id. at 451, 177 N.W.2d at 333.
717. See Handal v. American Farmers Mut. Casualty Co., 79 Wis. 2d 67, 74 n.2, 255
N.W.2d 903, 906 n.2 (1977).
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of law analysis, Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,718 the court used the
Leflar factors exclusively. It found that all five of the choice-influencing
considerations pointed to application of Wisconsin law.719
The two most recent contract cases, Haines and Schlosser, indicate
the Wisconsin Supreme Court intends to apply Leflar across the board.
However, the federal cases applying choice of law analysis in contract are
wildy inconsisted. 720 A pair of court of appeals decisions indicate that
choice of law clauses will usually be given effect.7 2 1
Wyoming
The Wyoming Supreme Court has so far declined to adopt a modem
choice of law theory. Conflicts inquiries in this state are still guided by
the rules of the First Restatement.
The prevailing rule was announced in the 1954 case of Ball v.
Ball,72 2 in which a Montana minor sued his father for injuries suffered in
the crash of an airplane piloted by the father. The crash occurred in
Montana where the suit was barred.723 The court remarked that the
rule of lex loci delicti was "supported by undoubted authority," as, in
fact, it was at the time.724
The court, in 1972 declined an opportunity to adopt the Second Re-
statement in Brown v. Riner.725 In that case, the plaintiff was injured in
an automobile accident at a Wyoming air force base. Both the plaintiff
and the car's driver were Colorado residents. Colorado and Wyoming
718. 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978).
719. Id. at 239-40, 271 N.W.2d at 885-86.
720. See Process Accessories Co. v. Balston, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 448, 449-50 (E.D. Wis.
1986) (Second Restatement); Anderson v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 618 F. Supp.
262, 268 (W.D. Wis. 1985); (Leflar) Hammer v. Road America, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 467, 469
(E.D. Wis. 1985) (Leflar), aff'd, 793 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986); Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud
Tractors, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 208, 214 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (grouping of contacts); Matter of
Kochell, 36 Bankr. 766, 767 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (grouping of contacts); Rototron Corp. v. Lake
Shore Burial Vault Co., 553 F. Supp. 691, 695-96 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (Second Restatement),
aff'd, 712 F.2d 1214 (7th Cir. 1983).
721. See Hammel v. Ziegler Financing Corp., 113 Wis. 2d 73, 76, 334 N.W.2d 913, 915
(Ct. App. 1983); First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Madison v. Nicolaou, 85 Wis. 2d 393, 397-400,
270 N.W.3d 582, 584-86 (Ct. App. 1978), appeal dismissed, 87 Wis. 2d 360, 274 N.W.2d 704
(1979). But see Sersted v. American Can Co., 535 F. Supp. 1072, 1078-79 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(applying § 187 of the Second Restatement in rejecting parties' choice of Ohio law).
722. 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
723. The defendant consented to being sued in Wyoming. Id. at 35-36, 269 P.2d at 303.
Sheridan, Wyoming, where the suit was filed, was apparently the nearest city to the Balls'
home in Big Horn County, Montana. It was also the city where plaintiff was hospitalized
following the accident. Id at 34-35, 269 P.2d at 303.
724. Id. at 37, 269 P.2d at 304.
725. 500 P.2d 524 (Wyo. 1972).
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each had guest statutes, but there was some evidence that the plaintiff
would not have been considered a guest under the Colorado statute. The
court flatly rejected the plaintiff's request to apply the Colorado statute
on the basis of the Second Restatement. 726
Finally, in Duke v. Housen,727 the court utilized the Wyoming bor-
rowing statute to apply the New York statute of limitations to a claim for
tortious infection with venereal disease. The plaintiff argued for applica-
tion of Wyoming's longer statute of limitations. The court noted that
application of the Wyoming borrowing statute, which directed its atten-
tion to the limitations statute of the state where the cause of action arose,
was "entirely consistent with the past utterances of this court with re-
spect to causes of action arising outside the state of Wyoming." 728 The
court cited its decision in Ball and quoted from a legal encyclopedia ref-
erence to the place of injury rule.729 A Tenth Circuit panel invoked
Duke v. Housen and the lex loci delicti rule as authority in applying a
Wyoming's workers' compensation statute, to bar a suit by an injured
Wyoming worker against his Colorado coemployee for an automobile ac-
cident which occurred while the two were on company business in Wyo-
ming.730 A federal district court has held, citing the First Restatement,
that Wyoming courts applying lex loci delicti would apply the law of the
state of plaintiff's domicle in defamation cases.731
There have been no reported decisions in Wyoming involving choice
of law in contract. Undoubtedly, the Wyoming Supreme Court would
rely upon its lex loci delicti holdings as authority for applying the tradi-
tional rules in contract as well.
III. Conclusion
In this Article, I have attempted to gather in one place the signifi-
cant choice of law decisions in every state and the District of Columbia,
and to provide litigants and judges with a reference which will enable
726. Id. at 526.
727. 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979).
728. Id. at 342.
729. Duke, 589 P.2d at 342. The court cited to 15A C.J.S. Conflict ofLaws § 12(2) (1967),
which now reads:
For many years it has been thoroughly established as a general rule that the lex loci
delicti, or the law of the place where the tort has been committed, is the law which
governs and is to be applied with respect to the substantive phases of torts or the
actions therefore, and determines the question of whether or not an act or omission
gives rise to a right of action or civil liability for tort.
730. See Venes v. Heck, 642 F.2d 380, 383 n.5 (10th Cir. 1981).
731. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (D. Wyo. 1986).
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them to determine the choice of law rules currently in use in their
jurisdictions.
The above survey has revealed that there is substantial disagreement
among the courts in the area of choice of law methodology. The trend
away from the traditional rules of lex loci delicti and lex loci contractus
continues. From this common point of departure, however, courts have
gone in variant directions.
About half of all states adopting a modem theory have settled on
the most significant relationship test of the Second Restatement. The
Restatement is a curious montage of virtually every choice of law theory
imaginable, all brought together in one, almost undecipherable text. Its
enactment, by a thirteen to twelve vote of the American Law Institute's
Choice of Law council in 1971, appears to have produced varying effects
in the courts. On the one hand, the Second Restatement provides courts
with a ready means of escape from the harshness of the traditional con-
flict of laws rules. On the other hand, the promulgation of the Second
Restatement has had a noticeable inhibitory effect on development of
other choice of law methodologies. Many courts behave as if the Second
Restatement were the final consummation of all modem choice of law
theories, with all other methodologies subsumed therein, never to appear
again. Since the Second Restatement approach has evolved in the last
fifteen years, there is evidence that the expansion of other theories has
been aborted.
For instance, Professor Currie's finely-tuned method of governmen-
tal interest analysis has been largely relegated to a secondary role in con-
flicts jurisprudence. It is used, with a few notable exceptions, not as a
method of its own, but as one of several considerations listed at section 6
of the Second Restatement to be used in the discovery of the most signifi-
cant relationship. Likewise, Professor Leflar's analysis has been incorpo-
rated in various provisions of section 6, but is no longer being adopted as
a choice of law approach in its own right, as had been the case in the
years immediately preceding adoption by the ALI of the most significant
relationship test.
In short, the most notable event to take place in conflicts jurispru-
dence during the last twenty years has had both a broadening and inhib-
iting effect on the development of theory into practice. Certainly the
Second Restatement is a far superior mechanism for resolving choice of
law disputes than was its predecessor. Unfortunately, judicial skill in
manipulating this difficult test has varied. Continued growth and devel-
opment in this area of the law will require an increased sophistication
among the members of the legal profession. An ability to recognize and
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distinguish among choice of law systems is an essential ingredient in this
growth of understanding.
Appendix
The following chart indicates in capsule form the choice of law methods
currently in use in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
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Tort 18 16 1 5 7 1 1 2
TOTAL Contract 23 16 5 4 3 0 0 0
